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Abstract  
The lack of complete harmonization at EU level during the electricity and 
telecommunications reforms allowed for regulatory competition between the 
Member States.  The aim of the thesis is to explore what regulatory lessons can be 
learnt out of the comparison of the different regulations of the UK and Germany.  
The major differences between these regulations concern:  
1) unbundling,  
2) regulatory authorities and 
3) Significant Market Power (SMP) regulation. 
Chapter 1 gives a general basis, through the analysis of the specific regulatory 
outcomes (prices, market shares and consumer satisfaction) then a more 
qualitative analysis of the separate legal issues above is carried out in Chapters 2, 3 
and 4.  
Chapter 2 focuses primarily on past regulatory differences in vertical separation of 
the network: in general a more separationist approach in telecommunications than 
in electricity.  We found that this difference is justified since stronger separation 
correlated with more companies challenging the incumbent in the electricity sector, 
while we found no evidence for this in the telecommunications sector.   
Chapter 3 assesses whether the UK could benefit from the creation of a super-
regulator similar to Germany’s Bundesnetzagentur, by merging Ofgem (the energy 
regulator) and Ofcom (telecommunications regulator).  We found that since there is 
no visible convergence yet between the energy and telecommunications sectors, it 
would only make sense to merge the UK regulators if this would lead to enhanced 
cost-effectiveness.   
Chapter 4 assesses the difference between the electricity and the 
telecommunications regulation in terms of the use of SMP regulation.  SMP 
regulation is an integral part of the telecommunications regulation, but the concept 
is not applied in the electricity regulations.  We assess whether SMP regulation 
could benefit the electricity regulations.  The conclusion is that the introduction of 
an SMP-style regulation could be a practical, politically feasible and potentially 
beneficial alternative solution. 
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I. Introduction  
 
1. Outline of the thesis  
 
Reforms in the EU network industries have now been going on for about 20 years 
(and even longer in the UK) with different success in terms of creating competition.  
The lack of complete harmonisation at EU level during this time allowed for 
regulatory competition between the Member States.1  Arguably, achieving full 
harmonisation in a single step at the beginning of the reforms by EU law in a given 
field may actually prove rather disadvantageous and unlikely to be politically 
achievable.  Allowing for the implementation of different regulatory options means 
that several regulatory solutions can be tried, and then the most efficient ones can 
later be selected and made compulsory.2  This environment also provides good 
opportunity for comparative regulatory research.            
The aim of the thesis is to explore whether regulatory solutions could be adapted 
from one sector/country to another in order to improve its competitiveness.  This is 
done by comparing different solutions applied in the UK and Germany.3  The reason 
for choosing these countries is that they are comparable in terms of size and 
development of their economies, while their laws in many respects differ 
significantly, which allows an analysis of the effects of different rules. 
Accordingly, the actual regulatory issues this thesis analyses are the major 
differences between the regulations that apply to these countries’ electricity and 
telecommunications sectors. These are:  
                                               
1
 CF Daniel C. Esty, Damien Geradin, ‘Regulatory co-operation’ (2000) 3 Journal of International 
Economic Law, 235, 236 
2
 Pierre Larouche, ‘Coordination of European and Member State regulatory policy. Horisontal, 
vertical and transversal aspects’ (2004) 5 (3-4) Journal of Network Industries, 277,  280 
3
 Generally the EU enacted directives which has to be implemented by the Member States. 
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1) unbundling of the networks (which are arguably natural monopolies and 
therefore bottlenecks in the sectors),  
2) features of the regulatory authorities and 
3) the use of significant market power (SMP) regulation. 
The thesis comprises of two retrospective chapters (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2) and 
two forward-looking ones (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4).  Chapter 1 sets the scene and 
gives the general basis, through the analysis of the specific regulatory outcomes 
(namely prices, market share and consumer satisfaction) then a more qualitative 
analysis of the separate legal issues is carried out in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  Among 
these, Chapter 2 focuses primarily on past regulatory differences, while Chapter 3 
and 4 looks at some regulatory solutions’ possible future applicability. 
  
1.1 First Chapter (Regulatory outcomes) 
 
In order to be able to provide recommendations on preferable regulatory solutions, 
two issues need to be understood first:  
1. which solutions (in which sectors) are associated with better outcomes and  
2. to what extent are these results connected to the regulation itself. 
Chapter 1 therefore seeks to answer these questions by assessing the outcomes of 
the reforms (based on price, market share and consumer satisfaction tendencies), 
at the same time searching for correlations between changes in the regulatory 
solutions and the regulatory outcomes, i.e. whether there are signs of the 
regulation affecting the outcomes.    
According to the assessment of price and market concentration tendencies, the 
telecommunications reform seems to have the best trends in both countries 
concerned.  The electricity reforms appear less successful: however the tendencies 
in the UK’s electricity sector are still much better than the German’s (especially in 
the early stages).  The assessment of the consumer surveys’ results is less 
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straightforward which may be the result of this data being based on subjective 
perceptions.    
The analysis has found limited evidence for changes in the regulatory solutions 
correlating with the data.  This does not mean that the different regulatory 
solutions have no measurable effect, but rather that in order to be able to evaluate 
these regulatory solutions a more qualitative approach is necessary.  This leads to 
the next three chapters.   
 
1.2 Second Chapter (Unbundling) 
 
The aim of this chapter is to assess whether increasingly stricter separation of the 
networks in the electricity sector, and predominantly simple access regulation in 
telecommunications, is justified, or whether stricter separation (like in electricity) 
would benefit the telecommunications sector. 
The assessment is done in two parts.  The first part looks at the theory behind 
vertical separation and concludes that – while integration can lead to enhanced 
efficiency – more separation should lead to better access to the networks in both 
sectors.   
The second part tests this in practice.  The second part describes the regulatory 
developments in the UK and Germany and assesses whether the incumbent’s 
market share (which in practice is arguably the most relevant indicator4) shows 
correlations with past regulatory changes.  The assessment finds that in electricity 
stricter regulation is followed by the incumbents’ market share loss, but there is no 
evidence for this in telecommunication, which justifies the different policies for the 
                                               
4
 Regulators and competition authorities rely on market shares when analysing market power and 
competition on a market.  Besides, other factors relevant for the analysis (entry barriers, buyer 
power etc.) are not hugely different in the two countries. 
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sectors.  This is likely to be the result of the different techno-economic factors, 
which signals the importance of non-regulatory features.  In the electricity sector, 
the network is still a true natural monopoly, while in telecommunications the 
network-based services are more and more contested by different infrastructure, 
and different technologies which is a great advantage from the perspective of 
competition. 
 
1.3 Third Chapter (Institutions) 
 
If the regulation affects the regulated sector, than the institution responsible for 
the enforcement of the regulation may also have an effect on it, and improving the 
regulatory authority itself may enhance competition and benefit consumers.   
It can be established that currently, the UK operates single sector regulators in 
comparison to Germany’s multi sector regulator.5  However, there is a tendency 
leading towards multi sector regulators in both countries.  This raises several 
questions: what is the reason behind this trend of merging regulators?  Are multi 
sector regulators superior?  If they are superior, why did EU countries start merging 
regulators just now instead of creating them right at the start of the reforms?  
Would the UK be better off by creating a multi sector regulator, like the 
Bundesnetzagentur?  In answering these questions, the paper provides a 
framework of key institutional issues:  
 independence (especially being able to act free from political pressure),  
 accountability (to make sure the regulator is working to achieve the goals 
set for it),  
                                               
5
 In the UK there are two separate regulators for energy (electricity and gas) and 
telecommunications (electronic communications), in Germany one regulatory authority is 
responsible for the regulation of these two as well as a number of other sectors 
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 ability to resist capture (by capture the paper means capture from the 
industry, which leads to the regulator focusing more on benefitting the 
industry participants, then benefitting the consumers), 
 regulatory quality,  
 costs (efficiency).   
The chapter assesses how the different structural setups (single vs. multi sector 
regulators) influence the key institutional variables.   
The analysis suggests that single and multi-sector regulators have both important 
pros and cons.  For example a multi sector regulator is likely to achieve higher 
regulatory consistency, but can cater less for the different sectors’ different needs, 
or a multi sector regulator may be more resistant to capture but in case the 
regulator fails that has an impact on all the sectors governed.   
However, the pros can be maximized and the cons minimized by creating single 
sector regulators first and merge them as the markets mature.  As an example: 
capture takes time to develop, therefore the ability of resisting capture is less 
important initially.  At the same time an inexperienced regulator is more likely to 
fail, therefore it makes sense to spread the risk initially.  If the mergers are timed 
correctly (when there are clearly predictable benefits), the changes they bring will 
follow the changing institutional needs of the developing sectors. 
In terms of the UK we find that currently there seems to be no clear benefits out of 
a merger between Ofgem and Ofcom, therefore following the German example 
would not yet be justified. 
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1.4 Fourth Chapter (SMP regulation) 
 
SMP regulation is in a sense a hybrid of competition law and regulation.6  It was 
designed to enable regulatory intervention in a flexible way until competition 
becomes strong enough to make such interventions unnecessary.   
One main general (i.e. EU-wide) regulatory difference between the electricity and 
telecommunications regulations is that the latter uses SMP regulation, while the 
former does not (except in Hungary).  At the same time there is a growing political 
pressure for “change” in the way the electricity sectors are currently working (even 
in the UK, which is a pioneer in the area).  The chapter assesses whether SMP 
regulation could provide a solution for the electricity sector.  The paper introduces 
SMP regulation and discusses its pros and cons and then compares SMP regulation 
to the other major possible solutions; competition law only, government 
intervention, and ordinary regulation.  
The conclusion is that the introduction of an SMP-style regulation could be a 
practical, politically feasible and potentially beneficial alternative of these other 
solutions. 
 
2 Significance and originality 
 
The research concerns two sectors: electricity and telecommunications. The 
importance of these sectors – and, therefore, the research undertaken in this field 
– is highlighted by the fact that the telecommunications and electricity sectors each 
                                               
6
 Alexandre De Streel, ‘The new concept of "significant market power" in electronic 
communications: the hybridisation of the sectoral regulation by competition law’ 2003, 24(10) 
European Competition Law Review, 535 
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produce an input which is essential for almost the entire economy. Accordingly, if 
these sectors became more efficient, the respective cost for the rest of the 
economy decreases, which makes consumers directly better off, and enhances the 
European economy’s potential to compete internationally.  Both sectors are 
explicitly of key significance for the EU.  As energy is crucial for the European 
economy, the EU identified the issue as one of its top priorities, and as a matter of 
fact approximately 500 million consumers are affected by the EU reforms.  
Furthermore, the European telecommunications industry is the “backbone of 
Europe’s developing information society and the digital economy” and it is used 
more and more extensively by individuals and business users. 
The efficiency of these sectors depends on many different (technological, 
economic, legal etc.) factors.  This thesis focuses on the legal side of the subject.  
Generally speaking – the telecommunications reforms in Europe are considered to 
be more successful than the electricity reforms 7 which perhaps mean that there is 
more scope for electricity to learn from telecommunications, than the other way 
around.  The overarching theme of this thesis is to improve the regulation applied 
for these sectors by drawing conclusions from the comparisons that can be made 
by virtue of the regulatory competition in existence, taking into account the 
different features of the sectors.   
While harmonisation is one of the major goals of the EU, achieving full 
harmonisation in a single step by enacting EU law in a given field may actually prove 
rather disadvantageous.  The lack of harmonisation at EU level, and the regulatory 
competition that can arise out of this, offers an interesting environment to 
experiment with different regulatory solutions.  It would appear that less 
harmonisation and regulatory competition is beneficial at the beginning of a 
                                               
7
 CF F. Trillas, "Electricity and Telecommunication Reforms in the EU: Insights from the Economics of 
Federalism." (2010) IESE Working Paper WP-861. 17, Nicoletti, P. C. G. (2006). "Product Market 
Regulation in the Non-Manufacturing Sectors of OECD Countries: Measurement and Highlights." 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 530. 19 
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reform, when it is hard to forecast which rules are going to be more advantageous.  
In time, however, the results of the industries should justify the superiority of one 
legal solution to another and the national rules should be further harmonized in 
accordance with the best previous national practices. 8  The EU sector reforms 
followed this approach; the introduction of permissive EU regulation, that had 
options for different regulatory solutions, became more and more harmonized.   
The flexibility in the EU regulations gave scope for different regulatory solutions to 
be applied in the Member States, leading to a kind of regulatory competition 
between them.  This regulatory competition gives a unique research opportunity to 
compare different solutions, solutions that have actually been applied in practice 
(see the different regimes for vertical separation) which means that their track 
records can be compared.  Quantitative data can be used to assess these 
regulation, although in areas where a hypothetical future application is considered 
a more qualitative analysis is needed relying on the existing literature.  
The body of literature that looks at the EU reforms is well developed in general, 
although, while there are numerous studies concerning the telecommunications 
reforms, the literature on the electricity reforms is considerably scarcer.  There are 
comparative studies with different focus (legal, economic, political science or 
mixed), but these tend to compare electricity to gas rather than 
telecommunications.  This thesis fills a gap in the literature by providing a 
comparative legal analysis, contrasted with empirical data (where possible), in the 
field of electricity and telecommunications regulations of the UK and Germany.  
They are two of the largest and most developed economies in Europe and, 
therefore, represent important players within the EU regime.  The thesis also offers 
a unique approach since the research is interdisciplinary: while the primary focus is 
on the legal element, it is backed by economic and political science. 
                                               
8
 Pierre Larouche, ‘Coordination of European and Member State regulatory policy. Horizontal, 
vertical and transversal aspects’ (2004) 5 (3-4) Journal of Network Industries, 277,  280 
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3 The research questions   
 
The actual regulatory issues we look at are the ones where there are major 
differences between the regulation of the countries concerned and, therefore, 
where different legal solutions can be compared.  These are:  
1) unbundling of the networks (which are arguably natural monopolies and 
therefore constitutes bottlenecks in the sectors),  
2) features of the regulatory authorities and 
3) the use of significant market power (SMP) regulation. 
Ad. 1: Essentially, in terms of vertical separation the UK opted for more 
comprehensive reforms, while – especially initially – Germany introduced arguably 
the weakest regulations in the EU.  In terms of the electricity sector, the UK carried 
out strict vertical separation at the beginning of the reforms (1989) between the 
generation (competitive) and transmission9 (monopolistic) levels, and later on the 
distribution (monopolistic) and supply (levels) 10  while in Germany the sector 
remained integrated until EU law made separation compulsory (transmission until 
2005 and distribution 2007).11  Moreover, a system of negotiated third party access 
was initially used to ensure access to the production levels that were the 
bottlenecks of the sector (this option was later withdraw by EU law and only 
regulated third party access remained possible).   
The same attitude can be observed in the telecommunications reforms of the two 
countries: in the UK the telecommunications sector the network parts have been 
functionally separated,12 while in Germany no separation has been carried out. 
                                               
9
 By the Electricity Act 1989 
10
 By the Utilities Act 2000 
11
 Energy Act of 2005 (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) 
12
 BT Undertakings 2005 
10 
 
 
Ad. 2: In the UK, a separate regulator was established at the beginning of both the 
electricity and telecommunications reforms: Offer for electricity and Oftel for 
telecommunications. Also, in Germany a regulatory authority was made responsible 
for the regulation of the telecommunications sector. Interestingly, in the German 
electricity reform they experimented with a solution that did not include the 
establishment of a regulatory authority.  In theory, this self-regulation in a “club” 
arrangement – as was the case in Germany – could be beneficial.  The outcome of 
the experiment, however, seems to prove the contrary: the experiment did not turn 
out to be successful at all.  Later on, in line with the EU requirements, an electricity 
regulator was set up in Germany as well.  Germany is still a special case though, as 
the regulator that was established is responsible for the electricity, gas, 
telecommunications, postal and railway markets, altogether.  Regulatory mergers 
took place in the UK as well: Offer merged with Ofgas (the gas regulator) creating 
Ofgem a regulator responsible for the energy industry as a whole, and Oftel merged 
with the Radiocommunications Agency (who regulated the mobile sector together 
with Oftel), and the Broadcasting Standards and Independent Television 
Commission thereby Ocfom was created which regulates the communications 
industry.  These merged regulators still regulate a much narrower field than the 
German Bundesnetzagentur.  
 
Ad 3: The use of SMP regulation differs between the sectors concerned even on the 
EU level (in this respect there is no major difference between the UK and Germany 
but only between the sectors concerned): it is a key part of the telecommunications 
regulation, but none of the Member States (except for Hungary) uses SMP 
regulation as part of their electricity reform. 
 
The research questions concern the regulatory differences detailed above.  
Accordingly there are three main questions: 
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• Is the different attitude towards separating the network in the electricity 
regulation and the telecommunications sector justified as far as access is 
concerned? 
• Are multi sector regulators superior to single sector regulators?  Is merging 
the regulators a good strategy? 
• Could SMP regulation provide a solution for intervention in the electricity 
sector? 
  
4 The method used 
 
The thesis uses a comparative method in order to evaluate the certain regulatory 
solutions’ their role in a successful network utilities reform.  Different legal 
solutions may suit better different sectors.  Cross-sectoral comparison is carried out 
to see if the same sort of regulation seems to be beneficial in general.  Cross-
country comparison is undertaken in order to be able to analyse different 
regulatory solutions in the same sectors.  
There is a trade-off between the number of countries concerned and the depth of 
the research when the resources for the research are fixed.  This thesis considers 
only two countries, which allows for more detailed analysis.  Choosing the UK was 
based on the fact that the reforms here started earlier than in any other EU 
Member State, therefore they are perceived to be in the most mature state.  The 
reason for choosing Germany as the second country was that this way we concern 
countries that are comparable in terms of size and development of their 
economies, while their laws (in terms of vertical separation/access regulation, and 
their ways of creating regulatory authorities) contrast significantly, thus allowing an 
analysis of the effect of these different rules. 
The research questions are answered by different methods.  The first two chapters 
concern primarily past developments.  Since these chapters are more backwards 
looking there is more scope for using quantitative data.  The last two chapters, 
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however, concern fairly recent/possible future solutions, therefore the analyses in 
these chapters are different, more qualitative.  The following section outlines the 
methodologies by chapters: 
 
4.1 Chapter 1  
 
In order to be able to show what sort of regulatory solutions are necessary for a 
successful reform in Chapter 1 the sectors are analysed in terms of their results 
first.  There are many ways these reforms can be assessed, but there is no single 
“generally accepted” method.13  In this chapter price, market share tendencies and 
consumer satisfaction are used.  This is because these indicators are widely used by 
both public bodies and academics when assessing the reforms.   
The research is based on existing data retrieved from various sources: databases, 
published papers, regulators’ publications/annual reviews etc.  
Besides giving an overview of the regulatory outcomes the chapter undertakes to 
analyse whether there are (strong) correlations between regulatory changes and 
changes in the outcomes.  Firstly, a catalogue of the major changes in the 
regulatory issues concerned has been prepared.  The relevant part of this catalogue 
has then been contrasted to the data.  The aim is to assess whether regulatory 
changes aiming to enhance competition were actually followed by lower prices, 
lower market concentration and higher consumer satisfaction.  
 
4.2 Chapter 2 
 
The second chapter concerns vertical separation and access regulation answering 
the first research question (“is the different attitude towards separating the 
                                               
13
 Lesley Davies, Kathryn Wright, Catherine Waddams, ’Experience of Privatisation, Regulation and 
Competition: Lessons for Governments’ CCP Working Paper 05-5, 5 
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network in the electricity regulation and the telecommunications sector justified as 
far as access is concerned?”).  In answering the research question the paper 
considers theory and then this is contrasted to the practical results. 
The first part of the chapter analyses the logic behind vertical separation in order to 
facilitate access to the network, based on the existing literature.  In the second part 
the countries’ past experiences with different kinds of vertical separation is 
described, and then this is contrasted to the actual track record of these regulations 
to see whether the expectations (based on the theoretical analysis in the first part) 
can be shown to materialize in practice.  Data on market structure are taken from 
Chapter 1 and then the chapter assesses whether increased vertical separation was 
followed by less concentration (higher entry). 
 
4.3 Chapter 3  
 
This chapter looks at the different means in which a regulatory authority can be 
established (or not established at all) answering the second research question (“Are 
multi sector regulators superior to single sector regulators?  Is merging the 
regulators a good strategy?”).  Since this chapter concerns relatively recent 
developments and possible future application of a regulatory solution (creating 
multi-sector regulators) the analysis in this chapter is predominantly qualitative.  
The chapter uses a series of regulatory “values” (independence, accountability, 
capture, cost, regulatory quality) as proxies, and analyses how these change 
through the suggested institutional change.  This way a list of pros and cons of the 
multi-sector authorities is created.  Based on these pros and cons, further analysis 
leads to a roadmap that can be used to maximize the benefits out of institutional 
changes. 
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4.4 Chapter 4  
 
The last chapter analyses the applicability of SMP regulation in the electricity sector 
answering question 3 (“Could SMP regulation provide a solution for intervention in 
the electricity sector?”).  The crucial issue here is to assess whether the solution 
would be suitable to the electricity sector, or its features make it too specific for the 
telecommunications sector.  In order to analyse this issue, based on the existing 
literature the chapter first provides an overview of the key strengths and 
weaknesses of SMP regulation (as it is applied in the telecommunications sector).  
Building on these pros and cons, the next part analyses how SMP regulation could 
be used in the electricity sector to see whether the different features of the 
electricity sector would likely to put more emphasis on the pros/cons (relative to 
telecommunications).  Lastly, the analysis compares SMP regulation to other 
possible kinds of interventions in the electricity sector to see SMP regulations 
strengths and weaknesses vis a vis other solutions.  
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II. Chapter 1: Evaluating the regulatory reforms and the 
connection between regulation and the outcomes of 
the reforms 
 
Abstract 
 
The thesis concerns different legal aspects of the electricity and 
telecommunications reforms in the UK and Germany.  This chapter is dedicated to 
provide an overview of the regulatory changes concerned throughout the reform 
process and the outcomes of the reforms.    
 
More specifically in order to be able to provide recommendations on preferable 
regulatory solutions, two issues need to be understood:  
 whether outcomes are better in the telecommunications sector or in the 
electricity sector and whether (on this basis at least) one can potentially 
learn from the other,  
 to what extent are these results connected to the regulation itself. 
Therefore, these are the research questions addressed in this chapter. 
 
This paper undertakes to answer these two questions as the following.  The first 
part is setting the scene by providing an overview of regulatory solutions applied in 
the sectors concerned.  The next part is assessing the outcome of the reforms 
based on price, market share and consumer satisfaction tendencies, at the same 
time searching for correlations between changes in the regulatory solutions and the 
regulatory outcomes.  The connection between the regulation and those indicators 
is quite complex mainly because there are many other factors (besides regulation) 
that affect them.   
 
Based on the previous parts, the analysis in the third section compares the 
tendencies of the different outcomes (prices, market concentration and consumer 
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satisfaction) and then assesses the connection between the outcomes and 
regulation.  The analysis finds that tendencies in the telecommunications sectors 
reflect the initial expectations towards the reforms more than in electricity, 
however the limited correlation between regulatory changes and the data signals 
the importance of non-regulatory (technical, economical etc.) factors, in other 
words the limited scope for regulatory solutions to affect prices, the structure of 
the market and consumers’ opinions. 
1 Introduction 
 
By now, the reforms concerned have around 20 years of history in the EU in general 
and they have been going on even longer in the UK.  During this period the 
regulations went through several changes.   
There is also plenty of data available regarding the sectors concerned, which gives 
an opportunity for the quantitative assessment of these reforms.  Out of the 
different data available, we are using prices, market shares and consumer 
satisfaction.  In analysing whether one regulatory solution is better than another 
such an assessment provides a crucial background.  Since the data is defined by 
many factors (out of which the regulation is only one) it is complicated to connect 
regulatory changes with trends in the data.  However, regulatory changes followed 
by the expected beneficial tendencies in practice gives a general indication on 
where to look for regulatory lessons. 
This leads to the next issue: the need for assessing correlations between the 
regulatory changes and changes of trends in the data.  Strong correlations suggest 
strong and more exclusive connections between the regulations and the 
tendencies.  This would suggest that simple quantitative methods are sufficient to 
assess regulatory solutions.  Weaker correlation indicates a need for a more 
qualitative approach. 
The following sections are concerning the issues above.  First the chapter gives an 
overview of the regulatory changes then it presents and discusses the data.  This is 
followed by the analysis which compares and contrasts the tendencies of the 
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different outcomes concerned (prices, market shares and consumer satisfaction, 
which are assessed separately in the previous section) to answer the research 
questions. 
      
2 Regulatory changes 
 
2.1 EU law 
 
This thesis is devoted to analyse the outcomes of certain regulatory competition, by 
comparing some Member States experiences with different rules.  It is, however, 
helpful to start with a brief overview of the EU regulation.  This is because – due to 
the supremacy of EU law – there is a limit on the Member States’ freedom of 
enacting regulations for electricity and telecommunications. 
 
2.1.1 Electricity 
 
First stage 
 
The electricity reform in the EU started with Directive 96/92/EC “Electricity 
Directive”.   The directive prescribed accounting separation (art. 14) for the 
different levels of the integrated electricity companies and at least management 
separation for the transmission level (art. 7).  According to the directive Member 
states could choose between a negotiated and a regulated approach in terms of 
providing access to the networks (art. 16).  Lastly, the directive required Member 
States to create efficient mechanisms to regulate the markets and monitor them to 
detect abuses (art. 22). 
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Second stage 
 
The second stage14 of the reform is marked by Directive 2003/54/EC.  In the second 
stage the unbundling of both network levels (transmission and distribution) was 
reinforced; integrated electricity companies had to carry out legal separation of the 
networks: according to art. 10 transmission and according to art. 15 distribution 
had to be independent „at least in terms of its legal form, organisation and decision 
making”.  Furthermore the directive ordered Member States to implement a 
system of third party access to the network levels, which is based on published 
tariffs (art. 20).  The requirements towards regulatory institutions became stricter 
as well.  The legislation now mandated that Member States had to create 
regulatory authorities that are independent from the industry (art. 23).  The 
directive furthermore ordered full market opening for non-household customers by 
1st July 2004 and household customers by 1st July 2007 (art. 21). 
 
Third stage 
 
The third electricity package15 entered into force in September 2009.  Member 
States had to transpose it into national law within 18 months. It requires stronger 
                                               
14
 Regulation 1228/2003/EC was introduced in the same year containing provisions on cross-border 
exchanges.  
15
 The third package consist of  the following directives and regulations: 
    Directive 2009/72/EC 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity 
and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC 
    Directive 2009/73/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural 
gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC  
    Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators 
 
19 
 
separation: transmission network operators had to carry out ownership separation, 
or operate as an independent system operator or independent transmission 
operator.  The directive also mandated stronger powers and more independence 
for the regulatory authorities. 
    
2.1.2 Telecommunications 
 
Stage 0 
 
In 1990 two pioneering directives16 already signalled a move towards the reforms, 
calling for more competition and introducing the concept of the Open Network 
Provision, however the sector has yet been fully liberalised.     
 
Stage 1 
  
The next stage consists of a series of directives enacted between 1996 and 1999.17  
The full liberalisation of the telecommunications sector has been carried out by the 
                                                                                                                                    
    Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-
border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 
    Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 
16
 Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for 
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision, 
Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services 
17
 Directive 1999/64/EC of 23 June 1999 amending Directive 90/388/EEC in order to ensure that 
telecommunications networks and cable TV networks owned by a single operator are separate legal 
entities 
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Full Competition Directive.18 The Interconnection Directive19 concerned access to 
the network through significant market power (SMP) regulation; a concept 
borrowed from competition law but with an extended reach by the application of a 
lower threshold.20  No vertical separation (besides accounting separation) was 
                                                                                                                                    
Directive 98/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 amending 
Directive 97/33/EC with regard to operator number portability and carrier pre-selection  
Directive 98/10/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 February 1998 on 
the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for 
telecommunications in a competitive environment  
Directive 97/51/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 6 October 1997 
amending Council Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a 
competitive environment in telecommunications  
Directive 97/33/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 30 June 1997 on 
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and 
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP)  
Directive 97/13/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 10 April 1997 on a 
common framework for general authorizations and individual licences in the field of 
telecommunications services  
Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the 
implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets 
18
 Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the 
implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets 
19
 Directive 97/33/EC on interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal 
service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP) 
20
 According to Article 4. 3 „An organization shall be presumed to have significant market power 
when it has a share of more than 25 % of a particular telecommunications market in the 
geographical area in a Member State within which it is authorized to operate. National regulatory 
authorities may nevertheless determine that an organization with a market share of less than 25 % 
in the relevant market has significant market power. They may also determine that an organization 
with a market share of more than 25 % in the relevant market does not have significant market 
power. In either case, the determination shall take into account the organization's ability to 
influence market conditions, its turnover relative to the size of the market, its control of the means 
of access to end-users, its access to financial resources and its experience in providing products and 
services in the market.” The 25% threshold is significantly lower than the competition law threshold 
for dominance, which is set around 40% (with the same reservations). 
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required.  Most Member States created regulatory authorities at this stage of the 
reform although this was not a requirement under EU law.21  
Second stage 
 
In order to make the telecommunications sector more competitive another 
package was adopted in 2002.  This 2002 package consisted of a Framework 
directive22 and four special directives.23  Access regulation was still based on SMP 
regulation, which was aligned with competition law.24  Articles 9-13 of the Access 
directive described the potential obligations which included accounting separation 
only.   In terms of the national regulatory authorities the Framework Directive 
required all Member States to “ensure that each of the tasks assigned to national 
                                               
21
 Although the preamble of the Framework Directive states that ”the establishment and 
administration of the national numbering plan should be entrusted to a body independent from the 
telecommunications organization”, according to Petit the first requirement in EU law for the 
creation of a regulatory institution can only be identified in Directive 2001/14 of 26 February 2001 
on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway 
infrastructure and safety certification – CF Nicolas Petit, ’The Proliferation of National Regulatory 
Authorities alongside Competition Authorities: A Source of Jurisdictional Confusion” The Global 
Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series 02/04, footnote 6 
22
 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework 
Directive) 
23
 Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) 
Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access 
Directive) 
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal 
service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal 
Service Directive) 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications) 
24
 The 25% threshold has been withdrawn.  
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regulatory authorities in this Directive and the Specific Directives is undertaken by a 
competent body”.25 
 
Third stage 
 
The 2002 Telecoms Package went through a series of amendments in 2009 by two 
Directives; the Better Regulation26 directive and the Citizens' rights directive27.  SMP 
regulation remained standard, but the Better Regulation directive introduced 
functional separation as a special remedy that a national regulator may apply for 
firms having SMP.28  The Better Regulation directive also put more emphasis on the 
adequateness of national regulatory authorities.29 
  
                                               
25
 Framework Directive Article 3. 1.   
26
 Directive 2009/140/EC 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access 
to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 
2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services 
27
 Directive 2009/136/EC of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service 
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws 
28
 According to Article 13A: „Where the national regulatory authority concludes that the appropriate 
obligations imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed to achieve effective competition and that 
there are important and persisting competition problems and/or market failures identified in 
relation to the wholesale provision of certain access product markets, it may, as an exceptional 
measure, in accordance with the provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 8(3), impose an 
obligation on vertically integrated undertakings to place activities related to the wholesale provision 
of relevant access products in an independently operating business entity.” 
29
 Article 1 changes the Framework Directive by adding that „Member States shall ensure that 
national regulatory authorities exercise their powers impartially, transparently and in a timely 
manner. Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities have adequate financial 
and human resources to carry out the task assigned to them” 
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2.2 Member States’ regulations 
 
Out of the numerous regulatory changes, this chapter focuses solely on the three 
areas of the regulation, which are concerned by the thesis: vertical separation, the 
structure of the regulators and SMP regulation.   
The EU law relevant for the issue mainly consists of directives, which need to be 
implemented in national law, and at the same time may leave some space for 
different implementation.  The EU law and the scope of divergence between 
national implementations have already been assessed.  In the following the 
regulatory choices made by the UK and Germany are described, to provide a 
summary of the legal background.  
  
2.2.1 Unbundling 
 
There is a different vision on the EU level towards unbundling of the network 
level(s) between the two sectors.  In the electricity sector unbundling is a key part 
of the reform, while in telecommunications unbundling has only been introduced in 
2009 as a special remedy. 
There is also a very distinct attitude towards unbundling within the Member States 
concerned.  In the UK there is strong unbundling in the electricity sector 
furthermore BT, the telecommunications incumbent’s network business has also 
been separated.  In contrast, in Germany there was no effective separation in the 
electricity sector until 2005 while Deutsche Telekom (DT) the telecommunications 
incumbent is still intact.  
The liberalisation of the electricity sector in the UK (de jure) started in 1983, when 
the Energy Act enabled new generators to enter the market by significantly 
24 
 
removing the entry barriers.30  The restructuring was started by the Electricity Act 
1989, which ordered the ownership separation of the transmission network, but 
the distribution networks remained integrated with the supply companies.  This has 
been changed by the Utilities Act 2000, which amended the Electricity Act 1989, 
section 6. 2, added that: "(2)The same person may not be the holder of both a 
distribution licence and a supply licence."  By 2007 half of the regional distribution-
supply incumbents have carried out ownership separation on a voluntary basis.31 
Also on a (de jure) voluntary basis in 2005 BT has been separated into four parts: 
Openreach, BT Retail, BT Wholesale and BT Global.32 
In the German electricity sector there has traditionally been a strong vertical 
integration between the different levels.  Unlike in the UK, in Germany the 
electricity reform has been driven by the EU directives.  The `96 EU Directive was 
implemented by Germany in the Energy Act of 1998, ordering minimal separation 
and negotiated access.  Even these measures have been enforced poorly: only the 
competition authority has been entrusted with the ex post oversight of the sector.  
This changed when the 2003 EU directive required legal or ownership separation of 
the transmission networks, which was implemented by the Energy Act of 2005 
(Energiewirtschaftsgesetz).  The Act came to effect the same year, but legal 
separation of the distribution businesses was delayed until 2007.  The new 
unbundling requirements of the third EU package were transposed by the German 
Energy Act by 2011.  
                                               
30
 Richard Pond, ‘Liberalisation, privatisation and regulation in the UK electricity sector’ Working 
Lives Research Institute, LMU- Country report on liberalisation and privatisation processes and forms 
of regulation 2006 
31
 Stephen Davies, Catherine Waddams Price, ’Does Ownership Unbundling Matter? Evidence from 
UK 
Energy Markets’ 2007 (Nov-Dec) Intereconomics, 298-299 
32
 CF http://www.btplc.com/Thegroup/BTsHistory/History.htm accessed 17/11/2011 
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Duetsche Telekom did not have to carry out any separation similar to BT’s in the 
UK. 
 
2.2.2 Authorities 
 
The EU law specifies some requirements towards the national regulatory 
authorities, but the Member States are free to choose the structure of the 
authority.  They may entrust the same authority with the regulatory tasks of more 
than one industry, or create separate entities for the industries reformed.  Although 
there is a tendency of integration in both Member States concerned, the way the 
authorities developed and their current states are significantly different.  
 
In the UK there is a regulator responsible for the energy sector (electricity and gas) 
and one for the communications industry.  The Electricity Act 1989 established 
Offer a stand-alone electricity regulator.  In 1999 Offer was merged with Ofgas, the 
gas regulator thereby Ofgem was created, which was formally brought into being 
by the Utilities Act 2000.33  Similarly, for the telecommunications sector Oftel was 
set up under the Telecommunications Act 1984.  According to the Communications 
Act 2003 Ofcom became the dominant regulator of the telecommunications 
industry, 34  Ofcom was created out of the merger of Oftel, the 
Radiocommunications Agency (who regulated the mobile sector together with 
Oftel), and the Broadcasting Standards and Independent Television Commission.35 
 
                                               
33
 Select Committee on Constitution, ‘Minutes of Evidence - Memorandum by OFGEM’ (2003) 
available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldconst/68/3052109.htm 
accessed: 25/10/2014, footnote 2 
34
 Helen Kemmitt, John Angel, The Telecommunications Regime in the United Kingdom’ in Ian 
Walden ed. Telecommunications Law and Regulation (3rd edn. OUP 2009) 142 
35
 Ian Lloyd, David Mellor, Telecommunications Law (Butterworths, 2003) 51 
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In contrast to the UK in Germany there is one regulator (the Bundesnetzagentur) 
that is responsible for energy, communications as well as some other sectors.  In 
Germany the Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP) has 
been established by Telecommunications Act 1996 and was tasked with the 
regulation of the telecommunications sector.  The RegTP was formed in 1998, at 
the start of the liberalisation.  For the electricity sector, however, no regulator was 
created at the beginning of the reform, but the competition authority was given the 
duty of exercising oversight (but only ex-post, no ex-ante powers were given).  This 
was in line with the EU regulation until the second stage of the reform.  Instead of 
creating a regulator for the electricity sector, when (due to EU law) it became 
mandatory, in Germany the existing telecommunications regulator was given 
mandate for the regulation of the electricity sector.  The RegTP was renamed to 
“Bundesnetzagentur” (Federal Networks Agency).  The Bundesnetzagentur is 
currently regulating the electricity, gas, telecommunications, post and railway 
sectors.  The third EU package did not necessitate any changes: the relevant 
German rules were already compliant.   
 
2.2.3 SMP regulation 
 
As it has been discussed, on the EU level the regulation is focused on unbundling of 
the networks in the electricity sector, but not in the telecommunications sector.  
Instead, the telecommunications regulation relies on significant market power 
regulation, a concept that is derived from competition law, but applies ex-ante. 
In the history of the telecommunications reform of the UK there has been a long 
period (before the EU reforms started) when telecommunications regulation did 
not include SMP regulation.  The British Telecommunications Act 1981 started the 
so called “duopoly period”, when the UK tried to create competition between two 
companies (the incumbent BT and the new entrant Mercury) in all levels.  During 
this period access was not an issue as no other firms were allowed to enter the 
market.  The initiative turned out to be unsuccessful and was abandoned step by 
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step after approximately 10 years.  As the EU started regulating the area, the UK 
system followed the EU regulation; access has been arranged according to the 
Interconnection directive (stage 1), then the Communications Act 2003 
implemented the changes necessitated by the 2002 EU package (stage 2). 
In Germany the telecommunications reform was led by the EU initiative from the 
beginning signalled by the Telecommunications Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz) 
1996.36 
In the electricity reforms none of the EU Member States (except for Hungary) used 
SMP regulation.37 
The following table provides an overview of the regulatory changes concerned by 
year (as they came to effect):  
 
Summary of regulatory changes 
Date 
UK Germany 
Electricity Telecommunications Electricity Telecommunications 
1984  Oftel was established 
Privatisation (BT) 
  
1985-
1988 
    
                                               
36
 OECD, ‘Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Germany 2004 - Consolidating Economic and Social 
Renewal’ available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-reviews-of-regulatory-
reform-germany-2004_9789264107861-en accessed: 25/08/2014, 169 
37
 The MALC sin the UK are similar too, but they have never been used in practice. 
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Summary of regulatory changes 
Date 
UK Germany 
Electricity Telecommunications Electricity Telecommunications 
1989 Ownership 
separation 
between 
generation 
and 
transmission 
   
Offer was 
established 
Privatisation 
1990-
1994 
    
1995    Privatisation (DT) 
1996     
1997  SMP regulation 
(Interconnection 
Directive transposed) 
  
1998    RegTP was 
established 
SMP regulation was 
introduced 
1999     
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Summary of regulatory changes 
Date 
UK Germany 
Electricity Telecommunications Electricity Telecommunications 
2000  Legal 
separation 
between 
distribution 
and supply 
   
Offer and 
Ofgas 
merged to 
Ofgem 
2001-
2002 
    
2003  The 2002 EU directives 
was transposed (new 
SMP regime) 
  
Ofcom was created 
(out of the merger of 
Oftel, the 
Radiocommunications 
Agency, the 
Broadcasting 
Standards and 
Independent 
Television 
Commission) 
2004    The 2002 EU 
directives were 
transposed (new 
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Summary of regulatory changes 
Date 
UK Germany 
Electricity Telecommunications Electricity Telecommunications 
SMP regime) 
2005  BT was functionally 
separated 
Legal separation 
between 
generation and 
transmission  
RegTP was entrusted 
with electricity 
regulation 
Bundenetzagentur 
was established  
2006     
2007   Legal separation 
between 
Distribution and 
supply 
 
2008-
2010 
    
2011   Unbundling 
provisions of the 
Third EU package 
transposed 
 
2012     
2013 ERRA changes 
regulators’ 
competition 
ERRA changes 
regulators’ competition 
law powers 
  
31 
 
Summary of regulatory changes 
Date 
UK Germany 
Electricity Telecommunications Electricity Telecommunications 
law powers 
2014 Ofgem energy 
market 
investigation 
referral to 
CMA 
   
Figure 1: Summary of regulatory changes 
The 2009 EU electricity and telecommunications packages did not require major 
changes in the regulatory areas concerned in the UK and Germany, besides these 
changes are too recent to allow for meaningful analysis of changes in the 
tendencies since their implementation.  Therefore, these are out of the scope of 
the research carried out in this chapter.    
3 Outcomes 
 
In order to be able to show what sort of regulatory solutions are necessary for a 
successful reform, the sectors should be analysed in terms of their results first.  
There are many ways these reforms can be assessed; there is no single “generally 
accepted” method.38  In this paper prices, market share tendencies and consumer 
satisfaction data are compared and contrasted with changes in the regulatory 
solutions (as detailed above).  These indicators are widely used by both public 
                                               
38
 Lesley Davies, Kathryn Wright, Catherine Waddams, ’Experience of Privatisation, Regulation and 
Competition: Lessons for Governments’ CCP Working Paper 05-5, 5 
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bodies and academics when assessing the reforms, and accordingly, the literature 
on the issue is already substantial.  The section below builds on this literature.  
It has to be noted here that using these indicators to assess the relative success of 
the reforms concerned is not straightforward.  Some of the regulatory changes took 
place at the same time and, therefore, by simply looking at the tendencies after 
such occasions it cannot be separated whether the tendency can be connected to 
one or the other.   
Besides (and perhaps more importantly), there are many factors outside the 
regulation that affect the data.  The connection between the regulatory differences 
concerned (unbundling, the structure of the regulatory authority, and the use of 
SMP regulation) and the outcome of the reforms in terms of price (1), market share 
(2) and consumer satisfaction (3) is rather complex, and not necessarily direct.  
Although there are studies evaluating the relationship between industry 
performance and regulation using cross-country dataset,39 establishing a direct link 
between regulation and its effect on prices, market concentration etc. is rather 
problematic as there are many factors that might affect that certain variable.   
Accordingly, the purpose of the analysis below is limited (1) to give an overview of 
the changes that happened after the reforms started, (2) to see whether there are 
correlations between regulatory changes and changes in the indicators chosen.   
Simply comparing the UK to Germany does not seem to be satisfactory: even 
though there might be seemingly big differences between their results, they can 
both be fairly good or bad.  Therefore, the results of the countries concerned are 
assessed in context of the average EU trends (where such data is available). 
 
   
                                               
39
 Faye Steiner, ‘Regulation, Industry Structure and Performance in the Electricity Supply Industry’ 
OECD Economic Studies No. 32, 2001/I 
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3.1 Price tendencies 
 
Price trends are described in numerous studies; one of the most frequently used 
method of assessing the success of a reform is looking at price tendencies.    
Whether prices should rise or fall as a result of a successful reform is actually not 
straightforward.  It is true that the reforms are aimed at achieving more 
competition and less monopoly, and a competitive price is by definition below a 
monopoly price.  However, the monopoly price has not been the base line (the 
starting point) in any of the cases concerned.  The governments have been 
influencing the prices in all sectors concerned before the start of the reforms.  This 
may mean that the prices before the reforms were either above or below the 
competitive prices.   
On one hand politicians have the incentive to establish low prices (maybe even 
below costs and subsidize the industry from the central budget), so they keep 
citizens content in order to gain votes.  Accordingly price rises after the reforms 
may only mean that prices now reflect the real costs, plus the profits necessary to 
attract investments which are essential for the security of supply.  On the other 
hand, the governments (especially when the reform involves privatisation) may try 
to raise prices before the start of the reform to give a signal of profitability in the 
sectors, thereby attracting entrants (or achieve a higher price when selling public 
property).  In this case price falls may only happen because beforehand they were 
kept artificially high and not because of enhanced efficiencies arising out of 
competition.  Under a competitive setup prices reflect costs therefore a change 
towards competition includes tariff re-balancing.  
Since the sectors were also vertically integrated, the companies only had to recover 
their costs overall (i.e. all the productions levels together).  This, however, changed 
by vertical separation.  The companies active on the different levels now have to 
recover their costs separately.  
Prices furthermore depend on other factors that are not directly related to the 
reforms or the regulation. For example, electricity prices are highly dependent on 
the cost structure of the generation portfolio.  Nuclear plants have high fixed costs 
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(they are expensive to build) but low marginal costs (fuel price is relatively cheap).  
The opposite is true for Combined Circle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plants: building such 
plants is relatively cheap, but their fuel costs are in general considerably higher, and 
also depend on the actual gas prices.  As the use of CCGT plants became more and 
more wide-spread electricity prices became highly dependent on gas prices.  This 
means that prices might change simple due to rise or fall of input (fuel) prices.  
An additional problem of comparing prices of countries having different currencies 
is that the exchange rates (and therefore the prices calculated and compared) are 
highly dependent on macro-economic factors.  
Still, the expectation towards the reforms was that they force prices down.40  
Although there are many factors that affect prices, it can be established that one of 
the benefits of competition (and privatisation) is enhanced productive efficiency 
which means better productivity, lower costs what then results in lower prices.41  
Some also argue that competition facilitates innovation,42 which may ultimately 
also leads to price reductions, although others suggest that high profits (thus high 
prices) are necessary to finance innovation.43  Indeed, investment is needed to 
achieve security of supply and investment can be attracted by higher prices. 
In order to see whether and to what extent these expectations were met, the 
following section looks at price data.   
 
 
 
 
                                               
40
 European Central Bank, ‘Price effects of regulatory reform in selected network industries’[ 2001] 
5, Steiner (2001) 144 
41
 Richard Whish, Competition Law (6
th
 edn OUP, London 2009) 5 
42
 William G. Shepherd, ‘Dim prospects: effective competition in telecommunications, railroads and 
electricity’ 1997 (42) The Antitrust Bulletin, 163 
43
 Cf Whish (2009) 4-6 
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European Central Bank (Electricity and Telecom) 
 
The European Central Bank carried out a study on the price changes in the 
industries concerned after the reforms.  They used a Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP)44 which shows the price changes of a “fixed-basket” of 
goods over time, from 1996 to 2000, so at an early stage of the German reforms, 
but at a more mature state of the reforms in the UK (especially in 
telecommunications).45  The regulatory changes concerned within this period are 
summarized below: 
Summary of regulatory changes between 1996 and 2000 
Date 
UK Germany 
Electricity Telecommunications Electricity Telecommunications 
1996     
1997  SMP regulation 
(Interconnection 
Directive 
transposed) 
  
1998    RegTP has been 
established 
SMP regulation has 
been introduced 
                                               
44
 About the HICP methodology in detail see: ‘HICP methodology’ available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/HICP_methodology accessed: 
30/05/2012 
45
 For the details of the index see European Central Bank (2001) 24-27 
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Summary of regulatory changes between 1996 and 2000 
Date 
UK Germany 
Electricity Telecommunications Electricity Telecommunications 
1999     
2000  Legal 
separation 
between 
distribution 
and supply 
   
Offer and 
Ofgas merged 
to Ofgem 
Figure 2 Summary of regulatory changes between 1996 and 2000 
The German data is especially interesting, as there the reforms started in the 
middle of this period, in 1998.  This allows for the comparison of pre and post 
reform prices.  The UK has started both reforms earlier, so – except for the changes 
in the telecommunications regulation in 1997 – there, this period more reflects 
“business as usual” at a rather developed stage.  There were substantial changes in 
the electricity regulation of the UK in 2000, but since this study does not concern 
the period after 2000, tendencies after these regulatory changes cannot be 
analysed through this source. 
  
The study calculated the HICP as the following: 
Sector Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 % change 
1996- 
2000 
Telecom Germany 100.0 96.2 94.9 84.1 79.9 -20.1 
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Sector Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 % change 
1996- 
2000 
United 
Kingdom 
100.0 96.7 95.0 91.9 87.7 -12.3 
Euro area 
(12)average 
100 97,7 95,8 90,5 86,4 -13,6 
Electricity Germany 100.0  100.5 101.7 105.7 100.5 0.5 
United 
Kingdom 
100.0   95.2 90.9 89.8 87.9 -12.1 
Euro area 
(12)average 
100 99,5 99,7 99,5 98,2 -1,8 
Figure 3 ECB HICP data between 1996 and 2000 
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Figure 4 ECB HICP Graph 
 
This data shows that in general there is a stronger tendency for price falls in the 
telecommunications sector then in the electricity sector. The UK electricity sector 
does considerably better than the German electricity sector, while it is the opposite 
when it comes to telecommunications: prices are decreasing in the UK, but the 
price reductions are even higher in Germany. Furthermore, the German electricity 
and the UK telecommunication sectors have worse tendencies than the respective 
averages. 
 
There is an especially noticeable fall in the Germany telecommunications prices 
after 1998, the year the reform (liberalisation, introduction of SMP regulation and 
the creation of RegTP) started.  On the EU level price falls were much more modest.  
The trends in the UK were very similar to the EU average and there is no visible 
change in the UK price trends after the regulatory changes that took place in 1997.   
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In contrast the German electricity prices after the enactment of the implementing 
act of the ’96 EU directive started rising to a higher pace than before, although after 
1999 prices started falling and by 2000 they were lower than in 1998.  During the 
same period the UK prices were falling without the trace of any similar pattern in 
the UK prices while in the EU level prices were essentially stagnating.   
    
The study claims that “[the] regulatory reform has been the driving force behind 
the substantial price decreases”46 while also acknowledging that “past investments 
in infrastructure and the acceleration of technical changes in telecommunications 
are likely to have contributed to the recent price decreases”.47  In connection with 
electricity the picture is not as pleasant.  According to the study: “it would be 
premature to attribute the recent falls in electricity prices primarily to intensified 
competition. In fact, they are more likely to occur either because of a pre-emptive 
pricing policy by the incumbent operators or because public regulators operate 
price caps in order to “simulate” competitive prices”.48  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
46
 European Central Bank (2001) 19 
47
 Ibid 
48
 Ibid 19-20 
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DG Competition Report on the Energy Sector (Electricity - Wholesale) 
 
The DG Competition Report on the Energy Sector contains price data of the 
electricity sectors between 2000 and 2006.  The relevant changes in the regulation 
during this period are summarized in the table below:  
Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sectors 
between 2000 and 2006 
Date UK Germany 
2000  Legal separation 
between distribution 
and supply 
 
Offer and Ofgas 
merged to Ofgem 
2001-2004   
2005  Legal separation between 
generation and 
transmission  
Bundenetzagentur has 
been established  
2006   
Figure 5 Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sectors between 2000 and 2006 
Observing the data, it can be established that generally, in the EU after the 
electricity reforms prices were relatively stable, then after 2003 they started to 
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rise.49  According to the Commission “[s]ignificant rises in gas and electricity 
wholesale prices that cannot be fully explained by higher primary fuel costs and 
environmental obligations”50 that is why it started a sector inquiry in 2005.  This 
also reflects the importance of prices when assessing the reforms.  In its report, the 
Commission uses wholesale prices, which are (in general, but especially after 2004) 
higher in the UK then in Germany.  
 
Figure 6 Electricity prices 2000-2006 
Trends related to the regulatory changes in the UK in 2000 cannot be analysed 
since the data for the country is missing before 2001, but the Germany regulatory 
developments in 2005 took place well within the period concerned by the study.  
Prices in Germany started rising from 2005 onwards, after a relatively stable period 
of lower prices.  However, the same trends can broadly be observed in other 
                                               
49
 DG Competition, ’Report on Energy Sector Inquiry’ SEC(2006)1724 part 2 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/full_report_part2.pdf accessed 
02/07.2012 111 
50
 DG Competition (2006) 4 
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Member States as well which means that the upward trend potentially has non-
country specific causes.    
 
Ultimately, the use of wholesale prices, however, does not seem to be appropriate 
to assess the reforms concerned (especially the German case).  The wholesale price 
is only a fragment of the overall price that end users have to pay.  Also, there is a 
potential that the wholesale prices are not cost-reflective because there is cross-
financing between the different levels.  Although there is regulation aimed at the 
impediment of cross-financing between the different levels, a vertically integrated 
firm will always have the incentive to try to allocate its costs where competition is 
less likely, because on an anti-competitive market, competitors are not going to 
drive prices down and force the firm out of the market. Considering this incentive, 
and the fact that there is information asymmetry between the regulated firms and 
the regulator, the possibility of such practice cannot be ruled out, even if there is no 
trace of such abuse in the regulators’ cases.         
In the UK there is vertical integration between the generation and the supply 
levels51: firms have the incentive to reach the maximum profit and defend their 
position on these two levels combined.  Entering the supply level is potentially 
easier than entering the generation business because fixed costs are less prominent 
there, so lower investment is enough. Therefore, these integrated firms are better 
off by charging more on the wholesale level: putting a higher profit ratio on the 
wholesale prices means that the margin on the retail prices can be squeezed.  This 
can reduce the likeliness of new firms entering the wholesale market, which is a 
joint incentive of all the firms present.  
In Germany the sector is much more integrated, which gives more opportunity for 
cross-financing.  While the UK firms can only allocate some of their costs to either 
the generation or the supply level, out of which allocation to the generation level is 
                                               
51
 Although some merchant generation and independent retailers existed, particularly in the non-
domestic sector. 
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the safest possibility, the German firms (especially until 2005) had an even better 
option: as they were integrated with the monopolistic levels as well, they have the 
option of allocating their costs to the transmission and distribution levels.  As these 
levels were (and still are) monopolistic, no one can enter and drive costs down 
there.   Also, prices of the transmission and distribution levels are regulated.  By 
allocating costs to those levels, the regulated price can be raised.  This is quite 
straightforward if prices are regulated by a rate-of return method,52 but even if 
prices are regulated by an RPI-X method,53 as this has to be re-adjusted from time 
to time, costs are ultimately taken into account.54  By raising the regulated prices, 
through the costs allocated there from the competitive levels, the integrated firm 
essentially manages to make its competitors subsidise its business from the 
competitive level, thereby putting the other firms in a competitive disadvantage.  
                                               
52
 This means that the price is calculated on the basis of the capital invested plus adding an amount 
equal to a „fair return”. 
53
 „An approach to regulating prices under which the regulated firm is allowed to adjust its own 
prices subject to the weighted average of prices not exceeding a cap. In the RPI-X price cap system 
this cap is allowed to increase at the rate of inflation (RPI) less some "X factor" to account for 
productivity gains or to reduce the regulated firm's rents.” – OECD, ’Glossary of Statistical Terms’ 
available at: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6754 accessed: 11/07/2012 
54
 Ellen M. Pint, ’Price-cap versus rate-of-return regulation in a stochastic-cost model’ (1992) 23 
RAND Journal of Economics, 564 
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This seems to be reflected in the breakdown of the electricity prices below. 
 
Figure 7 Breakdown of electricity prices (2004) 
This data reflects the 2004 state, so the time when the German electricity market 
was still fully integrated.  Although the German prices are higher at every level, the 
biggest difference is in the network charges.  There is also a big difference between 
the supply prices, which may reflect the fact that by 2004 (since 2000) legal 
separation between the distribution and the supply levels was a minimum 
requirement (but some companies carried out ownership separation on a voluntary 
basis) in the UK, while in Germany the same requirement only took effect in 2007.   
For the above mentioned reasons, data on generation prices in this period is rather 
inconclusive. 
 
EUROSTAT (Electricity - Retail) 
  
There is Eurostat data available on the industrial and household electricity prices 
from 2000 to 2011, which is potentially more meaningful in the context of this 
chapter than generation prices. 
 Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sectors between 
2000 and 2011 
Date UK Germany 
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 Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sectors between 
2000 and 2011 
Date UK Germany 
2000  Legal separation 
between distribution 
and supply 
 
Offer and Ofgas 
merged to Ofgem 
2001-
2004 
  
2005  Legal separation between 
generation and transmission  
Bundenetzagentur has been 
established  
2006   
2007  Legal separation between 
Distribution and supply 
2008-
2010 
  
2011  Unbundling provisions of the 
Third EU package transposed 
Figure 8 Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sectors between 2000 and 2011 
Unfortunately, the data only covers the post 2000 period, therefore the changes in 
the UK regulation (the creation of Ofgem and the legal separation of distribution 
and supply) that took place in 2000 (Utilities Act) cannot be assessed by looking at 
differences in tendencies before and after, while looking at the immediate 
46 
 
tendencies after 2000 there are no obvious and meaningful changes in this data 
(household prices only started falling in 2002, industrial prices started falling in 
2001).          
 
 
Figure 9 Electricity household prices 2000-2011 
  
The household prices in the UK tend to be lower than in Germany, however the 
prices in the UK started to rise significantly after 2005 and since 2008 the difference 
between them is marginal. 
The regulatory changes in 2005 (the establishment of the Bundesnetzagentur and 
the unbundling of the generation and transmission levels) were not followed by 
price reductions, although prices were rising in the EU in general post-2005, while 
in the UK 2005 was a starting point of a substantial price rise, which by 2008 
resulted in higher electricity prices in the UK than in Germany.  So, putting the 
German prices in context the post-2005 results are not disappointing.  In 2007, the 
legislation requiring legal separation between distribution and supply came into 
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effect.  In the same year the tendency of price rises stopped and in a year prices 
were below the 2005 level.  However, the price decrease did not last long: a year 
later prices were rising again, but since the separation of the distribution and 
supply levels in Germany the difference between the household prices in the UK 
and Germany are much less significant. 
 
 
Figure 10 Electricity industrial prices 2000-2011 
 
The trends of the industrial prices are similar.  The UK prices started to rise in 2004 
(one year earlier than household prices) and since 2007 there is no big difference 
between them, but by then prices have been higher in the UK than in Germany.   
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Bismut (Telecom) 
 
Turning to telecommunications, we start by assessing data on telephone prices 
from 1998 to 2005 which is available from Bismut’s study. 55   The German 
telecommunications reform just started at the beginning of this period while the UK 
was already ahead (even the main restrictions due to the duopoly policy has ended 
by 1993).  The regulatory changes concerned are summarized in the table below: 
 
Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sectors 
between 1998 and 2005 
Date UK Germany 
1998  RegTP has been established 
SMP regulation has been 
introduced 
1999-
2002 
  
2003 The 2002 EU directives has 
been transposed (new 
SMP regime) 
 
Ofcom has been created 
(out of the merger of 
Oftel, the 
Radiocommunications 
Agency, the Broadcasting 
Standards and 
                                               
55
 Sophie Bismut, ‘Competition in European Telecom Markets’ (2006) 64 Communications & 
Strategies  
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Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sectors 
between 1998 and 2005 
Date UK Germany 
Independent Television 
Commission) 
2004  The 2002 EU directives has 
been transposed (new SMP 
regime) 
2005 BT has been functionally 
separated 
RegTP has been entrusted 
with electricity regulation 
Figure 11 Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sectors between 1998 and 2005 
Bismut looks at the “[e]volution of fixed telephony tariffs based on OECD national 
PSTN baskets”56.  The corresponding data of UK and Germany are the following: 
Residential (Annual cost of fixed telephony for a typical business or residential telephone 
user, in EUR/PPP per month) 
Country 1998       1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Germany 32.83  26.99 25.33 25.32 25.81 26.10 26.62 23.56 
UK 29.59  29.26 27.07 26.71 25.28 24.97 24.47 24.65 
EU (25) 
average 
33,49 31,01 31,73 32,22 32,15 32,29 32,3 30,79 
Figure 12 Residential telecom prices data (1998-2005) 
                                               
56
 Bismut (2006) 21  
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Figure 13 Residential telecom prices graph (1998-2005) 
 
Business (Annual cost of fixed telephony for a typical business or residential telephone user, 
in EUR/PPP per month) 
Country 1998       1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Germany 79.52  63.17 54.06 54.06 54.49 54.36 54.95 39.54 
UK 68.28  68.97 67.99 68.57 69.16 69.24 69.24 68.85 
EU (25) 
average 
77,61 69,34 69,31 68,14 66,09 66,43 66,17 62,64 
Figure 14 Business telecom prices data (1998-2005) 
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Figure 15 Business telecom prices graph (1998-2005) 
According to these data the price tendencies of the German telecommunications 
sector are better.  This is more obvious looking at the business prices than the 
residential prices and especially comparing them to the EU average: while in terms 
of the residential prices both countries are well below the EU average, business 
prices in the UK are much higher than in Germany and even higher than the EU 
average.  Additionally, the overall price-falls between 1998 and 2005 is clearly 
greater in Germany than in the UK. 
 
There were distinctive price falls in Germany just after the start of the reforms, but 
the data is reluctant to tell whether this was part of a tendency that started earlier.  
Interestingly, the transposition of the new SMP regulation coincides with prices falls 
(both residential and business) in Germany (2004) but not in the UK, where the 
transposition of the new SMP regulation was even topped with the creation of 
Ofcom (2003).  Since the study only concerns the developments until 2005, the 
trends after the regulatory changes that took place in 2005 (especially the 
separation of BT) cannot be analysed through this source. 
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Directorate General for Information Society (Telecommunications) 
 
Price data concerning the telecommunications sector from 2000 to 2009 is available 
from a study made for the Directorate General for Information Society.57  There 
have been key changes in the telecommunications sector in the UK during this 
period as summarized in the table below: 
Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sectors 
between 2000 and 2009 
Date UK Germany 
2000-2002   
2003 The 2002 EU directives has 
been transposed (new SMP 
regime) 
 
Ofcom has been created 
(out of the merger of Oftel, 
the Radiocommunications 
Agency, and the 
Broadcasting Standards 
and Independent 
Television Commission) 
2004  The 2002 EU directives has 
been transposed (new 
SMP regime) 
                                               
57
 Teligen, ’Report on Telecoms Price Developments from 1998 to 2009 - Produced for: European 
Commission Directorate General for Information Society’ available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-
agenda/scoreboard/docs/pillar/studies/voice_tariff_1998_2010.pdf accessed: 14/07/2012 
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Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sectors 
between 2000 and 2009 
Date UK Germany 
2005 BT has been functionally 
separated 
RegTP has been entrusted 
with electricity regulation 
2006-2009   
Figure 16 Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sectors between 2000 and 2009 
Generally this data shows trends similar to what has been discussed before.  Until 
2007 residential prices were a bit lower in the UK, then in Germany, where prices 
are basically equal to the EU average. 
 
Figure 17 Fixed telephone residential prices (2000-2009) 
In 2003 Ofcom was created and the new SMP regulation has been transposed in the 
UK.  In the same year there was a price-drop however this did not last long.  After 
2004, the year when the new SMP regulation came to effect, prices have been 
falling in Germany (although from 2005 prices have been slightly rising there as 
well) while at the same time they were rising in the UK.  BT has been separated in 
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2005, but the data shows no obvious change that can be linked to that (a price-rise 
started a year earlier and continued with the same pace until 2008). 
 
Figure 18 Fixed telephone business prices (2000-2009) 
The assessment of the prices in the business sector is more straightforward: by 
2009 prices were much higher in the UK then in Germany (the UK prices were well 
above the EU average as well).  Furthermore, there is a trend of falling prices in 
Germany after 2004, the year when the new SMP regulation came into effect in the 
country, while especially after 2006 prices were rising in the UK, which is 
interesting, considering that the divestiture of BT has happened just a year earlier 
which would have been expected to result in more competition and lower prices.  
There was no trace of unusual trends in 2003, the year when Ofcom was created.  
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3.2. Changes in the market structure 
 
The sectors concerned used to be dominated by one (or more58) monopoly(ies).59  
In case (after the liberalisation) new firms enter, that shows that the idea behind 
the reform was right: not all levels are natural monopolies where one firm can 
supply the most efficiently, but there is real scope for competition.  Furthermore, 
market shares and market concentration are indicators of market power, which is 
generally speaking harmful for competition.60   
Accordingly, in previously monopolized markets loss of the incumbent’s market 
share is widely interpreted as a sign of awakening competition.  Economics theory 
also suggests that competition works better on a market where a large number of 
firms are present.  The practical importance of this feature can be illustrated by the 
Commission’s report on gas and electricity sectors, which mentions concentration 
as one of the major problems that exist in the electricity sector: “electricity markets 
(…) generally maintain the high level of concentration of the pre-liberalisation 
period. This gives scope for exercising market power.” 61  The Commission’s 
telecommunications report also states that “[t]he market is still very 
concentrated”.62 
 
One key aim of the regulations concerned is providing access to monopolistic 
facilities by fair terms (unbundling and SMP regulation is directly connected to the 
                                               
58
 See the case of the German electricity sector. 
59
 Except for the German electricity industry, this fact is taken into account in the study. 
60
 Whish (2009) 40 
61
 Communications from the Commission, ’Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors’ (2006) 851 (Final Report) 5 
62
Commission, ’Progress Report on the Single European Electronic Communications Market 2007 
(13th Report)’ COM(2008) 153 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/annualreports/13th/SEC(2008)
356DTSVol1final.pdf accessed: 12/07/2012 17 
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issue, while the regulators’ task is to apply these regulations).  Accordingly, an 
effective regulatory regime should facilitate entry which results in lower market 
concentration.  However, the connection is not direct: appropriate regulation 
enhances the likeliness of entry but there might be countervailing factors that may 
neutralize it, which has to be assessed as well.  For example economies of scale and 
scope and highly specific assets (features that are present in both electricity and 
telecommunications) generally imply that the number of competitors is going to be 
relatively small.63  Having many firms is rather the means, not an aim in itself.  The 
main goal of the reforms is to benefit consumers, and due to scale of economies it 
may well be that a lower number of firms can supply more efficiently (produce 
more consumer welfare). 
Still, both regulators and competition authorities use market shares (and market 
concentration data) as a starting point when assessing market power, therefore 
using this indicator is highly practical.  
 
Matthes et. al. (Electricity – Generation) 
 
The study of Matthes et. al. concerns the market structure of electricity generation 
in both the UK and Germany.64  The incumbent generators have an interest to keep 
new competitors out of the market to retain their market power.  New entry results 
in less market power and more competition. 
In electricity generation the assessment of the regulations’ effect on market share 
is not straightforward because in neither of the countries concerned did a single 
                                               
63
 Brian Levy, Pablo T. Spiller, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A 
Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation’ (1994) 10 (2) Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization, 201, 204 
64
 Dr. Felix Chr. Matthes, Katherina Grashof, Sabine Gores, ’Power Generation Market Concentration 
in Europe 1996-2005 - An Empirical Analysis’ (2007) available at: www.oeko.de/oekodoc/308/2007-
002-en.pdf accessed 12/08/2014 
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incumbent exist at the beginning of the reforms.  Therefore, it is not possible to 
analyse such company’s loss of market share.  Instead, the changes in the markets’ 
concentration can be used, which indicator is similar in nature.  The study by 
Matthes et. al. covers the period between 1996 and 2005.  The regulatory changes 
in the electricity sector during this time are summarized in the table below: 
Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sector between 
1996 and 2005 
Date UK Germany 
1996-
1999 
  
2000  (Legal separation 
between distribution 
and supply) 
 
Offer and Ofgas merged 
to Ofgem 
2001-
2004 
  
2005  Legal separation between 
generation and transmission  
Bundesnetzagentur has been 
established  
Figure 19 Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sector between 1996 and 2005 
This data covers the period before and after the creation of Ofgem.  The major 
regulatory changes that took place in 2005 in Germany cannot be analysed in the 
context of market trends since the data does not cover the period after.  
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In Britain the structure of the sector was altered at the privatization: the incumbent 
was broken up into three generation companies (and also fourteen supply 
companies existed right at the beginning of the reforms).  Later on even more 
companies entered the market. In the UK electricity sector there has been a 
tendency of less and less concentration and this general tendency does not show 
any unusual change in 2004, when Ofgem was created. 
 
Figure 20 UK Generation market concentration (1996-2005) 
In Germany the situation at the beginning was completely different: there were 
many – more or less vertically integrated – firms. Among those firms the biggest 
and most influential ones were the ones active in the generation level as well.  In 
Germany however – in spite of having a seemingly more beneficial initial structure 
– the tendency is opposite: the generation lavel got more and more concentrated.    
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Figure 21 Germany Generation market concentration (1996-2005) 
Data on the EU average is not available from this source.  Still, it can be shown that 
even the German market is much less concentrated than the average of France, 
Belgium the Netherlands and Luxemburg. 
 
Figure 22 Average generation market concentration (1996-2005) 
Also, a comparison of the HHI’s of some EU country’s electricity sectors between 
2003 and 2005 made by DG Comp shows that Germany have considerably worse 
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trends than the UK, although in a European context both markets are rather 
unconcentrated.   
 
Figure 23 Generation HHI (2003-2005) 
 
Eurostat (Electricity – Generation) 
 
There is Eurostat data available on the number of main electricity generators from 
2003 until 2010.  The regulatory changes concerned within this period are 
summarized in the table below. 
Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sector between 2003 and 
2010 
Date UK Germany 
2003-
2004 
  
2005  Legal separation between generation and 
transmission 
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Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sector between 2003 and 
2010 
Date UK Germany 
Bundenetzagentur was established  
2006   
2007  Legal separation between Distribution and 
supply 
2008-
2010 
  
Figure 24 Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sector between 2003 and 2010 
The data shows that the tendencies remained the same after 2005: the market in 
the UK is less concentrated than in Germany.  Although the literature still talks 
about the Big Six, this source remarks that by 2010 there were 8 firms having higher 
than 5% market share on the generation level (which is used as a criterion to qualify 
as “main generator”). In contrast, the structure of 4 main firms remained constant 
in Germany throughout the period concerned.  
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Figure 25 Number of major generators (2003-2010) 
Correlation between the regulatory changes and changes in the market structure is 
questionable.  It is true that the UK started with strong unbundling and a dedicated 
regulator and the market got less concentrated while in Germany there was no 
effective regulation at the beginning and the market got more concentrated.  
However, the regulatory situation improved significantly in Germany after 2005 but 
the data shows no changes after 2005. 
 
DECC and Bundesnetzagentur (Electricity – Supply) 
 
Comparable data on the incumbent suppliers’ market share loss is available for 
both the UK (data on the incumbents market shares are available from DECC 
website65) and Germany (data on the German electricity supply market is available 
                                               
65
 DECC, ’Quarterly domestic energy customer numbers’ available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/quarterly-domestic-energy-price-stastics 
accessed at: 15/06/2014 
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from the regulators annual reports66).  The data has been traced back to the date 
when legal separation became mandatory between businesses in the distribution 
and the supply levels, which means that the period covered in the UK is between 
2000 and 2013 and in Germany between 2007 and 2012.  The regulatory changes 
that took place within the period are summarized in the table below: 
Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sectors between 
2000 and 2013 
Date UK Germany 
2000  Legal separation between 
distribution and supply 
 
Offer and Ofgas merged 
to Ofgem 
2001-
2004 
  
2005  (Legal separation between 
generation and transmission)  
(Bundesnetzagentur has 
been established)  
2006   
2007  Legal separation between 
Distribution and supply 
                                               
66
 from the German regulator’s annual reports, available at: 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cln_1421/EN/General/Bundesnetzagentur/Publications/publicat
ions_node.html accessed: 15/06/2014 
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Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sectors between 
2000 and 2013 
Date UK Germany 
2008-
2010 
  
2011  Unbundling provisions of the 
Third EU package transposed 
2012   
2013 ERRA changes regulators’ 
competition law powers 
 
Figure 26 Summary of regulatory changes in the electricity sectors between 2000 and 2013 
In Germany before 2007 the incumbent basically enjoyed a monopoly position, the 
creation of the Bundesnetzagentur in 2005 did not affect the market structure, 
therefore, the period before 2007 is not shown below.   
 
Figure 27 UK electricity supply market shares (2000-2013) 
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Figure 28 Germany electricity supply market shares (2007-2012) 
There is a clear tendency of falling incumbent market shares in both cases, but in 
the UK the incumbents lost a share of 30% (on average) without mandatory legal 
separation, while in Germany even 5 years after the same unbundling the 
incumbents retained 80% of their markets, therefore it is hard to attribute the 
market share loss solely to the unbundling requirement. 
      
Eurostat (Electricity – Supply) 
 
There is Eurostat data available on the number of retailers from 2003 to 2010. This 
data shows that the number of retailers is fairly high in the UK (20-30 companies), 
but it cannot even compare to Germany, where the number of retailers is 
extremely high (around a 1000 companies).67  This looks promising at first sight 
                                               
67
 Cf ’Total number of electricity retailers to final consumers 2010’ available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Total_number_of_electri
city_retailers_to_final_consumers,_2010.png&filetimestamp=20120130132955#file accessed: 
12/07/2012 
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from the perspective of competitive. However, these numbers might be misleading 
considering that in 2006, 45% of the total electricity supplied can be accounted to 
the three biggest suppliers in Germany,68  and in the UK although according to 
Eurostat in 2008 there were 23 suppliers, an Ofgem report states that in the same 
year over 99% of the electricity was supplied by the Big 6 firms.69  
 
Bismut (Telecom) 
 
The study by Bismut compares the incumbents’ fixed call market shares between 
2001 and 2005.70  The regulatory changes during this period are summarized in the 
table below: 
Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications 
sectors between 2001 and 2005 
Date UK Germany 
2001-
2002 
  
                                               
68
 Federal Network Agency, ’2007 Report  by the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railway to the European Commission on the German electricity and 
gas market” available at: 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BNetzA/PressSection/ReportsPublic
ations/2007/MonitoringReport2007Id12648pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile accessed: 11/07/2012 
15 
69
 Ofgem, ’Energy Supply Probe - Initial Findings Report’ 140/08 available at: 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/ensuppro/Documents1/Energy%20Supply%20Probe%
20-%20Initial%20Findings%20Report.pdf accessed: 13/07/2012 27 
70
 Sophie Bismut (2006) 
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Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications 
sectors between 2001 and 2005 
Date UK Germany 
2003 The 2002 EU directives 
has been transposed 
(new SMP regime) 
 
Ofcom has been 
created (out of the 
merger of Oftel, the 
Radiocommunications 
Agency, the 
Broadcasting 
Standards and 
Independent 
Television 
Commission) 
2004  The 2002 EU directives has 
been transposed (new SMP 
regime) 
2005 BT has been 
functionally separated 
RegTP has been entrusted 
with electricity regulation 
Figure 29 Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sectors between 2001 and 2005 
The data enables the assessment of tendencies before and after the new SMP 
regulation was put in place in the UK (2003) and in Germany (2004), and Ofcom was 
created (2003).  
 
The data shows that both in the UK and in Germany the incumbents’ market share 
was falling during the period concerned.  Until 2001 BT’s respective market share 
was higher than Deutsche Telekom’s, but this changed in 2002, although in 
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Germany the reform started later than in the UK and within this period there was 
no difference in the regulations concerned.  The trend continued and by 2005 
Deutsche Telekom’s market share was considerably lower than BT’s, although BT 
was losing market share at the same time as well.71 
Telecommunications 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Germany 67.2%  61.1% 54.8% 49.7% 47.2% 
UK 62.0%  62.0% 60.0% 55.0% 55.0% 
Figure 30 Telecom incumbent market shares data (2001-2005) 
 
Figure 31Telecom incumbent market shares graph (2001-2005) 
There are no visible changes in the general tendencies at the times of the 
regulatory changes (2003 in the UK and 2004 in Germany). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
71
 Bismut (2006) 19 
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EUROSTAT (Telecom) 
 
Eurostat data is available on the incumbent’s market share from 2001 to 2005 in 
two different markets: 1) local, 2) national long distance and data on international 
calls is available until 2008 for the UK.  The regulatory changes during the whole 
period are summarized in the table below: 
Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications 
sectors between 2001 and 2005 
Date UK Germany 
2001-
2002 
  
2003 The 2002 EU directives 
has been transposed 
(new SMP regime) 
 
Ofcom has been 
created (out of the 
merger of Oftel, the 
Radiocommunications 
Agency, the 
Broadcasting 
Standards and 
Independent 
Television 
Commission) 
2004  The 2002 EU directives has 
been transposed (new SMP 
regime) 
2005 BT has been 
functionally separated 
RegTP has been entrusted 
with electricity regulation 
70 
 
Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications 
sectors between 2001 and 2005 
Date UK Germany 
2006-
2008 
  
Figure 32 Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sectors between 2001 and 2005 
According to this data, except for national long distance calls the trends in Germany 
are better than in the UK. While in the markets of local and national long distance 
calls both in the UK and in Germany the tendencies are better than the EU average, 
and by 2005 there is only a small difference between the UK’s and Germany’s 
incumbents’ market share, on the market of international calls BT managed to hold 
a strong position. 
 
 
Figure 33 Incumbents' market shares - local calls (2001-2005) 
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Figure 34 Incumbents' market shares - national long distance calls (2001-2005) 
 
Figure 35 Incumbents' market shares - international calls (2001-2005) 
Regulatory changes in the UK are not correlating with any unusual trends.  Neither 
the creation of Ofcom and the transposition of the new SMP regulation in 2003, nor 
the separation of BT in 2005 (as far as the data on the market shares for 
international calls is concerned) has been followed by differences in the existing 
market share trends.  Interestingly, in Germany the incumbent lost significant 
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market share both in the local and international calls just a year before the new 
SMP regulation came into effect.  
 
Ofcom and Bundesnetzagentur (Telecommunications – Broadband) 
 
It is interesting to assess another telecommunications market, broadband, that also 
involves the use of the local loop, but which is a relatively new and growing market.  
Data on the incumbents’ broadband market shares are available from Ofcom (BT 
broadband)72 and the Bundesnetzagentur (DT broadband)73 from 2002 to 2012.  
The regulatory changes that took place within this period are summarized in the 
table below: 
 Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sector 
between 2002 and 2012 
Date UK Germany 
2002   
2003 The 2002 EU directives has 
been transposed (new SMP 
 
                                               
72
 Post 2007 data: Ofcom, ’BT and Sky had the highest growth in broadband market share in 2012’ 
available at: stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-data/communications-
market-reports/cmr13/uk/UK-5.34 accessed at: 15/06/2014, 
Pre-2007: Ofcom, ’Impact of the Telecoms Strategic Review Evaluation’ available at: 
stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/telecoms/policy/bt/tsr_statement.pdf accessed at: 15/06/2014, 
p. 40  
73
 Bundesnetzagentur, ’Annual Report 2012 Energy, communications, mobility: shaping expansion 
together’ available at: 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BNetzA/PressSection/ReportsPublic
ations/2013/AnnualReport2012.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 accessed at: 15/06/2014, p. 75 
73 
 
 Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sector 
between 2002 and 2012 
Date UK Germany 
regime) 
Ofcom has been created 
(out of the merger of Oftel, 
the Radiocommunications 
Agency, the Broadcasting 
Standards and Independent 
Television Commission) 
2004  The 2002 EU directives has 
been transposed (new SMP 
regime) 
2005 BT has been functionally 
separated 
RegTP has been entrusted 
with electricity regulation 
2006-
2012 
  
Figure 36 Summary of regulatory changes in the telecommunications sector between 2002 and 2012 
There has been a significant decrease in DT’s (the German telecommunications 
incumbent’s) market share at the beginning of this period but the incumbent’s 
market share in the UK has generally been, and is still much lower than in Germany. 
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Figure 37 UK broadband market shares (2002-2012) 
 
Figure 38 Germany broadband market shares (2002-2012) 
In the UK neither the creation of Ofcom, nor the separation of BT resulted in any 
change in BT’s market share tendencies.  Also in Germany, the incumbent’s market 
share has already started to fall before the new SMP regulation came into force in 
2004, and continued to fall with roughly the same pace until 2006, therefore, 
according to this data it cannot be established that a change in the market share 
trends is linked to regulatory changes. 
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3.3. Consumer Satisfaction 
 
If competition enhances consumer satisfaction (as Geradin suggests 74 ) than 
enhanced consumer satisfaction might be a result of enhanced competition.  More 
generally, consumer satisfaction can be regarded as an evaluation of objective 
evidence.75    
The way consumers’ opinion should be used to enact new policies is not 
unproblematic, mainly because the objectivity of such data is questionable.  Prices 
and market share can be regarded as objective data, as it does not depend on one’s 
opinion, while consumer satisfaction is subjective: consumer A may be completely 
satisfied with a given price while consumer B may see it as too expensive,76 but 
overall trends are still informative.  Furthermore, leaving such input out of 
consideration at the policy-making would be undemocratic;77 ultimately policy 
makers are dependent on consumers support.78 Moreover, consumers’ feedback on 
regulatory development has a unique importance, as the reforms are ultimately 
aimed at enhancing their welfare.79  Consumer satisfaction is also shaped by 
important features such as the quality of the service that would be missed by 
looking at only prices and market shares. 
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 Damien Geradin, ‘Regulatory issues raised by network convergence: the case of multi-utilities’ 
(2001) 2 Journal of Network Industries, 113, 113 
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utility reform in the EU’, (2008) 12 Department of Economics Working Paper, University of Milan, 2 
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(2008) 36 Nota Di Lavoro available at: 
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Eurobarometer surveys 
 
Eurobarometer Surveys have been carried out on consumer satisfaction from an 
early stage of the reforms.  The surveys included both electricity and fixed 
telephony in all the Member States.  The same method was used to calculate 
consumer satisfaction in all the countries and sectors concerned therefore, the 
results can be used for a cross-country and cross-sectoral comparison.  The first one 
of the series was published in 1997,80 than follow-up surveys were published in 
2000,81 2002,82 200583 and 2007.84  The methodology used for the 1997 survey was 
different from the latter ones,85 which has to be taken into consideration when 
assessing the results.86  There was also a change after 2002: since then non-
consumers (of the service concerned) were surveyed as well.87  While the format of 
the 2005 and 2007 surveys show many similarities, there is one big difference: the 
2007 survey does not contain data on overall consumer satisfaction in respect of 
the countries and sectors concerned that is why it is not included in the graphs. 
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 EC, ’Eurobarometer 47.0: L’Europe des Consummateurs, Les Citoyens face a l’ouverture a la 
concurrence des monopoles de services public.’ 1997 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_110_public_fr.pdf accessed: 20/05/2012 
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Since, the surveys are carried out bi-annually, or even less frequently, it is unlikely 
that meaningful connections can be made with the regulatory changes.  The data is 
nevertheless useful to discover general tendencies. 
 
The overall measures of consumer satisfaction through time are summarized in the 
graph below: 
 
Figure 39 Consumer satisfaction - satisfied (1997-2004) 
According to Eurobarometer data, consumers are the most content with the UK 
electricity sector, there has been little change in this: it has been valued high 
throughout the period assessed.  84% of the consumers were satisfied with the 
fixed-telecommunications services of both the UK and Germany in 2004, however 
the German telecommunications sectors shows bigger improvement since 1997.  
Consumers were the less satisfied with the German electricity service in 2004, also 
its evaluations got much worse during the period concerned. The serious drop 
between 1997 and 2000 could have occurred due to the difference in the way the 
1997 survey was carried out, however in the other three sectors there is no trace of 
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a similar patter, which goes against such an argument.  Except for the German 
electricity sector, the consumer satisfaction levels are fairly above the EU average.  
 
Figure 40 Consumer satisfaction - dissatisfied (2000-2004) 
The Eurobarometer 47.0 (1997) did not contain data on the percentage of 
dissatisfied consumers, so in this aspect information is only available from 2000.  
The dissatisfaction ratios are in general consistent with the ranking established 
above: this means that there is relatively no big difference between consumers’ 
view of any given sector.  Having a high ratio of quite satisfied but also quite 
dissatisfied consumers would mean that there are big differences in the services of 
the sector.  Since this is not the case, we can assume that services tend to be rather 
homogeneous.  Consumers are the most dissatisfied with the German electricity 
sector.  While the statistics show some improvement between 2000 and 2002, the 
proportion of unsatisfied consumers has risen significantly by 2004.  Consumers 
were still more dissatisfied with the German telecommunications services than with 
the UK’s by 2004, however, the tendency there is slightly better than in the UK. The 
ratio of unsatisfied consumers is the lowest in the UK electricity sector. 
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The satisfaction levels so far are broadly consistent with what we expected based 
on the development of the reforms.  Within this period, among the reforms 
concerned the UK electricity reform has been the most mature: it started in 1989, 
with the unbundling of the generation and the transmission levels (but also the 
supply and the distribution businesses have been separated after 2000) and the 
creation of a regulatory authority.  The UK telecommunications sector is the second 
most mature (if we disregard the period dominated by the failed duopoly policy).  
The market has been liberalised, and a regulator has been created, although there 
has been no unbundling carried out within this time frame.  The 
telecommunications reform in Germany lagged behind the UK, but in 1998 a 
regulator has been created for the telecommunications sector as well, and SMP 
regulation has been applied.  In the Germany electricity sector, however until 2005 
there was no adequate regulatory supervision or unbundling.  
   
IPSOS INRA 
 
The European Commission ordered a consumer satisfaction survey in 2005 which 
was carried out by IPSOS INRA and was published in 2007.88  Interestingly, the 
results of this survey significantly differ from the 2004 Eurobarometer survey, 
although it was carried out only two years after that.   
 
The IPSOS survey shows that the ratio of satisfied German electricity consumers is 
considerably higher than the ratio of such UK consumers and also higher that the 
EU average.  The proportions of the latter two are fairly the same.  Also, the ratio of 
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 IPSOS INRA, ’Consumer Satisfaction Survey - Final Report’ (2007) available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/serv_gen/cons_satisf/consumer_service_finrep_en.pdf 
accessed: 22/05/2012  
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dissatisfied consumers is lower in Germany than in the UK, which is even higher 
than the EU average.    
 
Figure 41 Consumer satisfaction - electricity (2007) 
 
In terms of fixed telephone the results are not so straightforward: the ratio of 
satisfied German consumers is higher, however the ratio of dissatisfied German 
consumers is also higher than in the UK.  At the same time both countries are 
better than the EU average in both respects: satisfaction rate is higher, while 
dissatisfaction rate is lower.  
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Figure 42 Consumer satisfaction - telecommunications (2007) 
Overall, this source suggests that consumers are the most satisfied with the 
German electricity supply, where the ratio of satisfied consumers is the highest.  
They are the second most satisfied with German fixed telephony supply, where the 
ratio of satisfied consumers is the second higher overall, however, the ratio of 
dissatisfied consumers is considerably higher than in the German Electricity supply.  
The third in the ranking is the Uk’s fixed-telephony service, with the third highest 
ratio of satisfied consumers.  The UK electricity supply has the worst figures: it has 
the lowest ratio of satisfied consumers, and also a relatively high ratio of 
dissatisfied consumers.  This ranking is exactly the opposite of the 2004 
Eurobarometer survey’s. 
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Figure 43 Consumer satisfaction (2007) 
Within the two years between 2004 and 2006 considerable regulatory 
improvements were carried out in the German electricity sector.  The 
Bundesnetzagentur stepped up as a dedicated regulator (ex-ante) for the electricity 
sector and the generation levels has been separated from the transmission 
businesses (but distribution and supply still remained integrated).  Also the new 
SMP regulation came to effect in Germany in 2004. 
Furthermore, in the telecommunications sector of the UK the incumbent has been 
separated, while there was no change in the electricity regulation, and during the 
period satisfaction with telecommunication overtook electricity.  At the same time 
in Germany the telecommunications incumbent remained intact and consumer 
satisfaction with telecommunications was even higher in Germany than in the UK.    
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4 Analysis  
 
The assessment of the “objective” figures is rather complex.  Due to their obvious 
differences,89 they are not compared directly, but rather through their tendencies; 
we assess to what extent they reflect the initial expectations. 
 
Both the comparisons of price tendencies and changes in the incumbent market 
shares90 seem to suggest that the telecommunications reforms (a clear distinction 
between the UK and Germany cannot be made) have the best tendencies.  They are 
followed by the UK electricity reform, while the German electricity reform shows 
the worst trends.  
The Commission’s method of looking at wholesale electricity prices has been 
rejected on the basis that it does not take into account the incentives for cross-
financing and other data is used.  According to those data, until 2007-2008 
electricity prices in the UK were lower than in Germany, but since then the prices in 
the two countries got quite close while industrial electricity prices in the UK became 
even higher than in Germany.  Assessing the tendencies of the telecommunications 
prices is not straightforward.  In terms of household prices different sources have 
different results; however, generally prices tend to be lower in the UK, although UK 
prices are generally increasing, while they are generally falling in Germany.  The 
comparison of the tendencies of the business prices is simpler: they are clearly 
better in Germany than in the UK.      
                                               
89
 For example market shares in electricity generation and telecommunications obviously differ on 
the basis of structural intervention or simply naturally different starting points; in the UK the f 
generation portfolio was separated horizontally, in Germany numerous generators existed at the 
beginning of the reforms, while in telecommunications the incumbents were not divided 
horizontally.  Also comparing electricity prices to telecommunications prices would be comparing 
apples to oranges, although this could be overcome by using indexes. 
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 Although due to the already mentioned structural differences (which necessitated different data 
to be used) the cross-sectoral comparison of the market structures is not as robust as the cross 
sectoral price comparisons. 
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The assessment of the electricity market concentration data is fairly 
straightforward: after the series of mergers in Germany the generation level 
became much more concentrated than it is in the UK (although in an EU context, 
both countries are fairly unconcentrated).  The tendencies are the same in the 
supply levels: the UK incumbents lost market share to a much higher extent that 
their German counterparts.  In terms of the telecommunications sectors there are 
different results for the different markets (Germany is better in two, while the UK in 
one), but Bismut’s combined assessment suggests that the German tendencies are 
better.   
 
The assessment of the consumer surveys’ results is less straightforward. According 
to the Eurobarometer surveys, the tendencies between 1997 and 2004 are the best 
in the UK electricity industry.  This is followed by the telecommunications industries 
of the UK and Germany.  It is difficult to establish which one is superior out of these 
two, as according to the 2004 figures the UK is still ahead of Germany but since 
1997 the German tendencies are slightly better.  The German electricity sector has 
clearly the worst tendencies. 
However, a more recent soure, the IPSOS (2006) survey suggests that consumers 
are the most satisfied with the German electricity sector which is followed by the 
German Telecommunication sector, the UK’s telecommunications and lastly the 
UK’s electricity sector.       
Until 2004 (the last Eurobarometer survey) data on consumer satisfaction and 
prices and market share tendencies are broadly consistent.  However, the IPSOS 
survey carried out in 2006 shows a completely different picture: German 
consumers being more satisfied than consumers in the UK.  This is surprising at first 
sight, although it is consistent with the finding of Fiorio and Florio namely, that, 
there is no correlation between the advanced state of the reforms and consumer 
satisfaction.91  At the same time the “subjective” feedback does not seem to reflect 
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the “objective” data.  Pricing tendencies in all sectors has been improving in 
Germany after 2004 in compared to the UK, but in general and especially in 
electricity they still remained higher until 2006.  Arguably, there is a connection 
between the objective factors assessed so far and consumer satisfaction: according 
to the IPSOS survey “pricing issues are major factors determining consumer 
satisfaction”.92  The other factors assessed in the report are image and quality.  
Consumers tend to take quality for granted, so this factor only affects the overall 
consumer satisfaction to a minor extent.  The IPSOS report itself establishes that 
“[q]uality of service is the element that has the least influence on overall consumer 
satisfaction”.93  This is because these sectors generally speaking tend to work fine, 
and there is not much opportunity for further development.94 According to the 
IPSOS study, the suppliers’ image has a more significant role in telecommunications 
than in the electricity sector, however even this factor is considerably less 
important (in both sectors) then prices.  
The most significant finding in terms of consumer satisfaction is that the data does 
not support the superiority of telecommunications over electricity.  In the UK in 
2006 consumers were more satisfied with telecommunications than with electricity 
but before (between 1997 and 2004) it was the other way around.  In Germany by 
2004 the consumers were more content with electricity services then with 
telecommunications.  These results are unexpected since price tendencies are 
generally better in telecommunications than in electricity. 
The IPSOS survey notices this anomaly to some extent: although fixed-telephony 
prices have been high in the EU and recently there were serious reductions, 
consumers now regard fixed telephony as a very basic service and they are still not 
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content with the prices.  The Report does not go into details in terms of the 
reasons; it only shortly mentions two factors:  
• “liberalisation of the telecoms industry has put the spotlight on the different 
tariffs charged by different operators in different countries”  
• “competition between information technologies” 
 
It is true that in a democratic setup, before such elemental reforms are carried out, 
support of the public is essential.  At the same time convincing the public that the 
reforms are essential may easily lead to the exaggeration of the expected benefits.  
This, however, can strike back later on: having higher expectation about the 
benefits then it is realistic may result in the underestimation of the achievements.  
This argument still does not explain the differences between the two sectors in 
terms of consumer satisfaction, since similar reforms have been carried out in the 
electricity sector as well.  
The second reason, however reinforces the importance of techno-economic 
factors, while providing a more sound explanation for the matter.  While electricity 
has no alternatives, fixed telephony has.95  Mobile telephony offers a substitute to 
fixed telephony and at the same time that service is clearly superior to fixed 
telephony.  While both services enable consumers to communicate by voice, 
mobile has the advantage of portability: those having a mobile handset can reach 
and can be reached wherever they are.96  Fixed telephony is only an option when 
the consumer is at home, however, even in that case she might prefers to use her 
mobile phone, or might receive a call on her mobile phone.  The EU trends of the 
amount of voice calls made by fixed and mobile telephony seem to illustrate this: 
mobile is getting on the way up while fixed telephony is on the way down, 
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furthermore the share lost by fixed telephony is almost equal to the share gained 
by mobile telephony. 
 
Correlations between regulatory changes and changes in the trends of the 
outcomes were assessed in detail in the previous part.  While some distinctive 
trends in the data started after regulatory changes in the given sector97, in general 
we found no strong correlations between changes in the outcomes and changes in 
the regulations.  Since the factors defining the outcomes are quite complex, this 
result is not surprising.  At the same time it underlines the need for more 
qualitative approach when assessing the effects of the different regulations.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The general aim of this chapter (besides providing a general overview of the 
regulatory outcomes of the reforms) has been to assess the tendencies in the 
outcomes of the reforms, to see which sectors/country seem to achieve better, and 
so whether there may be scope for lessons to be learnt. 
There are many ways of assessing a sector reforms. This chapter uses three 
practical indicators: price and market share tendencies, and consumer satisfaction. 
With some limitations made earlier, according to the assessment of the price and 
market concentration tendencies, the telecommunications reform seems to have 
the best trends in both countries concerned.  Price tendencies are slightly better in 
Germany than in the UK, and the incumbent’s market share has been eroded to a 
much greater extent in the UK. The electricity reforms appear less successful: 
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however the tendencies in the UK’s electricity sector are still much better than the 
Germans’.   
Looking at consumer satisfaction data makes this conclusion less straightforward, 
since in Germany according to the latest survey consumers were more content with 
electricity than with telecommunications (although in the UK this was not the case).  
However, further analysis suggests that this is the result of non-regulatory factors 
which underlines the importance of such issues.  Consumers have very different 
perceptions about electricity and fixed-telephony.  They see electricity as an 
essential service, while fixed-telephony has alternatives and is therefore not that 
much indispensable.98 
The comparison of the UK’s and Germany’s electricity and telecommunications 
reform offer a good opportunity to compare regulatory solutions, because the 
regulatory attitudes differ significantly in these two member states and there are 
even more differences between the sectors concerned.  Between the 4 sectors 
concerned, 3 main regulatory differences have been identified, which concern: 
• unbundling, 
• regulatory institutions and 
• SMP regulation 
The analysis has found limited evidence for changes in the regulatory solutions 
correlating with the data.  This does not mean that the different regulatory 
solutions have no measurable effect on the data, but rather that in order to be able 
to evaluate these regulatory solutions a more qualitative approach is necessary. 
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III. Chapter 2: Vertical separation in Network Utilities: is 
the EU approach of applying different policies in 
different sectors justified? 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess whether the tendency of different regulatory 
priorities in the EU - namely increasingly stricter separation of the networks in the 
electricity sector and predominantly simple access regulation in 
telecommunications99 - is justified, considering that in theory stricter separation 
should lead to better access but, arguably, during this policy, competition 
developed better in the telecommunications than in the electricity sector.  The UK 
is compared to Germany, in order to be able to carry out cross country (as well as 
cross-sectorial) analysis.  The attitude towards vertical separation between these 
countries is very different: the UK typically choses stronger while Germany weaker 
solutions, which make them an interesting basis of comparison. 
The chapter has two parts.  The first part looks at the theory behind vertical 
separation while the second looks at the issue in practice.  The theoretical part 
starts with describing the pros and cons of vertical separation, focusing on 
efficiency.  The second section of the first part focuses on competition and vertical 
separation (between monopolistic and competitive levels).  The third part looks at 
the different degrees of vertical separation.  The first part concludes that vertical 
separation could result in efficiency gains or losses, but it should facilitate 
competition because it makes entry easier.  The different degrees of separation 
may be used to strike a balance between the two: enabling higher efficiency (when 
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integration leads to enhanced efficiency) while providing adequate entry and 
thereby facilitating competition. 
The second part tests whether vertical separation does facilitate entry in practice.  
First the relevant EU regulations are described.  Then the basis of the comparison, 
the regulatory solutions chosen by the UK and Germany (within the EU framework) 
are presented.  The different degrees of vertical separation having been used in 
these countries are then contrasted to data on entry from the previous chapter. 
The assessment finds that in electricity stricter regulation is followed by the 
incumbents’ market share loss, but there is no evidence for this in 
telecommunication, which justifies the different policies for the sectors. 
   
Introduction 
 
It is well-understood that vertical integration can hinder competition when market 
power exists on one of the production levels concerned.  This is because, when 
there is a dominant firm on one of the levels in the supply chain, this firm can 
leverage (or maintain) its market power to the competitive level through vertical 
integration by discriminating against competitors on the competitive level.100   
Electricity and telecommunications are both network industries.  This means that in 
their supply chain there is a network that is essential to provide services for the 
consumers.  Arguably, it is not economically viable to duplicate these networks, 
which means that they constitute a natural monopoly.101  From the argument 
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above it follows that in order to facilitate competition integration between the 
network and the other (potentially competitive) levels of the supply chain should be 
prevented.  As a matter of fact the key idea behind the sector reforms, creating 
competition, was meant to be achieved by localizing the monopolistic element and 
keeping it contained.102  Thereby, competition can emerge on the rest of the levels.  
The regulatory solutions put in place to contain the monopolistic element are, 
therefore, of crucial importance from the perspective achieving the aim of the 
reforms: creating competition in the electricity and telecommunications sectors.    
One of the main differences between the electricity and telecommunications 
reforms is in these regulatory arrangements, which are responsible for the 
restriction of monopoly: in the electricity sector the monopolistic levels have been 
strictly separated while in the telecommunications regulation only access 
regulation has been initiated to tackle leveraging of market power by discriminating 
against competitors on the access terms.103   
Although in the electricity sector the regulatory solutions put in place to contain the 
monopoly are generally stronger than the ones used in the telecommunications 
sectors, there is no clear indication for competition to be stronger in the electricity 
sector than in the telecommunications sector.  Paradoxically, there seem to be 
more evidence suggesting the opposite: more competition in the 
telecommunications sectors than in the electricity sectors.   
This chapter aims to answer whether the different regulatory vision in respect of 
vertical separation in the electricity and telecommunications sector is justified in 
practice.  In answering the question, first the pros and cons of vertical integration 
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are described to show how vertical integration may lead to enhanced or reduced 
efficiencies (depending on several factors).  This is taken forward by assessing how 
vertical integration – when it is combined with market power in one of the levels – 
eliminates competition in the market where there was no market power previously.  
Such practice may decrease consumer welfare even if integration otherwise 
increases the efficiency of the enterprise.   This is may be a threat in the sectors 
concerned because of the network, which constitute a bottleneck.104 
The theoretic background is followed by the assessment of legal solutions available 
(vertical separation to different degrees and access regulation) to enable 
efficiencies while preventing the leveraging of market power.  Arguably the better 
is a solution in preventing the leveraging of market power the weaker it is in 
enabling for enhanced efficiencies.  This part is followed by the description of the 
EU regulatory tendencies.  Although in a sense the relevant EU policy is the starting 
point, by putting it here we can build on the previous points.  In the next parts we 
compare these different solutions in practice.  The paper describes the regulatory 
developments in the UK and Germany in detail.  Assessing the regulations of these 
countries is informative as that they have generally opted for different solutions 
(the UK went for stronger separation while Germany opted for weaker solutions in 
both sectors), therefore they can serve as a good material for comparison. 
After describing the different regulatory solutions applied, the next step is the 
assessment.  The paper uses the incumbents’ market share as described in Chapter 
1 and analyses it in light of the detailed case studies.  Prices and consumer 
satisfaction data are disregarded since they are more remotely connected to 
vertical integration than market shares.  In practice market concentration data is 
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arguably the main indicator105 regulators and competition authorities rely on when 
analysing market power and competition on a market.   
 
Part 1: The theory behind vertical separation 
 
Under this section the general theory behind vertical separation is described: what 
is vertical separation good for, what are the drawbacks and what are the different 
options about the subject. 
 
1.1 The pros and cons of vertical integration   
 
From a technological perspective most products and services go through different 
phases before reaching the end-users.  Each phase can be described as a 
production level whose output constitutes an input used by the next level.  These 
levels altogether constitute the value-chain of a product or service. 
A single company may be involved in one or more of these production phases.  
Essentially the company has to decide whether it is more beneficial for it to produce 
the input for itself/keep on processing its output further (depending on the 
perspective), or just focus on a certain process, and buy the needed input/sell their 
output to another company.106 
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Factors that determine whether the best option for a firm is to trade with another 
level or integrate with it have been studied for some time therefore the issue is 
generally well-understood. 
 
1.1.1 Pros 
 
Economic theory suggests that vertical integration leads to considerable efficiency 
gains in sectors where sunk costs are substantial, and where complexity and 
uncertainty is significant. Thus, in such cases the benefits of vertical integration 
might outweigh the benefits of vertical separation.107  Vertical separation also 
results in smaller firms, which makes it harder for them to access external funding 
and makes takeovers (horizontal integration) more likely.108 
 
Some of the benefits of vertical integration are related to the elimination of certain 
transaction cost.  The key element of the bargaining procedure is to share the 
surplus achievable through the transaction.  In the market a seller will make a deal 
if the price is above its marginal costs and a buyer will ultimately agree to any price 
which is lower than her reservation price.  Therefore, when the reservation price of 
the buyer is higher than the cost of the seller a deal can be concluded.  However, 
the price can theoretically be anywhere between the reservation price and the 
marginal cost of the product.  In practice, therefore the parties will bargain to 
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achieve as much surplus for themselves as possible.  This bargaining process can be 
costly both in terms of time and money (transaction costs109).   
Besides eliminating key financial counter-incentives, integration is likely to result in 
enhanced cooperation and coordination.  Managers of the same firm can be easily 
incentivised to promote cooperation and coordination within the enterprise.  
Disputes can also be settled internally, which is likely to be quicker and less costly 
than formal litigation or even any sort of arbitration.110 
Working for the same company can create “clan-like” emotions which ultimately 
promote productivity.  Trainings and other means of socialising within the company 
develops institutional and personal trusted relationships.  Information asymmetry 
exists between people working at the different branches of the integrated company 
as well, but understanding that they ultimately work for the prosperity of the same 
enterprise, they are less likely to exploit this information advantage than people 
working for separate companies.111 
An integrated firm has better information.  Any firm will know its own business 
better than its business partners’.  By merging to another level the firm’s first-hand 
information is extended as well.  More formally, the firm has the right to audit its 
own branches but it cannot freely do that with its business partner.  Besides, as the 
surplus of the transactions stay within the organisation the branches have less 
incentive to use their information strategically.112  Better information leads to 
better decisions.113 
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From the society’s perspective one of the major benefits of integration is that in 
such cases (i.e. where both of the levels are monopolistic or there is market power) 
vertical integration prevents double marginalisation.114  When the production is 
done by two different companies in two different levels before it gets to the 
consumer both companies build their own profits in the price of the product, while 
if it is done by one entity the profit is only added once, and at the end the 
consumer price may be lower.115  Therefore, vertical separation and still imperfect 
competition may ultimately lead to higher costs to consumers than vertical 
integration.116  When the production levels are integrated in one company the 
surplus will stay within one entity and there will be no bargaining.  All the relevant 
costs can be saved.117 
 
1.1.2 Cons 
 
Vertical integration has disadvantages (related to efficiency) as well.  Generally 
these may come as enhanced bureaucratic, strategic and production costs. 
At the heart of enhanced bureaucratic cost there is the increase of size through 
vertical integration.  As the size of the company increases the governance is getting 
more complex which requires more staff.  While there is a potential of better 
communications, coordination etc. within the organisation (as compared to trading 
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partners) this may only materialise at additional costs.  Higher organisational 
complexity can hamper previously well-functioning structures.118           
Vertical integration may lead to higher production costs.  First of all, vertical 
integration causes a situation that is similar to monopoly.  For example the 
acquired supplier (upstream) company will no longer have to compete with other 
firms for sales; the whole purpose of the acquisition is that the downstream firm 
will use the acquired company to produce the necessary inputs.  Therefore, just like 
a monopoly, the acquired business, can enjoy a quiet life not focusing so much on 
cost-effectiveness.  Another issue is efficiency of scale.  If efficiency of scale is 
considerable and the company’s demand is limited, than the company will face 
enhanced costs.119  Demand fluctuation can cause a similar problem, because when 
less input is needed for the production downstream, the acquired (upstream) 
business may have over-capacity which is ultimately inefficient.120     
After the (vertical) integration the firm is locked in: it has to stick to one supplier.  
This has multiple implications.  While it has been suggested earlier that vertical 
integration may help to eliminate asymmetric information, there is also an 
argument that access to alternative information will be lost since connections to 
other suppliers will be severed.  Integrating to another level may also involve the 
acquisition of assets that ultimately enhance the firm’s sunk costs (higher exit 
barriers).  Integration also reduces the firm’s strategic flexibility; after the 
acquisition of another business divestiture can cause administrative and other 
issues and may lead to a commitment for the business even if it sets back the 
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company and using the services of another company would be more 
advantageous.121 
When the industries are integrated, the issues arising out of the separation as an 
intervention should also be considered.  Vertical separation may be a drastic 
interference with private rights,122 although, this is rather just an issue when at the 
time of the separation the sector is in private ownership.123  Moreover separation 
in itself will incur some costs.124  Ultimately, the assessment of the benefits 
expected from artificial vertical separation should also take into account that rapid 
technical evolution may change the face of the sectors naturally.125 
 
1.2 Concerns over competitiveness: the monopolistic element(s) 
in electricity and telecommunications sectors 
 
It has been shown that whether integration or trade is more beneficial for a 
company depends on multiple factors.  Companies are likely to expand to a related 
level of the distribution chain when such a move is more beneficial than using 
another firm’s services on that related level.126   
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But what does this imply for society?  Vertical integration may lead to enhanced 
productive efficiency, but may at the same time lead to market power and 
therefore less total welfare, so to a less efficient outcome from the society’s 
perspective.  This is illustrated in the graph below: 
 
Figure 44 Illustration: competition vs. monopoly 
Here we assume that integration leads to lower costs than separation (MCint ˂ 
MCsep).
127  If the company is integrated and there is competition the society will be 
able to purchase an amount of Q3 for a price that is equal to MCint.  In the lack of 
integration due to the lower efficiency the price is going to be somewhat higher 
(=MCsep) and the sold quantity is lower (Q2).  The worst case scenario arises out of a 
lack of competition, when even though the company can produce efficiently, it will 
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charge a monopoly price which is higher than in both previous cases (Pm(i) ˃ MCsep ˃ 
MCint) and the quantity sold (Q1) will also be the lowest (Q3 ˃ Q2 ˃ Q1).
128   
In a competitive setup the firm is forced to look for the most efficient solutions.  
Higher efficiency allows the firm to compete with its rivals by offering better deals 
to the consumers.  Ultimately, therefore, in a competitive market gains arising out 
of enhanced efficiency will be passed-on to the consumers.  Accordingly, vertical 
integration in itself may not be harmful for competition or consumers,129 but (when 
leading to higher efficiency) may rather benefit them. 
Vertical integration is rather just harmful for consumers and is unwanted from a 
competition point of view, when it is combined with some sort of horizontal 
integration as well, which results in market power on one of the levels,130 or when 
market power is already existent in one of the levels concerned.  Multi-product 
firms often cross subsidise between their businesses.131  From a competition 
perspective this is only a concern when it enables exclusionary practices.132  This is 
reflected by competition law, which is generally less strict when it comes to vertical 
integration than horizontal integration.133  
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In the industries concerned, however, this is exactly the case.  The Electricity 
industry can be separated into four different levels: 134 generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply.135 Electricity is produced by generators, transmitted via 
high voltage wires over longer distance then it is distributed to lower voltage wires 
and gets supplied to the consumers.136  Electricity cannot be stored,137 therefore 
the system should be balanced to make sure that the quantity produced and 
consumed is constantly equal,138 this creates another function that has to be 
carried out: balancing of the demand and supply.  In the electricity sector the 
„bottlenecks” are the transmission and distribution networks.139 Their duplication is 
not viable, or at least has not been carried out yet.  These monopolistic levels are in 
between the two competitive levels: generation and supply.   
Fixed telecommunications services work essentially as the following. A home device 
(telephone, modem etc.) sends and receives electric signals.  These signals are 
transported by a wire to the first switch (in the case of the UK so called Digital Local 
Exchange).  The network between the premises and the first switch is called the 
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local loop, which arguably still cannot be duplicated in an economically viable way, 
and therefore constitutes the bottleneck of the sector, although the cable networks 
can offer an alternative.140  In practice there are multiple levels of switches in the 
network and more variations of how the signals can be transported to the receiver, 
whose device (again, telephone, modem etc.) interprets the electric signal.141  
Network utilities in most European countries used to be organized as one vertically 
integrated monopoly.142  It is interesting to note that in the earlier on, integrated 
firms’ ability to cross subsidize was seen as a plus, since it enabled the firms to 
pursue social goals, such as provide affordable services to customers in rural areas 
where providing the service would perhaps not been profitable (or would simply be 
very expensive) on the cost of other customers.143  Vertical integration was 
combined with market power, because of the link between the network (the 
monopoly element) and the incumbent present in the competitive level(s) as well.  
The reason for this was that an essential part of these industries is the network, 
which cannot be duplicated in an economically viable way and, therefore, 
constitutes natural monopoly. 144   Vertical integration was considered to be 
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beneficial because of scale and scope economies.  Some form of regulation145 was 
put in place to prevent the monopoly from charging monopoly prices and thereby 
causing deadweight welfare loss for the society.146  This view was heavily criticised 
in the `80s for being inefficient.147 
The idea behind the reform is that, although the network is a true natural 
monopoly,148 the services attached to it can be provided by more than one firms,149 
hence competition can emerge, with all its potentially beneficial effects.150  This 
mixed system comprising of regulated monopolistic level(s) and connected 
competitive levels have been anticipated to lead to higher consumer welfare than 
an integrated regulated monopoly.151  
 
Simply liberalising the sectors did not seem to be a viable option for achieving 
competition 152 , as the incumbent would most likely restrict access to this 
network,153 which is still more or less a natural monopoly154 and make the entry of 
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new firms impossible.155  Squeezing the competitors’ margins and thereby making 
them unprofitable156 is a major threat since it only requires vertical integration and 
dominance on the level which competitors need as an input157, both of which are 
given in the sectors concerned.  At the same time tackling these practices is difficult 
because it essentially requires the establishment of a fair price (based on fair 
costs).158 
As part of reforming ex-monopoly network industries, some sort of legal 
intervention159 (regulation160) was necessary to control monopoly power161 and to 
enable competition and enhance its development.162  Providing access is still a key 
issue and will remain so as long as the network will constitute a bottleneck in the 
supply chain. 
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1.3 Regulatory solutions: regulated access vs. vertical separation  
  
There are two separate problems when a vertically integrated firm provides access 
to a monopolistic market: 1.) charging monopoly price for access and 2.) 
discriminating between competitors on the competitive level.    
 
There are two complementary tools available to tackle the problem163: 
 
 Vertical separation: by separating the monopolistic part of the industry 
from the incumbent, the new individual firm that deals with the network 
has no incentive 164  to treat competitive firms requests for access 
differently165 i.e. to favour the incumbent.166 This means that anti-
competitive discrimination is no longer an issue for the regulation 
(although even an unbundled network operator will have a general 
incentive for price discrimination, just like every other company with 
market power 167 ).  Prices, however, should be still regulated, as 
otherwise the network operator could (and probably would) charge 
monopoly prices.168   
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 Access regulation: regulating the price and other terms of access can 
also ensure that other firms – the competitors of the incumbent – have 
the same possibility to use the network as the incumbent, without 
discrimination and without paying supra-competitive prices.  As far as 
the access discrimination issue is concerned,169 in theory170  vertical 
separation and access regulation are alternatives of each other. The big 
difference is that, while vertical separation eliminates the incentives of 
the company managing the monopolistic assets to discriminate against 
companies who seek access, access regulation only prevents the 
monopolistic company to act according to its natural incentives.171 
It has been shown that vertical integration may lead to enhanced efficiency on the 
company’s level, but in the cases concerned (due to the monopolistic element) this 
integration would likely to go against fair access to the network, which is a crucial 
element.  By ordering vertical separation these efficiencies can be lost.172  There 
might be however solutions for providing fair access without losing the efficiencies 
arising out of vertical integration.173 Separation can be carried out to different 
extents.  This is important, because less complete version may still allow (to some 
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extent) for efficiencies that arise out of vertical integration, but at the same time, 
arguably, they are less effective in providing fair access.   
 
There are many ways of categorising separation and ranking them as stronger or 
weaker in terms of the fullness of separation.  It is generally accepted that 
ownership unbundling is the fullest form of separation while accounting separation 
is the weakest, but studies use different categories. 
   
Xavier and Ypsilanti174 analyse vertical separation in the telecommunications sector.  
They set up the following 6 categories: 
• Accounting, functional and corporate separation.  
• Separation into regional operators 
• Separation of local from long-distance services 
• Separation of local and mobile services 
• Separation of local and broadband/advanced services 
• Separation of an incumbent into smaller, vertically integrated, carriers.175  
 
Cave 176  – analysing also the telecommunications regulation – establishes 6 
categories, between accounting separation and ownership unbundling, so in total 
he differentiates between 8 categories: 
• (Ownership separation) 
• Legal separation (separate legal entities under the same ownership)  
• Business separation with separate governance arrangements  
• Business separation with localised incentives  
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• Business separation  
• Virtual separation  
• Creation of a wholesale division  
• (Accounting separation).177   
 
In practice the picture is even more varied. The legislation that defines the exact 
measures in terms of unbundling and access pricing are much more detailed and 
there can be many differences in those details. Therefore, in theory it is possible to 
make a distinction among even more types (levels) of vertical separation and access 
regulation.178 
In the EU’s legal terminology there are three different forms of vertical unbundling, 
listed here from the most to the least strict solutions: 
 Ownership unbundling: That is the strictest and most complete form 
of separating the monopolistic part, such unbundling means that the 
incumbent and the firm that takes care of the network are two totally 
separate entities. This ensures that there are no incentives to 
discriminate between the competitive firms. 
 Legal unbundling: This means that the network is managed by a legally 
different firm, however this firm can be owned by the incumbent or 
by other related entity.179  The owners’ interest is still maximising the 
profits achievable altogether by the firms they own on the different 
levels.  This type of separation is less strict then ownership 
unbundling, but still stricter then accounting separation.  The 
potential advantage of legal unbundling over ownership unbundling is 
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that it may still allow for the realisation of some synergies that would 
be lost under ownership unbundling, although some argues that legal 
unbundling will eliminate synergies that arise out of issues being dealt 
with within one entity as well.180  
 Accounting separation: Such requirement means that the network 
may be operated by a firm that is also active on a vertically connected 
market,181 but separate accounts have to be maintained of the two 
types of activities (competitive and monopolistic).  The reason for this, 
is that it leads to more transparency within the integrated unit, the 
regulator has better information, so it can – at least in theory – 
prevents cross-subsidization.182 
In this paper, these three categories are used because these can be applied well to 
electricity as well as the telecommunications sector, allowing for more 
straightforward comparisons. 
 
This paper is primarily concerned with the different types of vertical separation (as 
mentioned above).  However, as it is heavily connected to the issue of vertical 
separation, it has to be noted that there are also two different types of access 
regulation can be found in the EU’s legal terminology: 
1. Negotiated Third Party Access (nTPA): This is probably the most 
flexible type, where electricity industry participants can conclude 
deals by themselves.  There are no restrictions on transmission 
charges, they are only subject to general competition law, in other 
words there is no ex ante regulation only ex post intervention on the 
basis of competition law is possible. 
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2. Regulated Third Party Access (rTPA): Here the terms and tariffs of 
accessing the network are fixed ex ante, and so eligible customers can 
be aware of the charges before concluding a deal.  It is definitely a 
stronger measure, and it turned out to be more efficient as well in 
terms of facilitating access. 
It is worth noting that competition law can also be a tool to ensure access,183 
especially through the essential facilities doctrine.184  However, competition law is 
an ex-post type of intervention which means that in each case a complete 
procedure has to be carried out, before (if the case has been successful) the 
monopolistic company is obliged to provide access.  Of course, this is rather only 
helpful when such type of abuse of dominance occurs only occasionally.  
Considering that in the previously monopoly network industries problems with 
getting access was far from occasional, and therefore ex-ante regulation – which 
obliges the monopolistic company to provide access by pre-defined terms in 
advance – is much more effective in such cases.185   Sector regulation normally also 
provides the possibility of imposing duties in order to facilitate access that are not 
possible under the “essential facilities” doctrine of competition law.186 
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1.4 Conclusion to Part 1 
 
From the arguments above it is clear that in theory vertical separation can be used 
to provide better access.  However vertical separation has its downsides as well, 
which cannot be ignored. The discussion of the pros and cons of vertical integration 
makes it clear that a rule against vertical integration may lead to loss of efficiency.   
The different degrees of separation provide intermediate solutions facilitating 
access but saving some of the efficiencies arising out of integration.  There are costs 
and benefits to all of the above-mentioned regulatory options.  Having understood 
the importance of containing the monopolistic element, separation might look 
much more attractive than access regulation.  After all, it is clear that from the 
perspective of containing the monopolistic element(s), vertical separation is a 
stronger solution than access regulation, because it eliminates the monopoly’s 
incentive to try to leverage its monopoly power to the competitive level.  When 
vertical separation is required by law, the monopoly cannot be involved in 
operations on those levels and therefore cannot get profit from those levels.  This 
eliminates the incentives for interfering with competition on the competitive 
levels.187   
 
Part 2: Vertical separation in practice 
 
This part concerns the practical effects of vertical separation.  First, the part looks 
at the EU framework and then the actual solutions adopted in different Member 
States within this framework.  Secondly, the market developments that followed 
the adoption of these solutions are described.  Lastly, the two is contrasted to see 
what practical effects can be attributed to the regulations. 
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2.1 EU regulatory choices  
 
Having discussed the regulatory options and their pros and cons, the next part’s 
primary aim is to describe the regulatory solutions chosen by the EU two ensure fair 
access in electricity and telecommunications. 
Besides the aim of describing the adequateness of the policy in detail, the EU 
regulation is presented as it has key importance form the German regulation’s 
perspective, and it also sets requirements for the UK regulation which, however, 
generally preceded it.    
 
2.1.1 The Electricity reforms  
 
At the beginning of the EU liberalisation (1990-1996) all the different industrial set-
ups that existed in Europe had to be taken into account.188 
The political attitudes were also very different, so reaching a common point in the 
EU was a quite difficult task.189  
The first real breakthrough was signalled by Directive 96/92/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for 
the internal market in electricity.  This directive was the first move towards a 
uniform electricity market.  The directive opened the markets at least partially: the 
biggest consumers now had the right to choose their suppliers.  At the same time, 
the Member States were allowed to open the market for smaller consumers as 
well.  The only obligation was that by 2003, 35% of the total consumption should be 
freed.190  
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EU law did not require any horizontal unbundling, which was an essential part of 
the UK reform process at the generation level.191  
In terms of vertical separation - because of the strong opposition towards 
unbundling by some Member States - the Directive of 1996 only prescribed that:  
“(i)ntegrated electricity undertakings shall, in their internal accounting, 
keep separate accounts for their generation, transmission and 
distribution activities, and, where appropriate, consolidated accounts for 
other, non-electricity activities, as they would be required to do if the 
activities in question were carried out by separate undertakings, with a 
view to avoiding discrimination, cross-subsidization and distortion of 
competition”.192 
The Directive contained three basic options to arrange access to the monopolistic 
levels namely to the transmission and distribution networks: 
1. Negotiated access (nTPA)  
2. Regulated access (rTPA)193 
3. Single buyer system194 
The Directive was quite flexible in general, and on the issue of access as well which 
could result in weak solutions when it came to the implementation.  This flexibility 
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was the result of the compromises that were necessary 195  to enact such a 
regulation.196  
The First Directive (1996) was rather just the primary step necessary for creating a 
united and competitive electricity market, but was far from an adequate tool to 
achieve this goal. The Second Directive enacted in 2003 went further. The most 
important advance from our perspective was achieved by the second directive 
concerning unbundling and access regulation.  
Management unbundling and accounting separation was no longer sufficient, the 
minimum level of unbundling was set higher.  According to the Article 10:  
“Where the transmission system operator is part of a vertically 
integrated undertaking, it shall be independent at least in terms of its 
legal form, organisation and decision making from other activities not 
relating to transmission. These rules shall not create an obligation to 
separate the ownership of assets of the transmission system” 
This concerns only Transmission System operators, but Article 15. 1 prescribes the 
same obligations (basically word-for-word) for distribution system operators. 
Essentially, the second directive required legal unbundling of the monopolistic 
facilities, which meant that the transmission and distribution network operators 
should become separate legal entities.  Ownership separation was still not required, 
although such solution was is in compliance with the Directive.   
Also, the rules on accessing the network became much stricter. 197  The previously 
enjoyed wide discretion of member states to choose between several options had 
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been restricted to compulsory regulated access.198  Article 20 contained the rules 
on access.  Member States had to create a “system of third party access to the 
transmission and distribution systems based on published tariffs, applicable to all 
eligible customers and applied objectively and without discrimination between 
system users”.  According to Article 23 of the Directive Member States had to set 
up an independent regulatory authority, who was responsible (among others) for 
the enforcement of the access regulation.  The regulator had to approve at least 
the method of calculating the access tariffs. 
The latest electricity directive (Directive 2009/72/EC) establishes that the previous 
unbundling regime was insufficient and prescribes stricter unbundling for 
transmission system operators.  Ownership separation is regarded as the best 
solution, but two alternative options (the independent system operator and the 
independent transmission operator) are still available for integrated electricity 
companies (but the ones that carried out ownership separation already may not go 
“back” and chose either of these alternative options). 
Under the new rules unbundling of the distribution networks remained essentially 
unchanged.199  
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2.1.2 The Telecommunications Reforms  
 
The first phase of the EU telecommunications reform dates back to 1984.  However, 
at this time, the EU legislation focused solely on the technological issues, such as 
creating common standards, specifications and promoting compatibility that 
way.200 
In the next phase, which started off in 1987, the key aim became the full 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in all Member States of the EU.  This 
aim was reached gradually: in 1988 only exclusive rights in connection with the 
terminal equipments had been abolished by the Equipment Directive201.  This 
directive also prescribed the establishment of a regulator who ensures the proper 
application of the rules of the directive.202  The Commission used its powers defined 
by Article 86(3) of the EC Treaty (currently Article 106(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union), according to which: “[t]he Commission shall 
ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and shall, where necessary, 
address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.”203  Therefore, the 
legal basis of the liberalisation was essentially provided by competition law.  This 
practice was far from being an ordinarily applied method and was not welcomed by 
all Member States. In fact directives established by the Commission on this basis 
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were initially challenged in front of the European Court of Justice who, however, 
considered this practice legitimate.204 
  
In 1990, the exclusive rights about providing public telecommunications services 
had been abolished, except for telephony.  The concept of the Open Network 
Provision was also introduced in order to provide “open and efficient access”, 
initially only to the networks and to reserved services.205  Later on, the Open 
Network Provision was expanded to other fields as well.206  
Further developments led to the 1998 package, which carried out the full 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in the EU.  The main task of the 
1998 package was to handle the transition of the sector from a monopolistic setup 
to a competitive one.  The connections with the EU competition law in the future 
were already seen as inevitable and, therefore, the package was supported by 
guidelines on the application of competition law in the telecommunications 
sector.207  Also a “Notice on the application of the competition rules to access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector” was published, which was based on 
the previously mentioned Guidelines.  This notice was aimed especially at the 
application of competition law on access issues in the telecommunication sector. 
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The Interconnection Directive208 concerned access on the EU level for the first time, 
prescribing accounting separation.209  Before this directive Member States were 
free to deal with the problem in any way they wanted to.210   
The Directive contained two systems for providing access for two types of 
providers: 
1. All the reasonable requests for access made should have been met by the 
providers listed in Annex 1 of the Directive and have Significant Market 
Power.211 
2. Right of negotiating on access was conferred to the entities listed in Annex 
2 of the Directive, which also meant an obligation of negotiating in case 
they had been approached to provide access by another Annex 2 firm.212  
As part of the 1998 package Significant Market Power (SMP) regulation – a concept 
modelled after the concept of dominance in competition law – was introduced, 
according to which companies having a market share of 25% or more were 
presumed to be organizations with significant market power and might, therefore, 
be subjected to special ex-ante regulation.  
At the European Council of Lisbon, on the 23 and 24 March 2000, the aim of 
cheaper and faster internet service throughout Europe has been articulated (as part 
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of the eEurope Action Plan), and local loop unbundling was projected to be the way 
leading towards the realisation of that aim.213 
The legislation became stronger and stronger: later on that year a 
Recommendation 214  was issued on local loop unbundling recommending 
“appropriate legal and regulatory measures be adopted to mandate, by 31 
December 2000, full unbundled access to the copper local loop of notified 
operators under transparent, fair, and non-discriminatory conditions”215 
The Recommendation was followed by a Regulation, 216  which required that 
operators designated by the national regulatory authorities (so called “Notified 
Operators”217) “meet reasonable requests from beneficiaries for unbundled access 
to their local loops and related facilities, under transparent, fair and non-
discriminatory conditions”.218 
The 1998 package was changed in 2003.  At the end of the transition period, there 
was a need for a new framework which regulated all the different means of 
electronic communications.  The package was designed to deal with the challenges 
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of the constantly and unpredictably changing environment, the dynamical growth 
of the markets and the numerous new entrants and the interactions between the 
markets.219 
The New Regulatory Framework (2003 package)220 consisted of a Framework 
directive that gave the background and four special directives, out of which one 
dealt with access.  
Within the New Regulatory Framework, the use of self-regulation has not been 
accepted “expresssis verbis” while, for example in the UK, this is considered to be 
an inevitable part of the deregulation process.221  Under this Directive, all public 
electronic telecommunications network operators had the duty to negotiate access 
with each other, not just the ones mentioned in Appendix II of the 1997 
Interconnection Directive.222  There were still special rules for operators having 
SMP but the rules on who can be assigned as such, changed considerably. The 
“SMP” concept was largely adjusted to the dominant position concept of 
competition law, thereby abolishing the former conflict between them, which has 
been criticised by Germany. 
The most recent update of the EU telecommunications regulations has been carried 
out in 2009.  The regulation still relies primarily on access regulation. In terms of 
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vertical separation, the preamble of the 2009  Directive223  still only mentions that 
“[i]n exceptional cases, functional separation may be justified as a remedy where 
there has been persistent failure to achieve effective non-discrimination” (para 61). 
 
2.1.3 In summary: 
 
The EU took a step-by-step approach towards structural changes, but there is clear 
preference for stronger separation when it comes to electricity, especially between 
the generation and the transmission levels.   
One of the main reasons for this is that an integrated company have no incentive in 
developing the network in a way that promotes competition, for example by 
creating more interconnections – which would enhance competition and would at 
the same time promote market unification in the EU.224  At the same time synergies 
are likely to be less important when it comes to the common ownership of 
generation and transmission than distribution and supply.  In contrast the 
telecommunications primarily relies on access regulation and vertical separation is 
rather just reserved for exceptional cases. 
There is an implicit assumption that due to differences between the sectors, the 
importance of vertical separation is different.   
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2.2 Case studies of the Member States concerned 
 
The EU legislation concerned offers a certain flexibility in all cases: Member States 
an choose between less or more strict solutions, when implementing the directives.  
In order to be able to compare the effects arising out of less and more strict 
solutions the case studies should represent the two ends of this spectrum.  
Accordingly in the following, the paper assesses two countries; the UK and 
Germany, because as it will be shown, Germany tends to opt for less while the UK 
has generally implemented more strict solutions. 
 
2.2.1 The electricity sector 
 
2.2.1.1 The UK 
 
In the UK before the reform, the Central Electricity Generating Board was 
responsible for all the generation and transmission functions225, while twelve Area 
Boards were set up to deal with distribution and supply.226 Although there was 
connection with the Scottish and Irish systems, the English-Welsh system de facto 
operated on its own.227   
In the UK the reforms started with de jure liberalisation then the industry was 
restructured and finally privatised.228  
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Liberalisation started in 1983, when the Energy Act enabled new generators to 
enter the market by significantly removing the entry barriers.229 The Act also 
contained rules aimed at facilitating the access of these generators to the grid.  Still, 
in practice, no major changes happened in the industry: only a few companies 
entered the market.230  
The restructuring was started by the Electricity Act 1989. The monopolistic levels 
were – more or less231 – separated; the transmission network was divided from the 
Central Electricity Generating Board.232  The Area Boards were replaced by Regional 
Electricity Companies (RECs).233  National Grid, which owned the transmission 
network, was put in the joint ownership of the RECs until 1995, when they were 
required to sell these assets,234 which were then floated on the Stock Exchange.235  
Transmission and distribution networks remained regulated and they were 
accessible to all companies by mandatory open access236: the Director General of 
Electricity Supply was responsible for the price cap regulation imposed on the 
network companies (National Grid Company and the Regional Electricity 
Companies).  National Grid used a zonal method – based on the incremental cost of 
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the necessary developments made on the grid in that zone – for calculating the 
charges of its transmission services.237 
The UK started the electricity reform before the EU therefore initially she was 
completely free to regulate the way she wanted.  Later on she had to conform with 
the respective EU directives.  This was not a problem: the Grid Code that contains 
rules on access fully complied with the regulated third party access regime 
prescribed by the 2003 EU Directives.238   
In terms of structural changes – besides vertical separation – in order to kick start 
competition the CEGB was separated horizontally as well. Dividing up the 
generation portfolio was problematic as the power plants apply different 
technology, which means that their operation is not equally economical. The 
hardest part was dealing with the nuclear plants, especially as their 
decommissioning was known to be potentially costly.  For this reason, initially the 
plan was to put the nuclear plants in a big portfolio, which then enables its owner 
to cover the cost of the decommissioning in the future and still earn profit overall. 
Shortly before the privatization the plan of selling the nuclear power plant was 
rejected, but it was then too late to re-think the whole issue of horizontal 
separation,239 so at the end a big generator company National Power having 52% 
share and a smaller, Powergen producing 34% of the total capacity was 
privatised,240 while the nuclear portfolio – under the name of Nuclear Electric – 
remained in public ownership.241 
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The structure of the Regional Boards basically remained untouched242 and they 
were privatised in that state. The idea was that even this allows a so called 
“yardstick competition”, which means that as there are many similar companies - 
even though they are not competing against each other – they serve as a good basis 
for comparison.243    
In Scotland there was no such restructuring; the two vertically integrated regional 
monopolies were privatised without any separation.244  
There have been some compromises245 from the beginning in terms of separating 
all levels (not just the competitive ones from the monopolistic ones); Powergen and 
National Power were allowed to supply large consumers directly, while RECs were 
allowed to take part in the generation business.  RECs were permitted to cover their 
supply up to 15% of the electricity produced by them and allowing gas to be used 
for electricity generation enabled the building of cheap CCGT plants, so they started 
building power plants in order to counteract the generators’ power.246  This seemed 
to be necessary, as the likelihood of new firms entering the market – without any 
existing interest in the electricity sector – was quite low.247  Later on the two levels 
became more and more connected.  In 1996 Powergen and National Power were 
required to sell some of their generation capacity, which was acquired by the 
biggest REC company,248 even though by this acquisition it exceeded the 15% 
limit.249  
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Generators, Powergen and National Power also wanted to buy RECs.  An initial 
attempt in 1996 had been blocked by the Conservative government.  The reason for 
that was clear: they allowed mergers only in order to erode the duopoly position of 
Powergen and National Power. However, later in 1998 – under the new Labour 
government – the acquisition was allowed.  The only major condition was that the 
generators had to sell a bigger share of their generating capacity. 250  The 
explanation of this policy change might be that vertical integration between these 
levels by that time seemed to be unstoppable, and perhaps also unproblematic, 
although this issue is highly debated: it can be argued that allowing concentration 
was simply a mistake.  
The separation between the levels became more and more blurred, and the “Big 
Six” companies became the key players in the electricity sector.  These companies 
(British Gas, EDF Energy, E.ON Energy, NPower, Scottish Power, SSE) are to an 
extent vertically integrated, as they are both active in the generation and the 
supply level.   
Partial vertical re-integration was concerning from a competition perspective, as 
REC companies were involved in distribution as well, which is a monopoly level.  
Unlike generation and transmission, the distribution and supply functions remained 
integrated for about a decade after the start of the reform in the 14 regions of the 
UK (excluding Northern Ireland), and – despite “yardstick competition” – RECs were 
effectively regional monopolies.  The possible problem with this was that RECs 
could earn supra-competitive profit on the distribution level, which they could use 
to subsidize their retail business.  As a matter of fact in 1999 Ofgem intervened to 
reallocate the costs between the levels: numerous companies were instructed to 
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reallocate their costs (in one case one third) from the distribution to the retail 
level.251 
This arrangement was changed in 2000 by the Utilities act, which ammended the 
Electricity Act 1989, adding that: "The same person may not be the holder of both a 
distribution licence and a supply licence."  This essentially means that since 2000, 
legal separation of the distribution and supply businesses is mandatory in the UK.  
On a voluntary basis some suppliers went even further and carried out ownership 
separation.  By 2007 half of the regional distribution-supply incumbents have 
carried out ownership separation on a voluntary basis.252  Integration between two 
competitive levels can, however also raise concerns.  Even though generation and 
supply do not show characteristics of natural monopoly (such as the network levels) 
there may still be market power (collective dominance) on those levels.  In this case 
(i.e. when there is dominance on the generation or supply levels) market power can 
be leveraged similarly to the situation where a natural monopolistic level is 
included in the value chain.   
As a result of the already existing high level of separation the 2009 EU directives 
necessitated no changes in the UK.   
In summary, vertical separation is a key solution used in the UK electricity reform.  
The generation and transmission levels have been completely (by ownership) 
separate since 1989 and distribution and supply is at least legally separated since 
2000.  At the same time there is integration between the competitive levels, which, 
however is a conceptually different issue.    
 
Historical briefing: 
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• 1983 – New Electricity Act de jure started the liberalisation 
• 1989 – Ownership separation between generation and transmission  
• 1998 – Powergen and National Power were allowed to buy RECs indicating 
the start of a new policy tolerating vertical integration between generation 
and supply. 
• 2000 – compulsory legal separation of distribution and supply (and 
ownership separation on a voluntary basis in many cases) 
 
2.2.1.2 Germany   
 
In Germany a system of one vertically integrated public monopoly never existed.  
There have always been several suppliers.  Most of them were publicly owned or in 
mixed ownership,253 but some privately owned suppliers existed as well.  The fact 
that there were many suppliers does not mean that there was some kind of 
competition in the market; they were regional monopolies.  These suppliers were 
vertically integrated companies, and they supplied electricity within the framework 
of a franchise system to consumers in a certain area.  Furthermore these suppliers 
concluded contracts with each other and in these contracts they explicitly excluded 
the possibility of competing with each other.254   
Ultimately the German electricity industry evolved into a so called three tier 
system:  
1. The first tier consists of those companies who were active in the 
transmission level as well.255  These firms were typically vertically integrated: 
they own huge generation capacity, high voltage long distance transmission 
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networks, but may as well have been active at the distribution level and 
even supply to consumers.256 At the beginning of the reform process there 
were seven such companies.257 
2. The second tier258 consisted of companies that only have regional reach. 
These companies were also more or less vertically integrated. They might 
have owned smaller power plants and transmit electricity from either their 
own plant or electricity produced by tier 1 companies to local suppliers or 
even to end consumers.  There were approximately 60-70 such companies. 
3. The third tier companies only had local significance. These companies were 
normally not integrated; they did not own any power plants, just bought 
electricity in large quantities from tier 1 and 2 companies and then 
transmitted it to their consumers. There were around 800-900 such 
companies. 259            
Simply the fact that there were numerous different companies and not just one 
integrated monopoly as in most European countries is at least in theory an 
advantageous starting point for liberalization.260  
 
The `96 EU Directive was implemented in Germany by the Energy Act of 1998.  By 
that time the three tier system shrank to a two tier system.  The original second tier 
basically diminished, only some companies active in generation and transmission 
(first tier), and approximately 950 supply (similar to the original third tier) 
companies remained.261  
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The Directive prescribed accounting separation of the transmission network.  
However, the German rules implementing the separation did not effectively restrict 
such vertical integrations as they were enforced quite poorly.262   
First tier companies made the best out of this shortcoming: after the act came into 
force both horizontal concentration and vertical integration increased.  In summary 
VEBA and VIAG merged to E.On, RWE acquired VEW, EVS and Badenwerk merged 
to EnBW, HEW BEWAG and VEAG merged to Vattenfall.  The government 
welcomed this new structure, as it believed that four firms in the German market 
are enough to maintain competition, while by these mergers the German firms 
have more power so they can compete with foreign firms.263 Instead of separating 
their transmission businesses the first tier companies became strongly 
integrated.264  
As the ownership of the monopolistic levels did not change and the sector 
remained integrated the question of how much competition the Act can bring to 
the industry remained dependent almost exclusively on its access rules.265 
Under the first Directive Germany was the only Member State where the system of 
negotiated access had been chosen.266  This essentially meant that there was no ex-
ante regulation, only the possibility of an ex-post intervention by the Federal Cartel 
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Office (Bundeskartellamt) existed.267  The parties requiring and providing access 
were free to negotiate on the terms and most importantly on the access tariffs.268  
This however, did not mean that third parties requiring access had to bargain on 
their own with the companies active in the transmission and distribution levels, 
which would have probably meant that the parties would have been in unbalanced 
bargaining positions, and this would have favoured the network owners.  Instead 
two associations of the transmission and distribution system operators concluded 
contracts with two associations of third parties.  The calculating method of the 
access tariffs had been defined in contracts, which had been accepted as de facto 
binding throughout the whole electricity industry.  Whether this system was 
beneficial is quite controversial.  While some argue that self-regulation offers an 
alternative in several cases,269 here, the system was inefficient and led to supra-
competitive access prices.270  The sector was characterised by high network charges 
and low margins on the competitive levels, which led to little new entry.271  
According to Lapuerta and Moselle the network charges in Germany were much 
higher than in the United Kingdom, Norway and the United States.  Charges are 
especially extensive for long distances, for short-term periods and off-peak periods.  
The service is also inflexible (in compared to other transmission markets) and 
burdensome.  These altogether are especially problematic for new entrants.272  The 
most important critique came from the Federal Cartel Office which in some 
instances established that access prices were excessive, even though it was counted 
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according to the contracts. Also, the Study Commission on Monopolies 
(Monopolkommission) stated that this system of setting the prices is 
inappropriate.273  
Later on the 2003 EU directive required legal or ownership separation of the 
transmission networks.  The German implementation of the directive was 
incorporated in the Energy Act of 2005 (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) which came to 
effect the same year.  The new Act was aimed at solving the aforementioned 
defects of the sector by replacing the previous light handed regulatory system. 274  
According to the new requirements, legal unbundling had been achieved in 
Germany, but the national regulation went no further than necessitated by the 
Second Directive.  Transmission system operators were required to carry out legal 
separation by 13 July 2005.275  The previous era of vertical integration came to an 
end; the first tier companies now had to separate their transmission businesses.276   
Distribution system operators with over 100 000 consumers also had to implement 
functional and accounting separation by 13 July 2005.277  The legal separation of 
such distribution businesses, however, was delayed until 2007.278  Distribution 
network operators with less than 100 000 consumers had to carry out accounting 
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separation by 13 July 2005, but they are not be obliged to take this further to legal 
separation.279  
By 2011 Germany implemented the third (2009) EU package as well.  The 
unbundling rules of the Third Regulatory Package concerning distribution system 
operators have been incorporated into the new the Energy Act.280  The new rules 
for transmission system operators have also been implemented: out of the 5 
operators 3 carried out ownership unbundling and 2 have chosen the Independent 
Transmission Operator option.281 
 
In summary, in the German electricity sector there is a tradition for vertical 
integration, which has only been changed to meet the minimum of the EU 
requirements in 2005.  Before 2005 there was no effective separation (even 
accounting separation was enforced poorly) which was accompanied with other 
major regulatory issues, such as the lack of a regulator and inefficient access 
regulation.      
 
Historical briefing: 
 
• 1998 – The `96 EU Directive was implemented by Germany. 
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• 1998 (onwards) – Set of mergers resulted in four (E.On, RWE, EnBW, HEW, 
Vattenfall) vertically integrated electricity companies. 
• 2003 – EU directive requested legal or ownership separation of the 
transmission networks.  
• 2005 – The German implementation of the directive was incorporated in the 
Energy Act of  which came to effect in the same year 
• 2011 – The third EU package has been implemented 
 
2.2.2 The telecommunications sector 
 
2.2.2.1 The UK 
 
Initially the UK telecommunications reform followed a path very different from the 
electricity reform.  Instead of establishing that the network is a natural monopoly 
and competition is only possible in the connected retail services’ market – which 
then has to be fostered by guaranteeing access to the network without 
discrimination and by fair terms – the plan with telecommunications was to achieve 
infrastructure based competition. For this reason BT had not been separated 
horizontally and vertically: it remained an integrated entity,282 while a competitor – 
also providing fixed-line telecommunications services – was sought to be the way of 
creating competition.283 
Accordingly, the British Telecommunications Act 1981 (in order to protect Mercury 
from other entrants) only one licence was given out, to Mercury Communications 
Ltd who was expected to compete with BT in all possible levels.  According to its 
licence it could provide all the different forms of digital telecommunications 
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services, but it was not allowed to lease any of BT’s equipment.284  Initially BT was 
not required to interconnect with Mercury. Indeed, BT refused to provide access to 
Mercury saying that Mercury has to install its own line to its customers.285  The 
Telecommunications Act 1984 concerned the access issue.  The Director-General of 
Telecommunications was given the power by the Act of ordering BT to provide 
access. It did not take long for the new rule to be applied in practice: in October 
1985 terms and conditions of interconnection between Mercury and BT had been 
defined for the first time.286 
 
Mercury started providing its service in 1983. Its strategy was to connect big 
business consumers and to supply long distance and international calls,287 and it 
was never keen on deploying a parallel network. Its penetration remained quite 
limited: after nearly 10 years it only had a market share of 10%.288  It was clear that 
the policy failed to meet the expectations, namely to deliver facilities based 
competition on all levels.  Critics stated that the policy rather impeded the 
development of competition in the sector.  
The government issued a Green Paper in 1990 which was followed by a White 
Paper on the former policy.  According to the conclusive findings of the white paper 
there was a need to:  
• Open the market i.e. to give licence for everybody who is making a 
reasonable request, also to let cable operators enter the market and mobile 
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companies to provide fixed-line services. At the same time, BT was still to be 
prohibited from entering the cable market as there was a fear that BT’s 
entry would deter others from investing.  
• Ensure that others have equal access289 to the necessary facilities. 
• Enable simple retailers (parties without any facilities just re-selling others’ 
services to consumers) to operate in the market.290 
 
After the liberalisation, the new public telephone operators got licences in 1993, 
which again, raised the need of access.  In order to get access they had to prove 
that they had relevant connectable system291 (RCS) status.  Most of the new 
entrants could show this and so, were eligible for interconnection.  Later on, the 
implementation of the Interconnection Directive in the UK292 changed the way 
access issues were regulated.  All firms who had RCS status became Annex II firms.  
Annex II however had a wider membership then just RCS companies, which meant 
that many new firms (internet service providers, etc.) now had the right (and 
obligation) of access.  Moreover, they were entitled to get access to the SMP 
operators (most importantly BT) network on regulated terms and cost-based 
prices.293     
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The second half of the `90s amplified the shift of policy from aiming to achieve 
facilities based competition to service based competition.294  In 1998 the new 
Director General of Telecommunications started a consultation concerning these 
issues.  By the end of 1999 the consultation process led to the unbundling of the 
local loops, which enabled other providers to compete directly with BT.  This was 
backed-up by EU law.295  In its licence BT was required to unbundle the local loops 
by 2001.  The new measure was not as successful as it was expected previously.296  
Initially numerous operators expressed their possible demand, but many of them 
later pulled out.  Still, by now local loop unbundling seems to be successful; 
although in 2005 there were only 123 000 unbundled local loops by now there are 
almost 6 million.297                  
 
The history of BT’s separation started before the actual regulatory efforts for the 
separation began.  The issue of separating BT has been considered by Oftel in 1999 
as well, however, the idea was rejected at that time for two reasons: 
1. Separation in practice would have been problematic;  
2. The benefits of integration (economies of scope) outweigh the costs, as long 
as competition is ensured by regulation.298   
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The document concerned the anticompetitive issues of cross subsidisation and 
discrimination as potentially significant threats, since BT (especially at the time) was 
integrated across the different markets of the telecommunications sector.  
However, it was concluded that “there is a regulatory framework already in place to 
deal with unfair cross subsidy and undue discrimination issues”.299  
The Communications Act 2003 implemented the changes necessitated by the 2003 
EU package.  The new rules were therefore very much similar to the ones presented 
at the EU part, plus some connected necessary modifications have been made.300   
According to the Communications Act 2003 Ofcom became the regulator of the 
telecommunications industry.301  Ofcom then started off by carrying out a sector 
review,302 which was the second such investigation (after the review in 1990).  The 
review established that BT was still dominating the sector; it was bigger than its 
major competitors altogether. Another observation was that other operators still 
do not have fair access to BT’s facilities, which creates a set of connected problems. 
Therefore, Ofcom decided to focus on the problem of access with two measures: 
• BT was required to provide the same services for the same prices for 
wholesalers as it provides for itself. 
• BT was ordered to make changes in its organisation. 
Although it has never been established that BT engage in discriminatory practices it 
was  suspected to do so: as a vertically integrated firm it had the incentives for it, 
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and simply knowing this, could have been enough in itself to deter competitors 
from entering the market.303  
Ofcom used the Enterprise Act 2002 as a legal basis of reaching a legally 
enforceable settlement with BT (BT Undertakings), which was a quicker and simpler 
way than involving the Competition Commission304 (which BT wanted to avoid) who 
otherwise had the power to order the separation of BT.  It was also beneficial for BT 
to accept such a solution as this way it could avoid a full and lengthy investigation 
of the Competition Commission and perhaps stricter separation.305  In addition 
Ofcom offered some regulatory reduction in return for BT’s voluntary contribution. 
Some argue that such a separation could have been financially advantageous for 
BT.306 
BT already restructured itself in 2000-2001 as part of the program aimed at 
reducing its debts.307  This time, (in 2005) according to the Undertakings BT has 
been divided into four parts: Openreach, BT Retail, BT Wholesale and BT Global.308  
BT agreed to divest Openreach as an operationally independent entity (although it 
was still owned by BT)309, who maintains the telecommunications infrastructure 
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and provides services to all operators, including BT’s other division.  Another 
requirement was that Openreach has to supply the same products, under the very 
same conditions to all operators (Equivalence of Input).  The separation means that 
Openreach should have an independent CEO who reports to the CEO of BT, but 
who is not a member of BT’s operating committee.  The annual operating plan of 
Openreach has to be approved by BT, but it enjoys significant freedom in making 
decisions within the framework of that plan.  Openreach had to create its own 
brand name; it had to re-label its assets, from its buildings to the employees’ 
uniforms.  As Openreach is not a separate legal entity the employees are still BT 
employees from a legal perspective, but they can only get benefits according to 
Openreach’s prospering, therefore they are only interested in Openreach’s success.  
Otherwise, the relationship between BT and Openreach employees has been 
regulated by a Code of Practice.310   
Although the creation of Openreach and the connected regulation are the most 
important parts of the Undertakings, the separation of BT’s upstream and 
downstream services (other than Openreach) was carried out as well.  The related 
Undertakings are significant too; these parts have to be individual organisations, 
there are restrictions on the information exchanges between them etc. 
Furthermore, BT Wholesale even had to create separate division for providing 
services on markets, where it enjoys significant market power (SMP) and which is 
not available from Openreach and a division for non-SMP services which are 
however important for other operators.311 
 
In summary, access regulation in the telecommunications sector went through a 
long journey in the UK.  Initially the aim was full facilities-based competition which 
would have eliminated the bottleneck, and thereby, the access issue.  As this plan 
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failed, first access regulation was put in place, and then in 2006 BT has been 
separated from the network. 
 
Historical briefing: 
 
• 1981 – The British Telecommunications Act of 1981 separated the British 
Post Office into two companies: Post Office and BT, and allowed one more 
licence for a fixed network. 
• 1982 – Licence was given to Mercury Communication  
• 1984 – Telecommunications Act of 1984 served as the legal basis of the 
privatisation, also gave more rights to Mercury.  
• 1985 – Cellnet and Vodafone got licences so a duopoly was created in the 
Mobile sector too.  
• 2000-2001 – BT restructured itself in as part of the program aimed at 
reducing its debts.  
• 2005 – BT has been divided into four parts: Openreach, BT Retail, BT 
Wholesale and BT Global.312  
 
 
2.2.2.2 Germany  
 
The first official proposal of the telecommunications reform in Germany dates back 
to 1981, when the German Monopoly Commission (Monopolkommission) 
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suggested that the terminal equipment market should be liberalized however, this 
did not trigger much political consideration.313  
 
The first real step towards the reform goes back to 1989, when Deutsche 
Bundespost was separated to three operationally independent parts according to 
the different business activities: banking, postal and telecommunications.314  The 
integration of regulatory and operational functions also ceased. 315   These 
separations did not affect the legal status of the firm, but at that time this was in 
compliance with the EU requirements.316  Some financial independence had been 
achieved, but at this stage the company still remained integrated into the Ministry’s 
administrative system.317  Except for providing telephone services the sector was 
completely liberalised, this however did not change the sector much as 85% of the 
revenues of the telecommunications sector at that time318 arose out of offering 
telephone services and therefore it was quite hard for alternative suppliers to 
compete against the incumbent.  Moreover, the fact that the regulator was still not 
separated properly suggested that it was going to favour the incumbent which 
deterred new competitors from entering as well.319   
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The second stage – leading to the privatisation – started in 1994.  More and more 
complaints were received by the government about Deutsche Bundespost Telekom 
being too expensive.  the Federal Cartel Administration established that there was a 
practice of cross-subsidization from the voice to the data services which 
undermined competition in the latter.  The Technology Ministry’s own assessment 
on the issue also led to this conclusion.  The unification of Germany necessitated 
investment in the former East Germany’s telecommunications infrastructure, which 
was also an argument for privatisation, as the Government preferred these costs to 
be paid by private parties.320   
Later on the German telecommunications reform followed the way shown by the 
EU aiming to create one EU wide competitive telecommunications market. 
Accordingly, the Telecommunications Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz) of 1996 – 
marking the third step of the reform – was influenced and necessitated by the EU 
legislation.321  The Act ended the monopoly on transmission paths from 1998, so 
finally the whole sector had been liberalized.322 
In line with the act Deutsche Telekom – as it has significant market power – was 
obliged to maintain accounting separation.  However, this has not been enforced 
properly: only the standard German accounting rules were applied.  The OECD 
review criticised this practice: it states that at least the audited accounts should be 
publicly available, similarly to the German electricity firms’.  This is however not 
possible due to the fact that German corporate law is extremely strict on 
confidentiality of such information.323  
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Germany did not experiment with creating a duopoly, still by the end of 1998 
approximately 200 new telecommunications service providers got licences, prices 
were falling (to a greater extent than in most EU member states324) and also the 
incumbent market share decreased by more than 35%, which is considerably higher 
than what BT lost at the equivalent stage of the UK reform.325       
 
Competition seemed to work well in long distance calls, where DT’s market share 
was only 60% by 2001, and in international calls, where DT’s share fell to 50%.  
However, DT managed to secure great share of the Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) 
services, where in 2002 only 4.4% of the lines was provided by competitors.326   
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 introduced local loop unbundling.  Germany 
was the first country in Europe experimenting with local loop unbundling.  Initially 
there were shortcomings in terms of access.  In particular, the EC started an 
investigation in 2001 as Germany allegedly failed to transpose sufficient rules on 
publishing formal reference offers for accessing the local loop. The shortcomings 
were remedied in 2002 and therefore the investigation was stopped.327 
A further issue was DT’s price squeeze.  The case went through two appeals.  The 
Commission decided the case in 2003.328  DT appealed this decision in front of the 
General Court, where the Commission's decision was largely affirmed.329  DT further 
appealed to the Court of Justice, which dismissed DT's action in its entirety in 
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2010.330  The case concerned access to the local loops.  While the subscriber line 
rental was € 11 the access price to new entrants was € 12.48. The German 
Regulators decision was controversial.  Firstly, the prices concerned were regulated 
(although DT enjoyed some freedom in pricing331) therefore a competition law 
intervention raised concerns over legal certainty for regulated firms. 332  and 
secondly, instead of ordering DT to lower its access price below the subscriber line 
rental, it was ordered to raise it to € 13.50 and reduce the access price to € 
11.80.333  
Germany has not considered carrying out functional separation in the 
telecommunications sector.334  In fact, the German Ministry of Economics and 
Technologies did not even accept functional separation as a remedy.335  In 2006 the 
German parliament enacted rules which prevent the incumbent Deutsche 
Telekom’s competitors from accessing its newly built super-fast network, as it 
accepted that Deutsche Telekom needs such defence in order to be able to secure 
its investment.336  The Commission opposed the measures and in this connection 
Viviane Reding said that “"Functional separation", however, could become a new 
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remedial measure under European law”.337  Ultimately the case was decided by the 
ECJ in favour of the Commission.338 
 
Historical briefing: 
 
• 1989 – The first real step of the reform: Deutsche Bundespost was 
separated to three operationally independent parts 
• 1990 – Licence was given for Mannesmann to provide mobile services. 
Additional licences were issued in  
• 1994 – The second stage – leading to the privatisation – started when the 
Federal Cartel Administration established that there was a practice of cross-
subsidization from the voice to the data services which undermined 
competition in the latter.  
• 1995 – The privatisation of the part which dealt with the 
telecommunications services – Deutsche Bundespost Telekom – started.  
• 1996 – The Telecommunications Act of 1996 – marking the third step of the 
reform –ended the monopoly on transmission paths from 1998, introduced 
local loop unbundling, set up a National Regulatory Authority 
(Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post)  
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2.3 The effect of vertical separation on the incumbents’ market 
share  
 
This part of the paper assesses whether stronger separation and lower market 
shares for the incumbent go hand in hand in practice.   
In terms of the legal solutions it can be established that among the reforms 
described, the weakest solution was implemented in the early stages (pre 2005) of 
the German electricity reform, when neither vertical separation, nor effective 
access regulation existed.  A stronger solution has been implemented in the 
telecommunications sectors in both countries.  In the UK after the duopoly 
experiment, as the focus shifted from facilities-based to service-based competition 
in the telecommunications sector, fair access to the local loop was aimed to be 
achieved through access regulation.  Germany implemented the same solution: no 
vertical separation, but access regulation.  In addition to that, in 2005 BT (more or 
less freely) decided to carry out a weak form of vertical separation (created an 
operationally independent unit) in respect of the local loop.  After the initial stages 
(after 2007) the German electricity sector went through vertical separation in the 
form of legal separation.  The strongest solution has been implemented (ownership 
separation) in the UK, where the electricity transmission networks have been 
vertically separate since 1989 and distribution networks are (at least) legally 
unbundled since 2000. 
 
In order to assess the effects of the regulations, one option would be to assess the 
regulation’s complex effect on competition, through some measures that relate to 
the level of competition in a market, however establishing connections between 
regulatory options and the indicators may not lead to robust conclusions. 
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There are studies using cross-country dataset,339  establishing a link between 
regulation and their effect on prices, market concentration etc. However, even a 
quick look at the literature can illustrate the lack of robust findings: 
Looking at unbundling’s effect on prices Copenhagen Economics340 finds that 
electricity prices are lower when there is a higher level of unbundling (ownership 
unbundling being the highest), but they did not find the same result for gas.  
Assessing unbundling between generation and transmission Steiner341 finds that 
unbundling is associated with higher capacity utilisation rates and not lower prices 
(although in the study unbundling includes even accounting separation).  Hattori 
and Tsutsui342 found that unbundling (ownership as well as legal) results in higher 
prices.  The reason why three studies can reach three different conclusions is likely 
to be that there are too many factors that might affect a certain indicator. 
Instead of trying to assess how competition is affected by vertical separation, this 
paper assesses the connection between vertical separation and the incumbents’ 
market share, based on data presented in the previous chapter, in light of the 
previous detailed case studies.  The reason for using solely market shares, and not 
prices or consumer satisfaction is that its connection to vertical separation seems to 
be the most straightforward.  Prices and consumer satisfaction depend on many 
factors, and ultimately these indicators are more remotely related to vertical 
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integration, although market concentration depends on various factors too (such as 
economies of scale and scope, highly specific assets etc.).343 
In theory a more integrated company has more opportunities and incentives for 
squeezing its competitors’ profits through cross financing between its monopolistic 
and competitive businesses.  Cross subsidisation usually takes the form of allocating 
cost, not transferring actual funds.344  It can allocate all the costs possible to the 
monopolistic business levels, thereby raising the competitors’ cost and reducing its 
own cost on the competitive levels.  As the network prices are normally regulated, 
and the regulated price is set by some method which is ultimately based on the 
costs, the vertically integrated company will have an incentive to try and allocate as 
much of its overall as possible to this level anyway.  Cross financing, however is the 
means not the end; the aim of the whole practice is to drive competitors out of the 
market and achieve market power on the competitive level.  This leveraging of 
market power should result in companies leaving the market (or not entering) 
which translates to higher market share for the incumbent in the competitive 
level.345    
Besides, this indicator is of key significance in practice.  According to Beesley and 
Littlechild “[p]romoting competition involves facilitating the entry of new 
competitors, including the entry of existing competitors into new parts of the 
market” 346  they also establish that “[i]n order to promote competition, the 
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regulator's essential task is to assess the relation between his actions (…)  and the 
probability that entry will actually occur.” 347   Furthermore, when assessing 
competition, regulators and competition authorities normally look for signs of 
market power.  Although it is widely accepted that market power cannot be 
assessed solely on the basis of market shares, but other factors such as entry 
barriers, buyer power have to be taken into account as well, market shares tends to 
be the most influential measure of market power in practice.348  From this it follows 
that (since vertical separation is regarded as a pro-competitive method) an 
authority may consider stricter separation as a tool to be applied when the 
incumbent market share suggests that it has a continuing dominant position.  
In the following, the paper contrasts these regulatory solutions to the market 
developments. These are first assessed by sector, than the results of the sectors are 
compared.   
 
2.3.1 Electricity 
 
In the electricity sector there are two different networks (two monopolistic levels), 
that are connected to two different competitive levels.  Therefore, these are 
analysed separately. 
  
2.3.1.1 Generation-transmission 
 
In the UK, ownership separation between the generation and the transmission 
levels was carried out at the beginning of the reforms and, therefore, the problem 
                                               
347
 Ibid 
348
 Furthermore, within EU countries it is unlikely that big differences will exist in these respects. 
151 
 
of discriminating between firms on the competitive level was already solved, which 
means that access regulation was rather just needed to prevent monopoly prices 
on the monopolistic level, that otherwise would result in deadweight welfare loss 
for the society.  Whether this was successful or not is not important from the 
perspective of the incumbents’ market share loss in the competitive levels, because 
all firms had to pay the same prices.  There was no possibility of exclusionary 
practices throughout cross-financing between generation and transmission, which 
could have distorted competition and help the incumbents retain market share.  In 
Germany, however both ownership separation (of some transmission network 
operators) was only carried out much later (2011). 
Looking at the data of Matthes et. al.349 on generation market concentration 
confirms the expectations: 
 
Figure 45 UK generation market concentration (1996-2005) 
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In the UK, where there was no common ownership between the transmission and 
generation, the generation market’s concentration has been decreasing steadily. 
 
Figure 46 Germany generation market concentration (1996-2005) 
In Germany where there was no ownership separation (indeed, even legal 
separation was only introduced in 2005) between the generation and transmission 
level, during the same period market concentration was rising. 
 
Legal separation between the generation and transmission levels became a 
requirement in 2005, however, according to Eurostat data, even this seems to be 
insufficient to induce entry: 
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Figure 47 Number of major generators (2003-2010) 
This suggests that ownership separation is crucial to facilitate entry, and legal 
separation is not enough to change the dynamics of the generation market.   
However, the case studies described in detail earlier that this horizontal structure 
developed largely as a result of “artificial” factors, such as government intervention 
(the UK’s generation portfolio have been separated between 3 companies right at 
the beginning of the reforms) and mergers.    
 
2.3.1.2 Distribution-supply 
 
Data on the supply levels incumbents’ market shares are available from DECC350 
(incumbent electricity suppliers) and the Bundesnetzagentur351 (default vs. other 
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home suppliers 352 ). Starting with the Uk, the graph below shows that the 
incumbent suppliers’ market shares have been falling significantly after the 
compulsory legal separation (which in some cases went further to ownership 
separation) of the distribution and supply businesses.  This could mean that 
ordering stricter vertical separation led to the incumbents’ market share loss. 
 
 
Figure 48 Uk electricity supply market shares (2000-2013) 
This argument could be strengthen by the analysis of Davis and Waddams, who - 
through the assessment of supply market shares between 1998 and 2007, the 
period where half of the 14 RECs were still integrated half carried out ownership 
separation – show that in those areas where the supplier remained integrated by 
means of ownership with the distributor the incumbent managed to retain a higher 
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market share than those who carried out ownership unbundling on a voluntary 
basis.353  
Moving on to the country having a tendency for weaker separation, Germany, the 
paper only assesses the post-2007 data (before that the non-incumbent suppliers 
market share was insignificant).  After carrying out legal separation (2007), the 
incumbents’ market shares started to decline: 
 
Figure 49 Germany electricity supply market shares (2007-2012) 
At the same time even after 6 years the incumbents’ market share only declined to 
about 80%, while in the UK (see below) the incumbents’ market share was below 
70% before legal separation was made compulsory.  This would suggest that the 
examples cannot robustly suggest alone that vertical separation is necessary and 
access regulation is insufficient (or an inferior solution).  However, it takes time for 
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competitors to get a grasp and the UK has clearly been in better position for this 
especially before 2005. 
It has been presented that the UK started restructuring long before Germany and 
maintained a much stricter unbundling policy (especially until the Energy Act of 
2005 according to which legal separation of the distribution network has been 
carried out by 2007), and in the lack of vertical separation the German electricity 
system clearly suffered from access issues.  The competition authority which was 
made responsible for the matter had to establish a separate branch to deal with 
electricity issues but still failed to address the issues adequately.       
The early history of the Germany electricity reform underlines the importance of at 
least two more regulatory issues (besides vertical separation).   
The first one is related to institutions.  No regulatory solution can perform 
adequately, if it is not enforced in the proper manner.  This matter was especially 
visible in the early stages of the German electricity reform.  In the UK, the major 
steps of the reform were carried out by the Government. As a starting point, the 
sector has been restructured but also the licences obligated the privatised 
companies to follow the established rules in the future. The regulator’s task was to 
monitor the operation of the sector and to carry out other regulatory functions 
determined by the government.  In Germany, however, the government did not 
restructure the market.  Laws have been enacted ordering some restructuring but 
there was no enforcement; thus, it remained almost virtual.  On top of all there was 
no regulatory authority which should have enforced the laws, that includes the 
structural changes prescribed as well.  In contrast to the UK, far more duties would 
have been conferred to the regulatory authority.  Accordingly, the nonexistence of 
such an authority played its part in achieving the worst results among the four 
sectors concerned.354   
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The lack of a regulatory authority was a shortcoming heavily connected (and leads 
towards) to the problem of using nTPA.  One reason for choosing nTPA was that, in 
adopting this system, setting up a regulatory authority was not essential which is 
the second issue.  Although there are arguments for nTPA stating that it better 
suited to the German industry, as negotiations have taken place between two-two 
associations of the counter interested parties which may have reduced the 
imbalance of the parties, nTPA is clearly a weak and ineffective tool for arranging 
access. That is why the possibility of choosing an nTPA system was withdrawn in 
2003. The fact, that Germany was the only EU country choosing nTPA also implies 
that this was an extreme option.355 
 
2.3.2 Telecommunications 
 
In telecommunications there is only one monopolistic element, which is the local 
loop.  Data on the incumbents’ market shares are available from Ofcom (BT 
broadband)356 and the Bundesnetzagentur (DT broadband)357. 
 
As it has been described in the case studies, there have been quite a few issues in 
terms of access in both countries.  The Deutsche Telecom price squeeze case is a 
classic example of insufficient access: the company misused its monopoly position 
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in respect of the local loop to suppress its competitors’ business.  However, it has 
been show at “The pros and cons of vertical integration” that - besides competition 
- there are other concerns relevant to the matter.  In Germany, respect of private 
rights and solving transaction problems that could set back the spread of new 
investment in super-fast networks seem to be highly appreciated.   
Most importantly – from the perspective of this research – it has been discussed in 
detail that the UK has chosen to introduce some light form of vertical separation 
(functional separation) in BT’s structure in order to eliminate interest in 
discriminating competitors’ access to monopolistic facilities.  According to Cadman 
an even lighter form of vertical separation (accounting separation) would have 
been insufficient to address discriminatory practices that that are not price but 
quality related, while ownership separation would have been too difficult, and 
errors would have been costly.358  But are these issues reflected in the market 
shares of the incumbents?  
The comparison of the recent years’ trends show that Deutsche Telekom’s market 
share (see graphs below) is normally around 20% higher than BT’s.  This is in line 
with the expectation of higher shares arising out of less strict separation since in 
Germany there is only accounting separation between the local access services 
division and the rest of the company, while in the UK where there is functional 
separation. 
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Figure 50 UK broadband market shares (2002-2012) 
However, it is not clear at all whether the incumbent’s lower market share is a 
consequence of the separation.  BT’s market shares did not fall after the separation 
of Openreach, but there is rather a weak tendency of market share growth. 
In 2009, in its evaluation of the Strategic Review (2005) Ofcom seemed to suggest 
that rise in number of the unbundled local loops is connected to the separation of 
Openreach from BT.359  Indeed, the rise from less than 200 000 lines in 2005 to over 
5.5 million lines by the end of 2008 seems remarkable, and the number grew 
further to 9 million by 2013.360  However, by 2013 the number of unbundled local 
loops exceeded 9 million in Germany361 as well, so there is no evidence that 
stronger vertical separation would have affected local loop unbundling either.     
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Figure 51 Germany broadband market shares (2002-2012) 
Besides, the graph concerning Germany above shows that Deutsche Telekom’s 
market share has been falling although the company did not carry out any 
separation (besides basic accounting separation) between the network and the 
connected competitive elements.   
 
2.3.3 Cross sectorial comparison- is vertical separation less important in the 
telecommunications than in the electricity sector? 
 
Ultimately, the assessment of the electricity sectors has found that the supply 
incumbents’ market shares have been declining after stricter separation has been 
introduced, both in the UK and in Germany.  Furthermore, in the generation level 
market concentration has been declining steadily in the UK where ownership 
separation has been carried out while in Germany in the lack of ownership 
separation the market got more concentrated.   
However, comparing the UK telecommunications incumbents’ stable market shares 
to the German telecommunications incumbent’s declining broadband market 
shares do not suggest an exclusive link between strong separations leading to the 
incumbents’ market share loss (in telecommunications).   
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It is helpful to compare electricity to telecommunications, since they are different 
in many respects, while there is network element in both.   
In the electricity sector, the network is still a true natural monopoly, while in 
telecommunications the network-based services are more and more contested by 
different other infrastructures (cable and some extent mobile), and different 
technologies which is a great advantage from the perspective of competitiveness. 
Voice telephony is under competitive pressure from mobile telephony, applications 
such as Skype and cable operators as well.  There are no such substitutes for 
electricity.  The telecommunications (at least the broadband) market is growing 
while electricity is not. 
It is likely that some of these techno-economic differences between the 
telecommunications sector and electricity are responsible for the different 
correlation between separation and market shares in the two sectors concerned.  
Concerning the original question: is the different EU attitude towards vertical 
separation in electricity and telecommunications, it can be established that if 
techno-economic factors can substitute vertical separation in achieving market 
share loss on the incumbents side in telecommunications, but not in electricity – as 
the analysis above suggests – then the different treatment is justified.  
 
This furthermore implies that: 
• In the telecommunications sector if in a certain case, the concern is market 
power due to the incumbents’ high market share, simply ordering more 
separation may not necessarily solve the issue.362  In other words stricter 
separation may not necessarily reduce the incumbents’ dominant position.  
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• There should be more scope for less separation in telecommunications, 
which on the other hand may allow for more efficiency: forcing stricter and 
stricter unbundling may be counterproductive after a certain level. 
 
 
   
Conclusion 
 
One of the key regulatory differences between the electricity and 
telecommunications reforms has been the use of vertical separation of the 
network.  In the electricity sector vertical separation is used extensively in order to 
make sure that the network monopoly is contained and market power will not be 
leveraged to the competitive levels and providing better access for competitors.  In 
contrast, the telecommunications reforms tend to include access regulation only, 
which is a weaker tool for providing access to the network that is essential for 
competitors to provide their services.  The chapter assesses whether this difference 
in the regulations is justified. 
The chapter is divided into two parts.  The first part looks at the theory while the 
second part looks at the practical experiences in two Member States with very 
different attitude towards vertical separation: the UK (where vertical separation 
has been carried out in the electricity and more recently in the telecommunications 
sector as well) and Germany (where the electricity networks have only been 
separated after EU law required it while the telecommunications incumbent has 
not been separated). 
The theoretical assessment in Part 1 suggests that stronger separation between 
vertically related monopolistic and competitive levels of a production chain in 
generally should facilitate access.  There is a potential for loss of efficiency as a 
result of vertical separation.  Different means (degrees) of vertical separation have 
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been invented in order to preserve efficiencies while facilitating access as well.  
However, access in itself (i.e. disregarding the issue of efficiency) should be served 
better by fuller separation.   
Part 2 of the paper assessed the incumbents’ market shares in the UK and in 
Germany in the sectors concerned in order to see whether this logic can be show to 
work in practice the same way.  The market share data presented in chapter 1 is 
assessed here in the light of detailed cases studies of vertical separation in the 
countries concerned.  This analysis found decreasing market shares after stricter 
separation in the electricity sector but not in the telecommunications sector, which 
suggests that there is different importance to vertical separation in the two sectors, 
which justifies the differences in the policy. 
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IV. Chapter 3: Towards multi-sector regulators: a multi-
step approach 
 
Abstract 
 
One of the main legal differences between the electricity and telecommunications 
reforms in the UK and Germany is that of the institutional setup of the regulatory 
authorities.  In the UK there are two separate regulators for energy (electricity and 
gas) and telecommunications (electronic communications); in Germany one 
regulatory authority is responsible for the regulation of both sectors as well as a 
number of other sectors.  It can be established that currently, the UK operates with 
a single sector regulator compared to Germany’s multi-sector regulator.  The 
history of the regulatory authorities however, tells somewhat a different story: 
regardless of their respective differences, there is a tendency to lean towards multi-
sector regulators in both countries.  In certain EU countries, this tendency is even 
more obvious, having led to the merger between all sector regulators with the 
Competition Authority as well.  This raises several questions: what is the reason 
behind this trend of merging regulators?  Why did EU countries start merging 
regulators only recently?  Multi-sector regulators have been created for some time 
in Third World countries therefore, they cannot be considered as a new ‘invention’.     
Are multi-sector regulators superior – so the UK could learn from Germany in 
setting up a multi-sector regulator as well?  
In answering these questions, first the subjects of the comparison must be 
described: the evolution of the regulatory institutions in the UK and Germany.  In 
the next step, the paper provides a framework of key institutional issues on which 
the assessment is based.  The third step is based on the previous two; an 
assessment of how the different types of the regulators (single vs. multi-sector 
regulators) influence the key institutional variables, in other words the advantages 
and disadvantages of single and multi-sector regulators.   
165 
 
Answering the question of whether multi-sector regulators are superior, the 
analysis of this paper suggests that changing the institutional setup will result in 
changes concerning the key variables, however, it cannot be stated that one model 
would be superior overall.  This leads to the question of why there is a trend of 
merging regulators in the concerned countries and if the UK could “learn” from 
Germany and create a similar “super regulator”, it would be beneficial for the UK.  
To answer this question, the fifth part analyses the changes in the key institutional 
factors that arise out of changing the institutional setup (the merging of regulators) 
in terms of their dynamics.  Analysis suggest that while single and multi-sector 
regulators have pros and cons, the pros can be maximised and the cons minimised, 
by the creation of single sector regulators before merging them as markets mature.  
According to the sixth part of the chapter, if the mergers are timed correctly (when 
benefits of a merger are clearly identifiable), the changes they bring will follow the 
changing institutional needs of the developing sectors nevertheless, mergers 
between energy and telecommunications regulators in the UK are probably not 
beneficial thus far due to a lack of evidence showing positive synergy from 
regulatory mergers.  
1. Introduction 
 
Most regulators in the EU are in their infancy, created only between 1996 and 
1998.363  However, tendencies of the merging of regulators are already underway.  
In the UK, Offer and Ofgas merged to become Ofgem.  Oftel, the 
Radiocommunications Agency, the Broadcasting Standards and the Independent 
                                               
363 Damien Geradin, ‘Institutional aspects of EU regulatory reforms in the 
telecommunications sector: an analysis of the role of national regulatory authorities’ (2000) 
1 Journal of Network Industries, 5, 6 
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Television Commission merged to become Ofcom.364  These bodies are still closely 
related regulators.  
Germany took a step even further: the expansion of the German regulator’s 
competencies has led to the establishment of a regulator – the Bundesnetzagentur 
– regulating the electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal and railway sectors.  
The Netherlands took even more advanced measures, establishing the Netherlands 
Authority for Consumers and Markets on the 1st April 2013 by merging the 
Netherlands Consumer Authority, the Netherlands Competition Authority and the 
Netherlands Independent Post and Telecommunication Authority (OPTA).365  Just a 
few months later, Spain had created the National Markets and Competition 
Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia).  The new 
authorities were created by the integration of the Competition Authority with other 
numerous sector regulators, creating a hybrid authority enforcing competition rules 
and regulating telecommunications, energy, railway, postal, audio-visual issues as 
well as airports.366 
These examples highlight that the question of whether (or in what circumstances) 
creating multi-sector regulators is beneficial has become highly topical in the EU.  
At the same time, literature on merging regulators in developed countries is rather 
underdeveloped.  While there is a literature on creating multi-sector regulators in 
                                               
364 Jacint Jordana, David Levi-Faur, ’Exploring Trends and Variations in Agency Scope’ 2010 
(11) Competition & Reg. Network Indus., 343 
365 CF The Netherlands Competition Authority’s press release: ’Green light for the 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets’ available at 
http://www.nma.nl/en/documents_and_publications/press_releases/news/2013/05_13_g
reen_light_for_the_netherlands_authority_for_consumers_and_markets.aspx accessed: 
28/02/2013 
366 ECN Brief, ’Spain: Creation of the new National Markets and Competition Commission, 
CNMC’ available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/03_2013/es_cnmc.pdf, 
accessed at: 15/03/2014  
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developing countries, cases in the EU are substantially different.  In developing 
countries multi-sector regulators are mainly created due to issues regarding 
economies of scales; creating separate regulators is not financially viable, they lack 
personnel with the expertise in regulation, etc.  In the EU, the reason behind 
merging regulators is clearly different.  It cannot be argued that in the UK, 
operating separate regulators is not viable since different regulators have been 
established first and have only merged later on.  It also seems unlikely that 
Germany created a multi-sector regulator as a result of financial constraints or due 
to the lack of experts.   
This paper aims to analyse this new trend and assess the trade-offs when merging 
regulators and give guidance on how benefits can be maximised.  Ultimately, this 
chapter seeks to answer whether the UK could learn in this aspect from Germany, 
i.e. whether the creation of a similar multi-regulator would be beneficial in the UK.  
It has to be noted that the institutional setup, is only one of the numerous 
regulatory variables that affect the outcome of reforms.  There are other important 
regulatory features that have definite influence on the sectors however, yet this 
does not mean that the multi-sectoral nature cannot be analysed. 
This paper suggests that the multi-step approach; creating single sector regulators 
and merging them when there are clear synergies arising from the unification to be 
most beneficial. Since synergies resulting from the union between Ofgem and 
Ofcom are currently questionable at the present moment, we cannot make a case 
for following Germany’s example as of now given the current evidence. 
 
2. Types of Mergers of Regulatory Authorities 
 
The EU rules concerning national regulators are quite flexible.  Generally speaking 
the focus is on making sure that these bodies are accountable and independent.  In 
terms of other features, the EU Member States are largely free to do as they 
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wish.367  It is therefore not surprising that there is a wide variety of national 
regulators in the EU.368  Based on different features, regulatory authorities can be 
grouped in many ways.  In this paper, the number of sectors regulated by the 
authority is the key variable under examination.     
Combining regulators is a new regulatory trend in the EU: so far Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain have opted for this setup, the classic examples for this 
regulatory arrangement are the State Public Utility Commissions in the USA369. 
However, there are precedents for the creation of multi-sector regulators in many 
Third World countries as well.  
The Dutch and Spanish examples also involve merging the Competition Authority 
with the regulators as well.  This type of institutional mergers would need to take 
into account many additional issues370, such as ex-ante and ex-post regulation as 
well as the relationship of sector regulators and competition authorities371 in 
general.372  The inclusion of these issues would likely steer the focus of research 
from regulatory institutions towards the relationship between regulators and 
competition authorities, which is already a well-studied subject. 373  For the above 
                                               
367 Geradin (2000) 18 
368 Ibid 21 
369 Anders Henten, Rohan Samarajiva, William Melody,’Designing next generation telecom 
regulation: ICT convergence or multi-sector utility?’ 2003 (5) Info,30 
370 CF Damien Geradin, Robert O'Donoghue, ‘The concurrent application of competition 
law and regulation: the case of margin squeeze abuses in the telecommunications sector’ 
(2005) 1 (2) Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 355, 409-424   
371 Larouche (2004) 282 
372 Maher M. Dabbah, ’The relationship between competition authorities and sector 
regulators’ (2011) 70 (1) Cambridge Law Journal, 115 
373 Dabbah (2011) 113 
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mentioned reasons, this specific type of regulatory merger is out of the scope of 
this research: the paper only concerns regulatory authorities.   
It has to be noted at this point that the research is not simply about comparing 
regulatory authorities, but rather about the process of merging these authorities.  
The two types of regulatory mergers considered have been modelled on the UK’s 
and Germany’s history. 
 
2.1. Single sector regulators 
 
A single sector regulator would mean that one regulator deals with one sector only.  
However, the picture is a more complex as sectors can be different in different 
countries and are subject to change overtime.  This study essentially considers the 
process leading to the creation of the UK’s energy and telecommunications 
regulators as described below: 
 
Ofgem 
 
As part of the electricity reform – within the framework of the Electricity Act 1989 – 
the Conservative government established a Director General of Electricity supply, 
supported by the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) office which was 
essentially the regulator responsible for the electricity sector. 
After the Utilities Act 2000, OFFER (the electricity regulator) and OFGAS (the gas 
regulator) merged to OFGEM.  Thereby in a sense a multi-sector regulator has been 
created although, it is still only responsible for only two sectors which are similar to 
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each other and altogether constitute the energy industry.374  Hence, this paper 
considers Ofgem a single-sector regulator.375  After the merger, Ofgem became the 
authority with the main role in the economic regulation of the energy sector.376  
 
Ofcom 
 
In 1984 according to the Telecommunications Act Oftel became the economic 
regulator of the telecommunications sector.377  The Act establishes the Director 
General of Telecommunications, who may appoint staff thereby creating an 
office.378   
Some suggest that regulation in the UK’s telecommunications sector became less 
and less important as competition developed, the regulator became unnecessary 
and some argued that Oftel should become obsolete. 379   Such proposals 
nonetheless seem to be unrealistic in the telecommunications sector (as well as in 
                                               
374 David Coen, ’Business–Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play Regulatory Games in 
European Utility Markets’ (2005) 18 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions 397 
375 And also because of the difference in the regulatory scope between Ofgem and the 
Bundesnetzagentur. 
376 Roggenkamp et. al. (2007) 1179 
377 Coen (2005) 379 
378 This reflects the UK tradition of appointing a single person instead of an institution.  The 
Utilities Act 2000 was to challenge this convention as the establishment of a chairman and 
at least two board members were proposed to lead the authority, but this change was not 
implemented as part of the final Act. 
379 Keith Boyfield, Tim Ambler, ’Do the UK Regulatory Agencies Provide Taxpayer Value?’ 
2004 London Business School Centre for Marketing Working Paper No. 04-902.1, 3 
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the electricity sector) and in 2003, instead of the simple closure of Oftel, Ofcom was 
created.380   
Ofcom combined the duties of Oftel, the Radiocommunications Agency (which 
regulated the mobile sector together with Oftel), and the Broadcasting Standards 
and Independent Television Commission.381  After the merger of these bodies, 
Ofcom became the regulator responsible for fixed line and mobile 
telecommunications, TV and radio sectors, postal services in additional to the 
wireless sectors.382   
The UK media already called Ofcom a “Super-regulator”,383 however it still regulates 
some very closely related businesses – and also quite large ones – collectively 
known as electronic communications.  For this reason and since we compare Ofcom 
to the Bundesnetzagentur which regulates electricity, gas, telecommunications as 
well as rail and post, Ofcom is considered to be a single-sector regulator. 
 
2.2 Multi-sector regulator 
 
As presented above, what is called as a single sector regulator is in fact already a 
merged entity.  There is a difference between such a single sector regulator and 
what is defined by this paper as a multi-sector regulator, where one regulatory 
authority is responsible for essentially all the regulated sectors.  This category was 
                                               
380 Coen (2005) 379 
381 Lloyd, Mellor (2003) 51 
382 OFCOM, available at: http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/ accessed: 21/09/2012 
383 BBC, ’'Super-regulator' Ofcom launches’ 2003 available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/3354093.stm accessed 20/09/2012 
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modelled after the German regulatory authority (the Bundesnetzagentur), which 
also went through considerable changes. 
 
Bundesnetzagentur 
 
Before the reforms, the Deutsche Bundespost was under the regulatory and 
political control of the Federal Ministry for Postal Services and Telecommunications 
(Bundesministerium für Post und Fernmeldewesen).384  
EU law required the separation of regulatory functions and ownership in the 
telecommunications sector therefore in Germany, the Regulierungsbehörde für 
Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP) was created as a regulator through the 
Telecommunication Act of 1996.  The establishment of RegTP was a pioneering step 
in the history of the German public administration; it marked the starting point of 
regulation.385 
From the 2000s the authority gained more competencies and ended up being a 
multi-sector regulator.386  RegTP was renamed to Bundesnetzagentur on the 13th 
of July 2005, as it became responsible for the regulation of the electricity, gas and 
railway sectors as well.387  
                                               
384 Burkard Eberlein, Edgar Grande, ’Regulation And Infrastructure Management: German 
Regulatory Regimes And The Eu Framework’ (2000) 1 German Policy Studies available at: 
http://www.spaef.com/file.php?id=813 accessed: 14/09/2012, 45 
385 Martin Lodge, ’Varieties of Europeanisation and the National Regulatory State’ 2002 
(17) Public Policy and Administration 56 
386 Jordana, Levi-Faur (2010) 343 
387 Bundesnetzagentur, ‘The Agency’ available 
at:http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cln_1912/EN/FederalAgency/TheAgency/TheAgency
_node.html accessed: 16/09/2012 
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3. Key institutional issues  
 
In order to be able to evaluate the effect of a regulatory merger, a set of indicators 
is needed; there are numerous features based on which regulators can be 
evaluated.  The key institutional issues considered here are the ones that are 
influenced by the mergers of the institutions.  Among these, there are institutional 
features of major importance: independence, accountability, capture, costs 
(efficiency), and some others that have secondary importance (compared to the 
ones that have been mentioned already) but are also heavily affected by regulatory 
mergers.   
Ultimately the following 5 features are going to be used: 
 Independence 
 Accountability 
 Regulatory capture 
 Costs 
 Regulatory quality 
The following part concerns these features in general.  Besides providing a 
theoretical basis of the key institutional factors for the forthcoming analysis, the 
purpose of this part of the paper is to show that these factors cannot be 
interpreted as black and white and should not be taken to the extremes.  For 
example, independence is very important, but has to go hand in hand with 
accountability.  Similarly, capture by the industry has to be avoided, but without 
links to the industry it is hard to see how a regulator can make quality decisions.   
There are also cross-links between these features, so designing the authority 
requires a trade-off between them; for an optimal design a careful balance is 
needed. 
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3.1 Independence 
 
Independence can be interpreted in a broad and a narrow way.  A broad 
interpretation of independence means freedom from being affected by both the 
political sphere and the industry (as used by Hancer et. al.388 or Geradin389).  A 
narrow interpretation (as used here) means independence from the political sphere 
only. 
Before the reforms, the concerned sectors were nationalised in most cases, so they 
were under direct governmental supervision – regulation was implicit.  The idea 
behind the reforms is the creation of competition and thereby more efficient 
sectors, benefitting consumers through more competition390, lower than regulated 
or monopolistic prices thereby, achieving higher consumer surplus.  Liberalisation 
and privatisation are requisites of creating competition, but at the same time they 
eliminate the possibility of such “implicit” regulation.  Competition – that is aimed 
to be the new organising force that ultimately replaces implicit regulation – takes 
time to develop in general, while on some vertical levels (as they are still natural 
monopolies)391 introducing competition is not even the intention.  Therefore, there 
                                               
388 Leigh Hancher, Pierre Larouche, Saskia Lavrijssen, ‘Principles of good market 
governance’ (2003) 4 (4) Journal of Network Industries, 355, 360 
389 Damien Geradin, ‘Development of European regulatory agencies: what the EU should 
learn from American experience’ (2005) 11 Columbia Journal of European Law, 1, 28, 
Geradin (2000) 11 
390 The competitive price is likely to deliver the most consumer surplus on the long run. Too 
low prices look good on the short run, but they can impede investments and new entry 
which can hit back by leading to high prices on the long. 
391 Coen (2005) 376 
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is a continuing need for regulation.  As a matter of fact the reforms brought about 
the rise of the ‘regulatory state’.392  
In terms of the institutional side of regulation, the government could continue 
regulating the sectors after the privatisation in an explicit way (in opposition to the 
implicit regulatory role before the privatisation), but this is a rather problematic 
solution. 
Firstly in both the electricity and telecommunications sectors, competition is meant 
to be encouraged by separating the monopolistic levels from potentially more 
competitive ones. Governments, however, often had (have) ownership interest in 
firms active on the competitive levels as well.  Competing with a state owned entity 
is potentially unfair, as the government have powers that can be used to influence 
the market, as well as an incentive to promote state owned enterprises.  This 
however, harms competition which should be the driving force of efficiency gains – 
the reason for reforms.  In order to prevent governments from abusing their 
regulatory power by promoting the companies in which they have ownership 
interest and place other firms into a competitive disadvantage, separate regulatory 
authorities need to be created who are independent from governments393 and 
therefore does not share their anti-competitive interests.394 
                                               
392 Pierre Larouche, ‘Coordination of European and Member State regulatory policy. 
Horisontal, vertical and transversal aspects’ (2004) 5 (3-4) Journal of Network Industries, 
277,  277, Burkard Eberlein, ’Institutional Change and Continuity in German Infrastructure 
Management: The Case of Electricity’ (2000) 9  German Politics, 89 Coen (2005) 375, 
Burkard Eberlein ’Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the EU 
regulatory state’ 2005 (12) Journal of European Public Policy 104, Colin Scott, 
‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27 (1) Journal of Law and Society, Voices, 
Spaces, and Processes in Constitutionalism, 38, 44 
393 CF Larouche, et. al. (2012) 16 
394 Arjan Geveke, ’Improving Implementation by National Regulatory Authorities’ 2003 (3) 
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Secondly, even if the sector is fully privatised additional issues are likely to arise.  
From time to time the government has an incentive to intervene in the market in a 
populist way which is likely to be detrimental to consumers on the long run.  Such 
actions can range from forcing prices down as a method of campaigning for votes, 
or rewarding its supporters with ministerial seats, making the regulation more 
political and less expertise based.  As the government has an incentive for making 
populist interventions, it cannot make a truly credible commitment towards the 
industry.  This raises the risks factor of doing business in the industry, which 
ultimately means that it operates with higher costs (less efficiency).   
According to Majone, the outmost benefits of regulating a sector through a 
regulator (vis a vis a government) arise out of its “specialised knowledge and the 
possibility (because of independence from partisan political considerations) of 
making credible policy commitments”.395 
By assigning the task of regulation to a separate regulator, the government’s 
possibilities for such politically motivated interventions are reduced by a more 
technocratic organisation.  The use of an independent regulator enhances the 
objectivity and stability of the regulation, which boosts investor confidence.396   
Additionally, while a government (or even a ministry) has multiple functions 
independent sector regulators are created for a rather narrow function: 
implementing regulation.  In order to prove the necessity of their existence these 
authorities have an incentive to meet the expectations set up towards them.397 
                                               
395 Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Agency Model: The Growth of Regulation and Regulatory 
Institutions in the European Union’ available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/786/1/scop97_3_2.pdf 
accessed: 10/10/2014, 1 
396 Tim Schwarz, David Satola ’Telecommunications Legislation in Transitional and 
Developing Economies’ (2000) World Bank Technical Paper NO. 489, p. 25 
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The above arguments, imply that the government is better off by regulating the 
industry via an independent regulator; parallel to enacting regulation, setting up a 
separate regulatory authority would be more constructive.   
 
3.2 Accountability 
  
Accountability can be defined in different ways, 398  according to Philip “A is 
accountable with respect to P when some individual, body or institution, Y, can 
then require A to inform and explain/justify his or her conduct with respect to 
M”.399 
Accountability has three key elements:  
 Providing an explanation for an action, 
 Being exposed to scrutiny, and 
 The possibility of being reviewed by an independent entity.400  
Accountability is another key input of quality regulation.401  Another reason for 
creating separate regulatory authorities is that they tend to be more accountable 
than ministries.402 
                                               
398 Mark Philp, ’Delimiting democratic accountability’ (2009) 57(1) Political Studies, 29 
399 Ibid 32 
400 House of Lords - Select Committee on the Constitution, ’The Regulatory State: Ensuring 
its Accountability’  
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Accountability is necessitated by the potential conflict of interest between the 
regulator who is responsible for regulating the sector and consumers who are 
supposed to be the beneficiaries of regulation by working to achieve the aims set 
for it.  Defining the aims of the regulator is therefore crucial, at the same time it can 
be a complicated issue as the following examples suggest. 
The Utility Act of 2000 defined the “principal objective” of Ofgem as to “protect the 
interests of consumers in relation to gas conveyed through pipes, wherever 
appropriate by promoting effective competition”.403  After the millennium – besides 
economic regulation – Ofgem started dealing with issues such as climate change, 
carbon reduction, security of supply etc. thereby gaining a much wider role then it 
had initially.404  This was reflected in the changes made by the Energy Act 2010, 
which concerned “interests of existing and future consumers (…) taken as a whole”. 
According to the act, this includes:  
“(a) their interests in the reduction of electricity-supply emissions of targeted 
greenhouse gases; and 
(b) their interests in the security of the supply of electricity to them.”  
Defining the aims of the regulator is important from the perspective of 
accountability: they can be used as a benchmark to which the authority’s actions 
can be measured. 
In 2010 there was a review of Ofgem as part of the Conservative led coalition 
government program.  Ofgem was said to take up more and more functions and 
became unrecognisable in terms of scope. At the same time before the election, 
the Conservatives expressed their intention of turning Ofgem to a purely economic 
                                               
403 Utilities Act 2000, s 4AA (1) 
404 The evolving role of Ofgem’ (2010) Utility Week, available at: 
http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/news_story.asp?id=170841&title=The+evolving+role+
of+Ofgem accessed: 20/09/2012 
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regulator separating its green, sustainable development and competition related 
functions.405 However, the Review concluded that “wider public interest goals 
should remain embedded in Ofgem’s duties: it is right that Ofgem should consider 
trade-offs between economic and broader goals in all its decision making”.406        
In terms of Ofcom, the regulatory tasks of the previously separate regulators were 
combined together.  How the beneficiaries of Ofcom should be defined was widely 
debated.  According to the Communications Act of 2003 the main duties of OFCOM 
are connected to two objectives: consumer interest and competition. 
“3(1) It shall be the principal duty of Ofcom, in carrying out their functions; 
(a) to further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and 
(b) to further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by 
promoting competition”407 
There are plenty of notions that could have been used to describe the potential 
beneficiaries of Ofcom’s work such as audience, viewer, listener, user, customer 
etc.,408 but the Act uses the terms: citizens and consumer. The wording has been 
discussed and changed a lot throughout the legislative process, 409  different 
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stakeholders argued for different wording.410 The final outcome can be interpreted 
in different ways, what matters the most is Ofcom’s interpretation of the wording:  
“As consumers, we participate in the marketplace, buying or using goods and 
services. In short, we focus primarily on what is good for ourselves as private 
individuals or businesses.  Whereas, as citizens, we participate in society, which 
includes the marketplace, but also extends far beyond it.  Citizens are free to 
exchange goods and services, but can additionally be impacted by a whole range of 
social, cultural and political activities that are not the subject of commercial 
contracts.”411 
Arguably, the best way to understand the relations between these parties and to 
show how the regulator be incentivised to work to achieve the aims set for it, is by 
using a principal-agent model.  However some argue that it is overly simplistic,412 
for example problems may arise when dealing with multiple principals or agents.413  
The principal-agent model is used by many disciplines (law, economics, sociology 
etc.) to model relationships of parties with (1) conflicting interests, and (2) when 
asymmetric information exists between both parties.414  The model assists in 
understanding why accountability is essential for an effective institutional setup.  
According to this model, the regulator has both the incentive to ‘trick’ its principal 
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and pursue its own interests and there is normally also an information asymmetry 
between them. 415   Therefore the principal has to incentivise its agent (the 
regulator) so it works for the principal’s benefit,416  and make sure the operating of 
the agent is highly transparent417 in order to ease its evaluation. 
This is where rules for accountability come into the picture: to ensure that the 
regulator does not deviate from its duties.418  Conceptually, there are different 
bodies to which the authority is accountable to and different processes through 
which accountability works.  Ideally the regulator should be accountable to a 
neutral group instead of to the policy maker.419  In practice, the regulator normally 
has some sort of accountability towards the government, the parliament, the 
courts, the industry participants and the consumers/consumer bodies.  The national 
regulators should preferably be accountable to the political sphere through political 
control instruments, to the judiciary through legal procedures, and to other 
interested parties through the publication and explanation of policies and public 
consultation procedures.420 
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As an example, the Communications Act 2003 discusses the means of Ofcom’s 
accountability.  In carrying out its duties, Ofcom has the general requirement to be 
“transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in 
which action is needed”.421  Accountability is guaranteed through a series of 
arrangements: Ofcom reports annually to the Parliament, it appears before 
Parliamentary Committees, advises on Parliamentary Questions, replies to 
questions of Parliamentarians, meets with Ministers to explain its work (evidence 
and recommendations to the Parliament and Ministers are made public to support 
transparency) and finally Ofcom is audited by the National Audit Office.422   
Ofgem is also accountable for several bodies in several ways.  Ofgem is accountable 
to the Parliament: it submits an annual review to the Secretary of States which is 
laid before the Parliament. It may also give evidence before Select Committees of 
the Parliament.  Ofgem is audited by the National Audit office.  Ofgem’s actions can 
also be reviewed by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration.  Ofgem is 
not accountable to the Government, but it maintains working relationships with 
many of the departments.  Ofgem furthermore consults widely with the firms it 
regulates and there is an appeal process set to balance the rights of the parties.423  
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Accountability tends to be problematic in practice,424 mainly as the nature of the 
relationship between accountability and independence is questionable.   
In a publication on the matter, the House of Lords established that there is no 
conflict between accountability and independence.425 In practice this could mean 
that a regulator can be considered independent if it has the power to initiate 
decisions on its own, without de-jure and de-facto being dependent on the political 
sphere.  The fact that it has to justify its actions in some way (that the decision 
taken is in line with the government policies426) does not necessarily reduce its 
independence. 
Some suggest that there is complementary relationship between independence and 
accountability, but at the same time their goals are potentially conflicting.427   
Others suggest that accountability and independence go against each other428 and 
therefore they can be pictured as two ends of an imaginary spectrum.  This would 
imply that there has to be a balance between accountability and independence;429  
the ideal regulator should be sufficiently far from each extreme.   
This approach acknowledges that a model in which a regulator’s role is only 
implementing the mandate given by a parliament as too simplistic.  In reality, 
regulators are created because as a technocratic body it is capable of making 
quality decisions based on its expertise.430  This implies that the regulator should 
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make “real” decisions and for this they need discretion.  This goes further than just 
applying law which can be reviewed without taking away anything from the 
regulator’s independence, even though the extent of the discretion may vary.431  
 Regardless of which interpretation is accepted, it can be established that the 
accountability of the regulator is just as important as its independence; it ensures 
that the regulator works to achieve its set goals, not for itself and performs at a 
high standard. 
 
3.3 Regulatory Capture 
 
Regulatory capture can be defined in a broad or a narrow way. According to the 
broad definition, it is a “process through which special interests affect state 
intervention in any form”432, whilst the narrow definition is defined “specifically the 
process through which regulated monopolies end up manipulating the state 
agencies that are supposed to control them”.433  In this paper the narrow definition 
is used because the need for independence of the government has already been 
discussed above. 
According to the narrow definition, capture is in a sense the flip side of 
independence.  The regulator can conceptually be positioned between the 
government and the industry.  “Independence” as used above means autonomy 
from the government, hence resisting capture means maintaining autonomy from 
the industry. 
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Even if an independent regulator is created, there is the potential that it gets 
captured by the industry; it starts working in the industries’ interests, rather than 
pursuing the aims set for it.  The industry’s primary interest is maximising its profit 
which is the contrary of the aim that is wished to be achieved through competition: 
higher efficiency and thereby lower competitive prices.  
The literature on regulatory capture is already substantial. Most of this literature is 
heavily connected to utility regulation.434   There is evidence on information 
asymmetries, transaction costs, agency problems, strategic interaction between 
stakeholders etc. leading to capture.435  Informational links and personal links 
between the regulator and the industry are inevitable, but at the same time it can 
be used strategically to capture the regulator. 
 
Capture in Practice 
 
Approaching the issue from the regulatory process it can be established that first of 
all, good quality regulation should be based on quality data.  This data then has to 
be assessed by people with sufficient expertise.  These issues are connected to 
capture because the closer the regulator is to the industry the more information it 
has regarding it.  
 
Information  
 
An NRA (National Regulatory Authority) needs information on costs from the 
regulated companies and also feedback from consumers to see the perceived 
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weaknesses of its performance. 436   Key sectorial Information is shared 
asymmetrically between the undertakings present in the sector and the regulator.  
This is the factor that enables capture in the first place.437  In order to acquire 
reliable information, the authorities need to create a “circle of trust” where (at 
least some) firms can be expected to provide accurate information, but in return 
the authority has to consult with the firms as well.  This process obviously contains 
a degree of potential risk, as interactions between the regulator and the regulated 
firms (especially if those interactions became regular or even institutional) can 
easily lead to regulatory capture.  At the same the asymmetric information 
between the regulator and the industry has to be neutralised somehow.  Creating a 
circle of trusted firms is a comfortable option in general, while authorities that have 
a low budget, staff shortage, etc. will hardly find other ways to overcome this 
handicap,438 as they will have insufficient capacity to carry out extensive monitoring 
that would be necessary otherwise.439  The amount of risk arising from such 
practices depends on many components, such as the number of companies.  The 
more companies that exist in a certain sector, the more options the regulator has to 
choose the ones to whom it gives credit for as well as allowing it to compare 
information across firms; the regulator has a stronger position, which lowers this 
risk. This also means that the danger involved in this process varies greatly through 
countries and sectors.440 
One possible solution to maintain connection with the industry, but prevent 
capture is to counterbalance the influence of the industry.  The regulatory authority 
tends to listen to the industry’s arguments, as other parties are too small and 
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diffused; they will find it difficult to express their opinions.441  This suggests that the 
more diverse the parties (especially parties that have a lesser stake within the 
industry: consumer groups, NGOs, etc.) are involved with consultation, the less 
likely regulatory capture evolves.442 
At the same time, Coen argues that firms working together with the authorities 
results in a positive outcome in the long run.443  According to his theory, the 
relationship between regulators and regulated firms goes through four different 
stages. In the first stage, companies are rather just concerned about the 
information they give out and there is high regulatory uncertainty.  In the second 
stage, there is increased co-operation yet no real trust between the parties and the 
focus is on compliance with the norms.  The third phase states that companies 
begin to establish norms and understanding with the regulator, but there is still no 
industry-wide trust in these connections. In the last phase – after realising the 
benefits of co-operating – firms start to establish proactive links with the 
regulators, making issues and solutions heard to the regulator.444   
 
Personal Expertise  
 
The regulator needs personnel who have an in depth knowledge of the industry it 
regulates.  Hiring people who worked in the industry may be a straightforward 
solution to make sure the regulator has experts who know the industry inside out, 
however this has its downsides as well.  
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The issue of personals link between the industry and the regulator (“revolving 
doors”) is quite complex.  Many scenarios can be analysed with both advantages 
and disadvantages.  When an employee who used to work in the industry joins the 
regulator, he or she might still hold some bias favouring the industry during 
decision making; personal links and connections tend to exist even when switching 
jobs.  At the same time, such a person potentially has extensive knowledge that can 
greatly assist the authorities.  Whether the regulator’s employees should be 
allowed to work later on for the industry is also not straightforward.  The industry 
may “bribe” personnel of the regulator by offering them well-paid jobs after leaving 
the regulator.  In addition, from an employee’s perspective – who plans to look for 
employment in the industry – it also makes sense to be strict with the industry 
while working at the authority, showing that they are competent and ethical, giving 
him or her a positive professional reputation as a future employee.445 
 
3.4 Costs 
 
Just like every public service, regulation comes with its drawbacks as well.  Part of 
the disadvantage of regulation arises from operative costs of the regulatory 
authority.  Regulation is often put in place to reduce the cost of monopoly.  An 
obvious part of the monopoly cost is the deadweight welfare loss, however the 
monopoly cost has additional elements, the monopoly cost is higher than just the 
welfare loss.446  Regulatory costs are justified as long as the benefit (reduction of 
the cost of monopoly) exceeds the costs of regulating, but the higher the ratio of 
the benefits/costs of regulation the better. 
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The idea of efficiency based regulation has been debated for long.  According the 
“Public Interest” view, natural monopolies call for regulation in order to hinder 
their ability to impose monopoly costs on the society.447  This approach concludes 
that regulators are working for the consumers when preventing such abuse, and 
the costs of maintaining a regulator are justified by higher consumer welfare which 
arises from of its operation. 
The “Public Interest” view was challenged by Stigler,448 (although, his ideas were 
not completely new,449 Laffonte and Tirole trace the idea back to Marx450) who 
argued that regulators – even if they were really set up due to the natural 
monopoly problem, and tasked with the promotion of consumers’ interests – tend 
to be captured by the industry, which means that after a while they rather work for 
the firm(s) they would have to regulate to reduce the costs of monopoly.  He also 
pointed out the fact that regulation is not only used in cases of natural monopolies, 
so it cannot be said that regulation is used in general to reduce the costs of a 
monopoly.  Sectors may actively call for their regulation for their own benefit, and 
achieve it depending on the numbers of voters, the wealth they have, and the ease 
of their organisation.451 Politicians seek money and votes,452 in a sense these are 
the currencies used to buy regulation.  Politicians can even make otherwise 
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unpopular decisions as the average voter would normally only be marginally 
affected and therefore will not be too concerned.453  Stigler’s argument can be 
regarded as the Chicago School’s doctrine on public policy and also as a compliment 
to the “Public Choice” theory.454 
Peltzman expanded on Stigler’s idea.455  In Peltzman’s model, three sides are 
analysed: the industry’s, the consumers’ and the politicians’.  According to 
Peltzman “what is basically at stake in regulatory processes is a transfer of 
wealth”.456  He argues that politicians act like a mediator between the industry and 
the consumers457: therefore they introduce regulation when there is relatively high 
possibility for levelling gains between them (regulatory entry).458  
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Figure 52 Peltzman model (illustration) 
This means that in a monopolistic industry, regulation is introduced because the 
monopoly earns monopoly profit and there is plenty of scope for making 
consumers better off.  By applying the same logic, it can then be shown that 
regulation is also likely to be introduced in highly competitive markets, whereby 
firms can only price their product on the level of their marginal costs (which is at 
the same time the most beneficial for consumers), because there are plenty of 
gains achievable for them.459  However, regulation is not aimed at the elimination 
of the cost of monopoly. 
In terms of the institutional side of regulation, this school of thought suggests that 
the whole point of their existence is mitigating surplus (as opposed to maximising 
consumer surplus).  They only do harm to consumers in a competitive setting, but 
they do not aim at achieving maximum consumer surplus in a monopolistic setting 
either because their aim is mitigate, rather than eliminate.  Getting rid of the 
middle-man and putting in place regulation aiming towards full consumer surplus 
leads to better results, it also saves the costs of operating a regulatory authority.   
The German regulatory experiment however does not support this view.  During 
the initial stage of the German electricity reform, they did not put any ex-ante 
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regulation in place (only the Competition Authority had ex-post power as usual), 
nevertheless the lack of a regulatory authority turned out to be highly problematic.  
During the period when the regulator responsible for the electricity sector was 
absent, factors such as prices, market concentration and consumer satisfaction 
were performing worse in Germany than in the UK.  There was an especially 
noticeable fall in consumer satisfaction between 1997 and 2000 (which is also the 
period when the German electricity companies merged into four electricity giants) 
in the German electricity sector.  Eberlein connects market structure to prices and 
ultimately to consumer satisfaction: “some claim that these price increases are in 
response to higher fuel prices, a much more important reason however, is the new 
market structures we see operating – market structures that are in fact less 
efficient than their predecessors. The result is higher prices and no net consumer 
benefits.”460  Providing access through fair terms is probably the most important 
prerequisite for the development of competition.  Assigning this issue to the 
competence of competition authorities and via ex-post regulation seems to be a 
very weak solution. Giving a weak answer to the most important problem of the 
sector inevitably led to insufficient competitiveness.461  Although it seemed that the 
costs of operating a regulator were reduced, since other bodies had to deal with 
issues arising from the absence of a regulatory authority, this turned out to be a 
false impression.  Moreover, these other bodies were likely to be less efficient than 
a regulator would have been.    
However, it was a mistake to think that Germany can save the costs of operating a 
regulator: problems arose that had to be dealt with.  As a result of the lack of a 
regulatory authority, the Competition Authority had to deal with all emerging 
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issues.  The Competition Authority had two main tools at its disposal: firstly, it can 
use the essential facilities doctrine to facilitate access to the grid. Secondly, it can 
use merger control to block mergers that would have the likely effect of restricting 
access by fair terms to the grid.  The main problems seem to be that the 
Competition Authority simply did not have the resources such as technical expertise 
or the time to deal with the large amount of cases that originated from the 
electricity sector.  Moreover, the companies had the widespread right to turn to the 
court (being an organisation focused on the interpretation and application of the 
law), that were presumably less competent in deciding on cases concerning 
predominantly economic issues. Additionally, the Competition Authority’s interim 
injunctions or orders do not have direct enforcement powers.462  
There was not much to expect from the competition authorities of the Landers’ 
either. These authorities tend to be understaffed and in general rather passive. 
They also seemed to be ill-equipped to deal with the nation-or even European wide 
electricity companies. 463   At the end, EU law made changing this system 
compulsory. 
The outcome of the above-mentioned German experiment suggests that investing 
in the operation of a regulatory authority is more beneficial than not having one.  
Lasting market power leads to constantly emerging competition issues; in order to 
be able to deal with these issues, capacity and expertise is needed.  However, 
minimising the costs of the regulatory authority is crucial; the regulator should be 
as efficient as possible. 
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3.5 Regulatory Quality 
 
The way the regulator is set to operate also affects regulatory quality.  The 
regulator’s operation is defined by a complex set of rules.  As the aim of these rules 
may go against each other in some cases, a careful balance is essential. 
Continuing with listing the factors that support regulatory quality, the next point to 
note is that the regulator might have all the data and expertise necessary to make a 
correct decision, but if the appropriate solution falls outside of the powers of the 
authority, than the outcome of the whole process will be compromised.  The 
regulator needs a sufficiently wide toolkit, appropriate procedural and structural 
arrangements so it can provide appropriate regulatory solutions. 
Innovative regulatory solutions should also be encouraged.  This again, underlines 
the importance of wide powers and discretions.   
At the same time there should be mechanisms to ensure regulatory consistency 
and legal certainty.  Falling short of doing this will enhance risks and therefore, 
deter investments. 464  When the regulation is not predictable, the companies lose 
confidence about the profitability of their investments. 465   
All these goals should be balanced within a structure that remains as simple as 
possible.  Procedural and structural complexity may have several drawbacks: it may 
reduce transparency, lead to slow operation and make the operating of the 
regulator less cost-effective.  Cost-effectiveness for EU member states may be less 
of a concern than for third world countries, but it is still a concern nevertheless and 
therefore it should not be overlooked.      
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4 The Pros and Cons of Multi-Sector Regulators 
 
The previous section set up a general framework of institutional issues and 
described the interactions as well as the necessary balance between them.  Here 
the assessment is taken forward by analysing how these features are affected by 
the institutional setup.  In other words, what difference does it make in terms 
independence, accountability, likeliness of regulatory capture and costs, whether 
the regulator is set up as a single sector regulator or a multi-sector regulator, and 
what other regulatory features are affected – all other factors affecting these 
features being equal.  The issues under “Regulatory Quality” are dealt with 
separately here as there are different effects in terms of different elements. 
The existing literature on this question mostly concerns Third World countries.  This 
paper however concerns two of the major EU economies, hence the applicability of 
the findings of this literature is considered where necessary due to the differences 
between the subjects.     
Most of the pros and cons are two sides of the same coin, so for the sake of 
simplicity here we will analyse the issues from a multi-sectoral perspective (the 
“pros” of a multi-sector regulators are implicitly the “cons” of a single-sector 
regulators, neutral features are irrelevant by definition). 
 
4.1 Pros 
 
Enhanced Independence 
 
Due to its broader constituency a multi-sector regulator is more likely to be able to 
stay independent of the political sphere.466  Multi-sector regulators are claimed to 
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be more resistant for capture from either the government’s or the industry’s 
side.467 From the government’s side capture is usually attempted by the ministry468 
that is in charge for the current sector, however when there are more than one 
sector governed by the authority, it is likely that there is more than one ministry 
trying to influence the sector.469  When there are several principals (in this case 
ministries) but only one agent (the regulator), the individual principals’ ability to 
influence the agent is likely to be lower than when there is only one principal. 
The multi-sector regulator is therefore more likely to be able to resist political 
pressure during its decision making.  Refusal to submit to political pressure 
concerning one sector can create a precedent that can be applied in a range of 
other sectors when a multi-sector regulator is in place.470 
However if a dominant ministry manages to exert power on the regulator, all 
regulated sectors may be influenced by the political sphere.471 
Examples of regulators from the countries concerned also support the concept that 
multi-sector regulators tend to be more independent.  Hanretty et. al. compared 
the regulators’ independence based on a weighted scoring system that consisted of 
political independence of the regulator, freedom from political instructions, length 
of term for the head of the regulator, potential for renewal of the appointment, the 
ease of removal of the head, independence from financing, the regulator’s control 
over its own budget, political potential for overturning regulatory decisions, 
regulator’s exclusivity of competence and political incompatibility (members of the 
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regulator cannot hold political office).  They found that the Bundesnetzagentur is 
now more independent than Ofgem of Ofcom, or the Bundeskartellamt, signalling a 
significant change in the German regulatory culture.472 
 
Enhanced Resistance to Capture 
 
The multi-sector regulator is going to be dealing with more than one industry, 
which decreases the likeliness of problems arising out of linkages between the 
regulator and the industry (see the example of the revolving door problem, 
mentioned before).  This is because a multi-sector authority is not just 
dependent473 on one industry but rather, on many474, hence the link to each single 
one is weaker.475  Industry-specific groups should therefore, find it harder to 
capture the regulator.476  The industries would have to collude in order to be able 
to have the same opportunities to capture the regulator, making it much more 
complicated to carry out. 
Also, the theory suggests that capture is less likely when the number of firms 
regulated is higher. Dealing with more sectors means that (excluding the unlikely 
event of having the same firms participating in all sectors) the authority will 
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regulate more firms. However, if one dominant industry manages to capture a 
multi-sector regulator, other sectors might be affected as well.477         
 
Enhanced Cost Effectiveness  
 
Analysing the reforms of developing countries, some argues that establishing multi-
sector regulators can be a cost-effective solution.478  Essentially this is because the 
industry specialist staff can share the services of the same administration and other 
non-industry specific staff. 479   Personnel with expertise such as lawyers, 
economists, financial analysts are likely to be useful regardless of the different 
industries concerned.480  At the same time, Kerft and Geradin argue that by taking 
into account factors such as the costs of delays and possible regulatory mistakes, it 
might compensate for the higher costs of maintaining a specialised regulator.481   
It would seem that the relevance of the issue in the cases concerned is 
questionable: a small developing country might find it impossible to establish 
properly functioning specialised regulators482 however, it is unlikely that this would 
be a problem for countries such as Germany or the UK.  
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A key finding of the Atkins report (in connection with the regulators of the UK) was 
that the cost of regulation is rising “well in excess of inflation”483, but adds that 
these costs are “still very small in comparison to the turnover of the regulated 
industries and to the benefits received by consumers”.484 This would still suggest 
that in the long run, even richer countries can find this solution beneficial.  
On the other hand, there is evidence that expectations for enhanced cost 
effectiveness may not be realised in practice: Ofcom cost 25% more than the cost 
of the regulators it supplanted.  Although, it was not the aim behind merging the 
regulators,485 some overall cost reductions were expected by combining all these 
regulators into one.  Whether this expectation materialised or not is 
questionable.486  Considering that Ofcom had 263 separate regulatory duties, which 
was more than twice as many its predecessors had altogether,487 the creation of 
Ofcom might have led to more cost-efficient regulation even if the costs did add up 
to be more than previously.  
There is only scope for staff related costs savings when part of the staff is not 
working on full-capacity. This can be the case when the workload is inconsistent 
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over time, for example there is a tendency for the beginning of the month to be 
significantly busier while towards the end of the month, workload is a lot more 
relaxed. If another agency has the opposite cycle of inconsistent workload by 
uniting the regulatory staff-related, costs can be cut.488 
 
Enhanced Innovativeness 
 
What, seems to be more realistic however, and hence more important than cost 
reductions, is the enhanced quality of regulatory work by creating teams of experts 
with different backgrounds, especially if their more diverse expertise can be used 
creatively to help resolve issues in another sector.  
Merging regulators can facilitate the transfer of regulatory know-how between 
different sectors.  This is likely to be more important when a country has limited 
regulatory expertise or skilled personnel.489 
Whether the potential for such quality gains exist however, is hard to assess. If 
there is a frequent need to consult such outsider experts available at another 
regulator, it is likely that uniting the regulators can achieve enhanced quality 
decisions. 
  
Enhanced regulatory consistency and credibility 
 
By creating a “common regulatory culture”, a multi-sector regulator is also likely to 
bring more consistency in the regulation of the different sectors.490  This enhances 
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regulatory certainty because a decision made in respect of a sector, is more likely to 
be replicated if the same issue is considered in terms of another industry.491  Since a 
multi-sector regulator has a higher caseload, the range of precedent cases is going 
to be wider too.492  These factors enhance regulatory certainty; more regulatory 
certainty brings about important benefits such as increased investments.493 
In the UK, the first proposals for a merged communications regulator date back to 
the mid-‘90s. 494   The main argument for the merger was that the 
telecommunications and the broadcasting platforms were converging, therefore 
regulatory convergence was necessary to avoid regulatory inconsistencies.495 
Multi-sector regulators are expected to deal better with big firms operating in more 
than one sector. 496   Inconsistent regulation may cause distortions between 
competing industries (e.g. gas-electricity).497   There is a trend of quickening 
convergence between related sectors (such as telecommunications and 
broadcasting) and regulated companies, frequently start competing in another 
industry, offering bundled services (many telecommunications and electricity 
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services provided by the same firm).498  Enhanced regulatory consistency between 
different industries is likely to be more and more important in the future.499 
The obstacle is that the regulator may find, is the increased risk regarding 
improperly applied precedents.  The more different two sectors are, the less likely 
the same logic can be applied for them yet however, a multi-sector regulator may 
start to feel obliged to follow a pervious precedent, regardless of this factor.500 
  
Less problems with conflicting competencies 
 
As markets and sectors converge, authorities that have overlapping competencies 
become a key issue.  Cross subsidisation between multi-product firms is a common 
practice. 501  At the same time, this practice blurs out the costs of the different 
businesses.  It is important to note though, that the regulatory authority 
understands these costs.  When separate regulators only observe parts of the 
company businesses, this task becomes much more difficult compared to when one 
authority is responsible for all the different branches within the company. 502  
In case the firms have multiple authorities to turn to, they can simply contact the 
one that is more lenient towards them503 and then claim to other authorities that 
the issue is res judicata.  From the regulator’s perspective, the same practice results 
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in becoming either virtual or the most lenient: each authority knows that unless 
they offer the most favourable solution amongst all, they are going to be 
circumvented which in turn triggers a race between the authorities themselves to 
serve the industry as much as possible.504  At the same time, having multiple 
authorities may lessen or diminish the potential for the regulator to act in favour of 
the industry and mislead his principal. 505  The reason for this is because when more 
than one regulator is dealing with a certain issue, they have the capability to check 
on each other. 
Being in a “monopoly” position in terms of sector regulation is advantageous as it 
simplifies the picture: it is clear to all parties as to who is in charge of the sector. 
Firms know that there is only one body to who they can turn to so they have the 
incentive to have a good relationship with the authority, to comply with its 
decisions, enhancing the importance of the regulator.506   
Nevertheless, the principal agent model suggests that when there is more than one 
agent, information asymmetry becomes less of an issue.  Additionally, when 
interest groups are added to the picture, the information asymmetry is reduced. 
For example, the industry will not let the regulator misinform the principal 
(especially misinformation leads to disadvantageous consequences), but go forward 
with their own data and findings.507    In highly complex industries, asymmetric 
information subsequently poses a bigger problem, 508  this suggest that 
telecommunications should be more problematic. 
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Although mergers between the Competition Authority and the sector regulator was 
out of the scope for this study, the lessons that can be learnt from existing 
arrangements to deal with overlapping competence between the Competition 
Authority and the sector regulators is relevant here.  In the countries concerned, 
conflicting competencies exists rather between regulators and competition 
authorities.   
During the 1990’s, the task of OFFER was solely economic regulation.  The 
Competition Act 1998 broadened the competition tasks of the regulator, who had 
to work together with the OFT on competition related issues.509  Ultimately the OFT 
and the Competition Commission also had duties related to the electricity sector. 
OFT protected consumer interest in general in the competitive levels, while the 
Competition Commission’s speciality is in investigating mergers, so it promoted 
competition via merger control, but only when a case was referred to it by the 
Ofgem or the OFT.510   
As markets are becoming more and more competitive in the UK, especially after the 
Competition Act 1998, there is more space for competition law and also for the 
Competition Authority that applies it. This ultimately provides the companies an 
option to think strategically and circumvent the least preferred authorities.511 In 
order to neutralise the problems that could arise out of the collision of 
competencies, the OFT and the regulators set up the Concurrency Working Party in 
1997. The Concurrency Working Party gathers approximately six times a year under 
the chairmanship of the OFT’s representative. The aim of the meetings is to 
establish practical working arrangements, discuss issues of common interest, share 
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information and coordinate the competition law related cases.512 Besides the 
Concurrence Working Party, the good reputation established by the regulators 
throughout years of work has also helped it adapt to the changing environment 
without much problem.513    
Recently, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 altered this arrangement, 
giving more power to the new Competition Authority, the CMA.514  Furthermore, 
Ofgem’s referral of the energy market for a full investigation to the CMA515 could 
harm Ofgem’s reputation as an effective regulator. 
In Germany the regulatory authorities were far less strong.  The Competition 
Authority and the courts had significant overlapping powers even in the 
telecommunications sector while in the electricity sector, initially a regulatory 
authority was not even established, but the regulatory functions necessitated by EU 
law (in Germany’s case, negotiated third-party access) was added to the 
Competition Authority’s responsibilities.516 
There was an overlap between the competencies of RegTP and the Federal Cartel 
Office (sometimes even with the Monopoly Commission) in competition issues.517 
While the RegTP was probably the dominant in ex-ante regulation, the Competition 
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Authority was the major ex-post regulator, transparency was a problem as it was 
not even clear who (RegTP or Competition Authority) was in charge for certain 
issues. 518   This problem was largely resolved by the creation of the 
Bundesnetzagentur.  The Bundesnetzagentur was the main regulator of the 
telecommunications sector: it enforces the provisions of the special 
telecommunications law as well as German competition law, leaving the 
Bundeskartellamt only EU competition law to apply for the sector.519 
Yet, both the existence of a regulator and a Competition Authority seems to be 
necessary as on one hand, the German example has shown that the Competition 
Authority cannot completely replace the job of the regulator and on the other 
hand, according to Geradin, the application of competition law by national 
regulators carries the risk of alternative interpretation and is therefore fragmented 
in the legal practice.520 
 
4.2 Cons 
 
Less Accountability 
 
Further to being more independent, multi-sector regulators are likely to have a 
more complex structure, more complex procedures, aims and obligations which, 
may potentially reduce transparency.  Accountability therefore, may be more of an 
issue for multi-sector regulators than for single sector ones.  In order to achieve 
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adequate accountability more emphasis has to be added to the issue when it comes 
to multi-sector regulators. 
In line with expectations i.e. a super regulator is less accountable, Larouche et. al. 
suggest that the Bundesnetzagentur is less accountable than Ofgem and Ofcom 
(but more accountable than the Bundeskartellamt).521  These together mean that 
the German regulator has considerable power, potentially more than its British 
counterparts.  
 
Higher Risk: One Fails – All Fails 
 
It has been argued that creating a multi-sector regulator is risky.  Combining the 
regulatory functions is like "putting all your eggs in one basket";522 if the authority 
fails all sectors’ regulation is going to fail.   
The risk of institutional failure can be mitigated by creating separate regulatory 
authorities.523  Creating separate regulatory authorities also gives the potential of 
experimenting with different innovative ideas at the same time, with a limited risk 
of failure.524 
 
Less Able to Accommodate for Different Needs of the Different Sector  
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One of the main reasons for establishing sector regulators is that they have a 
special focus (compared to the government, or the competition authorities525) 
hence, they are better placed to study the industry and to gain knowledge to 
provide better regulation.526 By combining the regulators, this focus is broadened 
which may reduce the aforementioned ability.527  A multi-sector regulator may be 
more likely to use a generalised approach even if it is not appropriate in a certain 
case.528 
The fact that different regulated industries are likely to evolve at a different pace 
moving towards competition from the ex-monopolistic state may also cause 
additional issues in a multi-sector regulator.529    
This effect can however, be mitigated by creating sector-specific branches within 
the regulatory body.530 
 
More Complex, Slow Operation 
 
The structure of a multi-sector regulator is likely to be more complex than of a 
single sector regulator’s, which can lead to complicated decision making.  This may 
lead to less transparency, which is a key principle of good governance.531 
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However, this can be counteracted by structural arrangements as the Ofcom 
example suggests.  The structure of Ofcom is defined by the Office of 
Communications Act of 2002.  There seem to be a deviation from the previous 
model of single person dominance which was observable in other regulators, 
especially in Oftel’s structure.  At the same time the ITC and the Radio Authority 
operated a commission structure.  The proposal for Ofcom was a mixture of the 
two.  Ultimately, Ofcom’s Board is similar to a private company’s, with a separate 
chairman and chief executive, a majority of independent members and some 
executive members.532  The Board is Ofcom’s main decision making body533 and is 
headed by a chairman who is appointed by the Secretary of State for five years.  
There are also executive members, headed by the chief executive who is appointed 
by the chairman.534  The Chief Executive is responsible for Ofcom’s day to day 
operation as well as being answerable to the Board.  Together with the rules 
established on founding, which is combined from fees pertaining to the sectors 
regulated and grant-in-aid from the Government, appointment rules are key to 
Ofcom’s independence. 535   The internal structure got little attention in the 
Parliamentary process, although – besides guaranteeing independence – it has 
important implications on Ofcom’s operation: for example it states to have enabled 
Ofcom to act quickly especially during the set-up period.536   
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Ofgem got a similar structure as Ofcom, and although Ofgem grew larger and 
gained more tasks, it still had a reputation of working quickly and efficiently, which 
was especially important in connection with managing the agreements of regulated 
access and ultimately regulatory quality.537 
However as the German example would suggest, timely operation is not exclusively 
defined by the internal structure.  The RegTP dealt with controversial cases in 
chambers (similar to courts).  Its decision could have been challenged by third 
parties in front of the administrative court.538  One of the issues with the RegTP was 
that it worked rather slowly.  This was partly due to the fact that its decisions could 
be widely challenged in front of the court and therefore, the interested parties had 
to wait until the court reached a decision partly due to simply having been a newly 
established body. This was because the German ex-ante type regulation was still 
under development.539 
       
4.3 Summary 
 
The structure of the authority is not the only factor that influences the features 
concerned above.  There are normally special rules describing the duties related to 
accountability, the safeguards for independence etc.  However, if these rules stay 
the same, merging the regulators (the creation of a multi-sector regulator) in itself 
is likely to have an effect on these features.   Some of these changes are beneficial 
some are not (see the summary in the table below). 
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Summary of the pros and cons of multi-sector regulators 
Pros Cons 
Enhanced independence Less accountability 
Enhanced resistance to capture Higher risk: one fails –all fails 
Enhanced regulatory consistency and 
credibility 
Less able to accommodate for different 
needs of the different sector 
Enhanced innovativeness More complex, slow operation 
Enhanced cost effectiveness  
Less problems with conflicting 
competencies 
 
Figure 53 Summary of the pros and cons of multi-sector regulators 
It can be seen from this summary, that there are numerous advantages but also 
quite a few disadvantages of multi-sector regulators.  Therefore, it cannot be 
argued in the one model or the other is “better” in general. 
  
5. A multi-step approach     
 
The previous part analysed the differences in the key institutional features in a 
static way: the assessment simply looked at how these features change if the 
regulator is setup up as a single sector regulator or a multi-sector regulator.  Here 
the analysis takes a step forward by looking at the question in a dynamic way.  Not 
simply the regulatory structure, but the merger process is in the focus.  This is 
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contrasted with the predictable changes in regulatory issues as the reforms 
develop.  
The paper started off by claiming that the main institutional factors work as a 
system of checks and balances and a careful balance is need to be achieved when 
designing the regulatory institutions.  As the sectors evolve during the reform 
process, the circumstances which the regulator has to deal with, as well as the aims 
set for the regulator are likely to change this, however, means that balance might 
need to be re-adjusted along the reform process. 
Then the subjects of the comparisons; the British and the German sectorial 
regulators have been discussed as a development process rather than as a snapshot 
of the current institutional arrangement.  This is because the paper argues that 
asking whether a UK style single sector regulator or a German style multi-sector 
regulator is a superior setup (according to any measure) would likely to lead to the 
over-simplification of the matter.  A dynamic approach is needed which takes into 
account the changing circumstances within which the regulator operates.  
This leads towards the question of how can synergies arising out of merging the 
regulator outweigh the costs of it.  While it has been shown that both setup has 
pros and cons and the decision between creating one or another is ultimately a 
trade-off, assessing these in their dynamics enables maximising the pros and 
minimise the cons. 
   
(5.0 The counterargument) 
 
There have been a few studies540 concerning briefly the actual process of creating 
multi-sector regulators.  They essentially argue that the creation of multiple 
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authorities and then their subsequent union is a disadvantageous strategy for two 
main reasons:  
• they do not have the a potential for advanced cross-industry learning; and  
• the regulators do not have an incentive to merge in later stages.541  
However in relation to the first point, this paper argues that in the early stages, by 
definition regulators do not have much experience which would give the basis of 
learning from other industries.  At the beginning, experimenting with different 
solutions enabled more widely (the creation of many different authorities)bis likely 
to carry more benefits.   
In terms of the second argument, it is easy to see how a policy of merging 
regulators (a step-by-step approach) leads to constant tensions within the 
authorities: employees are under pressure because they know they might become 
redundant.  There is practical evidence for the existence of this incentive as well: 
during the creation of Ofcom.  Not all the regulators welcomed their planned 
assimilation into a single regulator: there was a body of opinion that the creation of 
Ofcom should not have proceeded.  There were different potential options 
considered, such as the creation of two regulators: one responsible for content, the 
other for network issues, or even a looser federation of regulators, yet setting up a 
single authority became the popular favoured option.542 
However, it cannot be implied that the already existent authorities will try to 
‘sabotage’ the merger.  Merging regulators is an existing practice and it does not 
seem to have a vast negative effect on the work of the regulators; extreme cases 
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such as the Netherland’s and Spain’s example shows that combining existing 
regulators is a workable solution.  Furthermore it can be argued, that pressure is in 
fact a good thing: in the private sector this incentivises employees to put more 
efforts which results in enhanced efficiency.  The same thing is likely to happen in 
the public sector: employees at the authority would be more urged to distinguish 
themselves, which ultimately leads to higher quality regulatory output. 
 
5.1 Independence 
 
It has been established that a multi-sector regulator is more independent.  
Therefore a gradual approach, creating separate regulatory authorities at the 
starting point of the reforms and then merging them later on would mean 
(relatively) less independence at the beginning and more independence as the 
reform proceeds. 
Both in the UK and Germany, the single sector regulators created at the beginning 
of the reform (Oftel, Offer, RegTP) enjoyed limited independence in compared to 
their current situation.   
Ofgem, the regulator of the electricity sector in the UK currently enjoys a higher 
degree of independence than its predecessor, the Offer.  Due to privatisation, the 
previously great significance of the Secretary of State for Energy has been reduced.  
Still, according to the Electricity Act of 1989 the Secretary of State shared powers 
with the independent regulator.  The reason for this solution was that as the 
initiator of the reforms, the government would ultimately be made responsible for 
the mistakes of the regulator, so it retained the option of stepping in (if necessary) 
to balance its responsibility. In practice the Secretary of State rather delegated the 
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powers to the regulator and remained active mainly in policy setting.543  The 
Electricity Act 1989 ordered the Secretary of State to appoint a Director General of 
Electricity Supply for a maximum of five years, but with the possibility of re-
appointment.  Within that period, the Secretary of State could only remove the 
Director from the office in case of incapacity or misbehaviour. 544  
While Ofgem is more independent than Offer used to be, Offer was at the time 
more independent than the German RegTP, however after the creation of the 
Bundesnetzagentur this had changed, and now the German super regulator is even 
more independent than Ofgem.  This makes the German example even better in 
illustrating how regulatory mergers lead to more independence. 
In Germany, the RegTP started its operation on the 1st of January 1998 as an 
independent agency, but under the general supervision of the Federal Ministry of 
Economics.  The RegTP was generally responsible for market control and licensing. 
545 It was far from being a powerful and independent authority: its competencies 
were severely restricted by the Competition Authority, courts, and even 
government interventions that occurred occasionally.546 The government could 
simply overrule the RegTP, which is especially concerning as it has ownership 
interest in the incumbent, Deutsche Telekom.547  As an attempt to tackle the 
problem of possibly conflicting interests, the RegTP was put under the supervision 
of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, while the Ministry of Finance was charged with 
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dealing with shareholding issues.548  Separation was however, only done on a sub-
governmental (ministerial) level, which is not necessarily enough to neutralise the 
incentive for promoting the incumbent. Knowing that the government has an 
incentive to intervene in the sector and promote Deutsche Telekom as it had a 
stake in it. In addition while it had the possibility to intervene, the regulator was not 
satisfactorily independent and as a result, other companies remained distrustful.549  
It was clear that the ministry had a (politically tinted) directing role over the 
regulator550 although, the regulator showed loyalty toward consumers and against 
the incumbent when it prohibited Deutsche Telekom from charging a substantial 
fee from customers wishing to switch to a new provider which would have 
consequently impeded the entry of new firms.551  
According to Coen, the RegTP could have become a more independent regulator: 
he argues that the Competition Authority is de facto headed by the Ministry of 
Economics. Still, intervention was rare as RegTP failed to fight this influence.552  
RegTP was also criticised for not withdrawing the regulation as quickly as it should 
have and for showing favouritism towards the incumbent.553 
It is easy to see how is this justified and it can be argued that initially being more 
embedded in the political sphere can be seen as more beneficial. 
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When deciding on starting the sectors reforms, politicians essentially make a 
political decision.  Therefore they have political responsibility, which in practice 
means that ultimately the citizens will blame the politicians if the reform turns out 
to be unsuccessful.  If the politicians have to bear this risk/responsibility it would be 
unfair to require them to give up their powers of influencing the reform.  Instead 
more and more independence can be given to the authority gradually, as it shows 
capability when dealing with its tasks.  
Being more embedded in the political system can be beneficial for a regulator that 
lacks reputation.  A newly set up authority is likely not to have a strong reputation.  
Within these circumstances, if the regulator does a performance in a distinguished 
fashion and manages resists capture from the industry (which is likely to lead to 
tensions between the industry and the regulator), the firms participating in the 
market may find that running a campaign against the regulator is a good strategy to 
force the authority to act in their favour.  Note that there is information 
asymmetry, so there is a new – virtually unknown – authority versus companies 
who have information on every aspect of the market.  It is easy to see that firms are 
likely to have the opportunity to make the authority look incompetent in the eyes 
of the citizens, who are ultimately going to show their dissatisfaction towards the 
government (because in most cases the director/board of the authority is not 
elected directly).  When the authority is close to the government/ministry the 
reputation of the government is in a sense extended to the authority, thereby, such 
a strategy is less viable. 
Concerning regulators not being adequately independent at the beginning of the 
reform, the literature mentions that this can set back privatisation.   Without a clear 
signal of giving up political interference with the sectors, privatisation may cause 
investors to under-value the business opportunity.  However, the priority at the 
start of the reform should be the creation of a well-functioning market and not by 
maximising the one-time revenue achieved by privatisation.  Furthermore, this 
effect can be mitigated by multi-step privatisation; the government can initially sell 
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a minority share of the incumbent, and then when the regulator achieves a good 
reputation of being independent, sell the rest of the shares. 
 
5.2 Accountability  
 
Following on from the arguments above, accountability is less important at the 
initial stages of the reform, but becomes crucial in later stages. 
When the regulator’s independence is limited, there is less potential for it to 
deviate from the goals set to it and to start working for its own interests.  A single 
sector regulator – such as what was created initially in both the UK and Germany – 
tends to be less complex structurally which helps aids in its transparency.  Single 
sector authorities are also less powerful (in compared to multi-sector regulators) 
vis-à-vis the political sphere and therefore, are less likely to ignore their duties 
concerning to accountability. 
Accountability however, becomes vastly more crucial the more single sector 
regulators are merged to form a multi-sector regulator.  The UK’s currently 
operating merged regulators; Ofgem and Ofcom are still only responsible for the 
regulation of a fragment of the economy.  But through the regulation of the 
electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal and railway sectors, Germany’s 
Bundesnetzagentur is a key entity when it comes to the German economy.  The 
findings of Hanretty et. al. namely that the Bundesnetzagentur is less accountable 
than the British regulators554 suggest that Germany did not realise that the creation 
of such a multi-sector regulator should go hand in hand with rules providing for 
enhanced accountability, to maintain the balance between accountability and 
independence. 
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5.3 Capture 
 
It has been discussed that a single-sector regulator is less capable of resisting 
capture than a multi-sector regulator.  Therefore, creating single sector regulators 
at the beginning of the reform would mean that as far as the institutional setup is 
concerned the regulator is less capable of tackling this issue. 
However, capture does not seem to be a big threat at the beginning of the reform 
so in practice, establishing a single sector regulator may be an adequate solution.   
As it has been presented earlier, capture does not happen all at once, but it is 
rather a process.  It takes time to establish information links and trust between the 
authority and the industry that can lead to the mutual understanding that by 
‘working together’ and avoiding conflicts; it can lead to a less turbulent relationship 
for both of the industry and the authority.  It also takes time after the privatisation 
of the incumbent until the personnel of the authority starts integrating with labour 
coming from the liberalised industry. 
Furthermore, a connection between independence and capture has demonstrated 
that regulatory authorities tend to be less independent at the beginning of the 
reform and this may help avoid capture.  Also supporting this view is that extra 
measures – such as a multi-sector structure – are less important in avoiding capture 
in the initial phases of the reform process.    
The above mentioned arguments also show that in the latter stages, capture of the 
regulators becomes more of a threat.  Once links (both information and personal) 
between the regulator and the regulated firms get into a more developed stage, 
there is a strong case for the creation of a multi-sector regulator.  An additional 
benefit of merging the regulators in terms of avoiding capture is that by merging 
regulators, the setup is likely to change.  Reorganisation potentially leads to 
changing the people occupying different positions at the regulator.  Such shuffling 
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of personnel leads to the destruction of personal links meaning that the process 
that can lead to capture may be nullified. 
 
5.4 Regulatory quality 
 
There is an inevitable trade-off between sector-specificity, coherent regulation555, 
flexibility and regulatory certainty.556  
It has been established that multi-sector regulators are less able to accommodate 
for the different needs of the different sectors.  At the start of the reforms, 
different sectors tend to have different features (from a regulatory perspective).  
This means that initially, the creation of a single sector regulator is much more 
beneficial as it only focuses only on one sector.  Creating a multi-sector regulator 
right at the beginning might lead to the domination of one-or-the-other regulatory 
branch and therefore, regulatory approach.  If that happens, the special 
requirement of a certain sector (that is not dominant within the authority) is likely 
to be disregarded. Even if one regulatory branch does not become dominant, on 
higher levels, there is likely to be less industry-specific expertise.  Solutions worked 
out on lower levels, which would suit a certain sector well, might get overturned on 
higher level because of less sector specific expertise. 
A multi-sector regulator provides more opportunity for the “branches” regulating 
different sectors to learn techniques from each other.557  To what extent this offers 
real benefits, depends on the developments in the sectors or more precisely, 
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whether the sectors have reached a stage of convergence558 where separate 
regulation can result in conflicting and undefined policy goals.559  This might well 
mean, that it is rather advantageous to set up separate regulators at the beginning 
of the reforms and only assimilate them into a multi-sector regulator once it is clear 
that the sectors reached a state of similarity, where there is a potential for creating 
a more efficient authority due to regulatory synergies. 
Another argument backing this theory is that in the early stages, it is advantageous 
to have more than one authority as different regulatory solutions can be tested.560 
However, there should be a time when these solutions have produced enough track 
records to enable their assessment.  After the assessment has proven the 
superiority of one or the other, there is no further need to maintain the less 
efficient practice: a multi-sector regulator can be created incorporating the best 
regulatory solution(s) tested. 561   
The timely operation of the regulator is also relevant regarding the regulatory 
quality. There can be an issue in this respect when setting up a multi-sector 
regulator.  Some sectors may be regulated already by a regulator while others may 
not be (or may be under ministry supervision).  A political decision has to be made 
on the means of creating the regulator, either by merging the entities or creating a 
complete new structure.  In any case, creating sufficiently independent regulators 
can already be problematic since the ministries may view them as an instrument to 
reduce their powers.  As more ministries are likely to take part, the number of 
potentially arising issues setting back the process is higher.562 
                                               
558 Larouche (2004)  283 
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560 Larouche (2004)  280, Smith (1997) 2 
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Both the creation and operating of a multi-sector regulator is likely to be slower, 
which can set back the whole reform process initially.563 
The case is much different when it comes to a more developed stage of the 
reforms.  A history of independent regulators can eliminate the potential issues 
arising out of ministerial gaming.  The convergence seen between different 
industries through their evolution (such as telecommunications and broadcasting) 
and mergers between firms in different industries offering bundled services (such 
as gas and electricity) can make a compelling case for merging regulators through 
practical efficiency gains.564 
 
5.5 Costs 
 
In terms of efficiency, it has to be noted that although one of the main reasons for 
creating multi-sector regulators in Third World countries is to save costs, the 
operation of a multi-sector regulator is might not necessarily be more cost-efficient 
than a single-sector regulator.  It has been mentioned that Ofcom’s operation 
turned out to cost more than the authorities whose tasks has been overtaken by 
Ofcom all together – although other tasks were added as well, which might explain 
the enhanced costs.   
Even if it is still accepted that regulation costs more initially because of the creation 
of several authorities instead of one, high costs would be justified since the 
workload is expected to be higher at the beginning as competition takes time to 
consolidate and discipline the firms automatically.565  At the same time these 
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reforms are likely to start with privatisation, and when privatisation is done 
properly the government is likely to have the additional funds necessary for 
financing several authorities at the beginning. 
 
6 Timing the merger 
 
We have shown that merging the regulators per se affects its independence, 
accountability, flexibility and predictability, cost effectiveness amongst other 
features.  We have also shown that as a general method (and if financial constraints 
are not prohibitive), it is beneficial to set up different authorities at the beginning of 
the reforms and then merge them later on.  The next question is when should these 
mergers take place, and what should be the most decisive factors to trigger a 
merger? 
It is helpful, to approach the question by looking at the pros of a multi-sector 
regulator: 
• Independence: We have shown that it is beneficial to gradually enhance 
independence during the reform process, but what is the best way to for it?  
According to the literature, merging the regulator should enhance its 
independence yet, independence primarily depends on other safeguards in 
regulation (financing of the authority, election/withdrawal rules etc.).  This 
suggests that enhancing independence can be carried out by changing these 
rules as there is no need to change the structure of the regulator. 
• Enhanced resistance to capture: It has been discussed how capture takes 
time to develop, which means that resistance towards capture should be 
enhanced during the reform process and merging the regulator can be 
helpful in this respect.  At the same time capture cannot be used to define 
the appropriate time of the merger, because by definition capture is a 
hidden process.  If we could detect capture easily, than it could probably be 
tackled by some means but normally, capture is only detected in hindsight. 
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• Enhanced cost effectiveness: This chapter took a sceptical approach towards 
the enhanced cost effectiveness of multi-sector regulators.  We have shown 
that whether merging the regulators could result in lesser costs largely 
depend on the excess capacities in the authorities, and on the potential to 
use this excess capacity by other means.  However, when it can be shown 
that there is a clear potential for costs saving on this basis, structural change 
may be a good solution. 
 Enhanced innovativeness, consistency and less conflicting interests are 
discussed together because their relevance seemed to depend largely on the 
state of convergence between the sectors.  As long as the sectors are 
completely different it is hard to see why similar solutions would be 
appropriate.  In addition, consistency and conflicting competencies seem to 
be issues that are irrelevant as long as the sectors (and the companies in the 
sectors) have no connections. 566  At the same time these connections should 
be quite visible (and may cause practical problems) therefore, they can be 
used to time the mergers. 
The regulatory mergers of the UK are good examples of how the above mentioned 
features can be useful indicators of timing the merger.  There have been different 
types of convergence567 between the electricity and gas sectors (firms started 
operating in the other sectors although the markets are largely still separate) and 
also between the different telecommunications markets. 568  Merging the regulators 
was therefore justified on this basis.  Costs saving were also expected to arise out of 
the mergers and although the costs turned out to be higher, this does not mean 
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that the benefit/cost ration was not enhanced.569  The same cannot be said in terms 
of Germany, e.g. there were no visible connections between the electricity and 
telecommunications sector.  Until such connections start to develop (which may 
happen in the future570), there is no strong case for the UK to follow the German 
example unless perhaps cost effectiveness can be shown to be enhanced through 
such a merger.         
    
7 Conclusion 
 
Currently, one of the key legal differences between the electricity and 
telecommunications reforms in the UK and Germany is in the way they set up their 
regulators.  The British regulators were essentially responsible for one sector only: 
Ofgem for energy and Ofcom for electronic communications however, these are 
already merged entities.  In contrast, Germany operates a real multi-sector 
regulator.  Besides energy and communications, the Bundesnetzagentur is 
responsible for rail and postal regulation.  Other EU member states such as Spain 
and the Netherlands not only followed the German example but had taken it 
further, merging the Competition Authority with the combined sector regulator.   
From this follows the first question this paper aims to answer: are countries 
creating multi-sector regulators because they are superior?    
To answer the question, the paper first looks at the history of regulatory 
institutions as described in the UK and Germany.  Then, it sets up a framework 
                                               
569 CF Ofcom, ’A case study on public sector mergers and regulatory structures’ (2006) 
available at: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/files/2010/07/public_sector_merger_case_study.pdf accessed: 
10/04/2014, p. 4 
570 Geradin (2001) 117-118 
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consisting of regulatory independence, accountability, capture and other relevant 
features to provide a structure for the analysis.  The paper answers the first 
question by analysing these institutions within this pre-set framework.  This analysis 
shows that the institutional models have different strengths and weaknesses, but it 
does not show the clear superiority of any of the institutional models.   
As a static approach did not help in explaining the trend of creating multi-sector 
regulators itself, the findings of the research (the pros and cons) are analysed in a 
dynamic context.  The reform process is expected to result in economic 
(development of competitive markets), technological (enhanced innovation) etc. 
changes.  Since the regulator has to operate in a dynamically changing 
environment, it is logical that the regulation will potentially have to change as well 
to maintain optimal operation. 571   This potentially involves changes in the 
institutional structure.   
Taking the analysis forward, the paper describes the likely challenges a regulator 
faces early on in its life cycle and the way these challenges are likely to change as 
the market matures.  The paper compares the different in the challenges coping 
with the changes of strengths and weaknesses that arise out of merging the 
regulators.  The analysis finds that the two matches up: the strengths and 
weaknesses of a single sector regulator provides more benefits at a lesser cost 
initially however as the market matures, this is likely to change and merging 
regulators into multi-sector regulators becomes more beneficial. 
Our analysis suggests that regulatory mergers should mirror the convergences 
between the sectors.  On this basis it can be established that regulatory mergers in 
the UK are justified, but there it is not necessary to follow the German example and 
merge the energy and telecommunications regulators. As long as there is no visible 
                                               
571 Stéphane Jacobzone, Chang-Wong Choi, Claire Miguet, ’Indicators of Regulatory 
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convergence between these sectors, the creation of a super regulator (like in 
Germany) is not justified in the UK unless perhaps excess capacities in one regulator 
could be used at the other, making regulation less costly. 
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V. Chapter 4: Introducing SMP regulation to the 
electricity sector of the UK 
 
Abstract 
 
Significant Market Power (SMP) regulation is generally used in the 
telecommunications sectors of the EU to handle the transition period after 
liberalisation until competition becomes strong enough, when competition law in 
itself may be insufficient to control the incumbents’ retained market power.  
Interestingly, this solution has not been applied in the competitive levels of the EU 
electricity sectors (except in Hungary).  Considering that there is growing political 
pressure in the UK for some kind of an intervention in the electricity sector, this 
chapter analyses whether SMP regulation could be a solution, or whether it only fits 
to the telecommunications sector. 
The chapter starts by describing how SMP regulation works in the 
telecommunications sector, then based on the existing literature the main pros and 
cons of it are described.   
In the next part the chapter describes how SMP regulation could be used in the 
electricity sector.  This is based on the Hungarian experience, which is contrasted to 
the situation in the UK.  The differences between the electricity and the 
telecommunications sector relevant to SMP regulation are also considered (in light 
of the pros and cons described earlier). 
Ultimately the chapter compares SMP regulation to some other alternative 
solutions (competition law, government intervention, ordinary regulation) and finds 
that SMP regulation can be a potential alternative. 
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1. Introduction and motivation  
 
The electricity reform of the UK has been debated throughout the reform process 
by academics.572  More recently debate on the competitiveness of the energy 
industry has reached the highest political levels: the UK government573 (as well as 
the opposition574) started expressing its dissatisfaction towards the way the 
electricity sector operates in the UK, which has been followed by further price-
rises.575  In June 2014, Ofgem referred the energy market for a full competition 
investigation to the new competition authority, the CMA.576 
This is happening, albeit the UK electricity sector seems to be one of the most 
competitive in the EU,577 which suggest that the electricity reforms throughout the 
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 John A. Anderson, ‘Electricity Restructuring: A Review of Efforts around the World and 
the Consumer Response’ 2009 (22) The Electricity Journal, 70 
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 ‘Millions to see energy bills fall after David Cameron promises tariff reform’ The 
Telegraph, available at: 
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available at: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/press-releases/ofgem-refers-energy-market-full-
competition-investigation accesset: 08/10/2014 
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EU are probably failing to deliver the benefits expected from it. This alone suggests 
that rethinking the reform process and the way forward – a solution – is justified. 
The UK government seems to have decided to act in the matter, 578 however, there 
seem to be scope for suggestions on what sort of intervention would be the most 
appropriate. 
This chapter analyses whether the electricity regulation could learn from the 
telecommunications regulation by adopting a concept similar to SMP regulation.  
The chapter compares SMP regulation to other potential alternatives to see 
whether it can provide a better solution.  
The reasons to focus the analysis to the applicability of SMP regulation in the 
electricity sector, is that one of the main differences between the 
telecommunications and the electricity regulation is that while the former uses 
SMP regulation in the latter we do not find such a concept.579  
While the telecommunications reforms are far from being perfect, there is a view 
that they are more successful than the electricity reforms.580  As an illustration, 
according to Watson “[i]t is clear from a number of statements made by the 
European Commission and other community institutions that the liberalisation and 
harmonisation processes and the 2002 framework are considered to be a true 
                                                                                                                                    
22/04/2013, para 7, CF Georg Zachmann, ‘A Markov Switching Model of the Merit Order to 
Compare British and German Price Formation’ 2007 DIW Berlin Discussion Papers, available 
at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.61917.de/dp714.pdf 
accessed: 25/04/2013 
578 ‘Cameron’s energy policy plans ‘unravel’’ 2012 Financial Times available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/840ac476-1911-11e2-af88-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RwtaL2eP accessed: 30/04/2013 
579 Except for in Hungary.  
580 See Chapter 1 
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success story for the work of the EU” 581 and “[t]here are powerful suggestions (…) 
that this process should be seen as a benchmark for other industrial sectors and 
their development within the EU.”582   
As part of the reform Significant Market Power (SMP) regulation has been used to 
regulate the telecommunications sector since 1997.583 According to Doherty, “[a]t 
the heart of the telecommunications directives is the concept of “significant market 
power””.584 
The telecommunications reforms started before the other sectors’ reforms both in 
the UK and in the EU, therefore it was the “core laboratory world-wide”.585 The 
electricity reform follows the telecommunications reform – lagging a few years 
behind – hence, there is a theoretical potential to learn from it; implementing 
solutions that turned out to be useful there. 
Whether that potential can be materialised in practice is a matter of similarity 
between the electricity and the telecommunications sector, which is ultimately a 
limitation of the previous argument.  Regulatory solutions that work well in the 
telecommunications sector might not be suitable for electricity simply because they 
have different features.  Hence, similarities and differences of features relevant 
from the regulation’s perspective are crucial when trying to draw conclusions out of 
                                               
581 Chris Watson, ‘2007 review of the 2002 European telecommunications directives’ 2007, 
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582 Ibid 
583 Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 
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an inter-sectorial comparison.  Furthermore, a dynamic view is essential when 
comparing the relevant features as throughout the reform process these different 
network utilities may change considerably.  
It has to be noted, that in terms of the competitive levels of the electricity sector of 
the UK this would in a sense mean re-regulation – taking one step back – however, 
this practice would be far from unprecedented: it has been used in the (by nature 
more competitive) telecommunications sector for example in Sweden.586 
2. What is SMP regulation 
 
The essence of SMP regulation lies in its special regulatory process.  Hence, it would 
seem that the best way to describe SMP regulation – which is essential to give a 
basis for the forthcoming analysis – is to describe the process itself.  
SMP regulation is carried out in a three step process. It has to be noted at the 
beginning that SMP regulation is not a one-time process but it is a cycle where the 
same process is carried out again and again,587 as the following: 
 The market concerned is defined. This can be quite burdensome in a sector like 
telecommunications due to rapid technological changes. 588   Under SMP 
regulation the market definition is done in two sequences.  Firstly, based on 
competition law principles, the Commission issues a recommendation defining 
the product and service markets that – due to their features – are likely to 
qualify for regulatory intervention.  Secondly, taking into account the 
Commission’s recommendation on relevant markets and the Commission 
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Guidelines on market analysis, the national authorities tailor the market 
definition according to the national circumstances.589  There is a conceptual 
difference between market definition in competition law, where this done 
focusing on a hypothetical monopolist and then substitutability of the firm’s 
products are assessed from the consumers’ perspective, 590  while in SMP 
regulation the sector is segmented with the aim to find the problem areas.591 
 The firms present in the market are scrutinised and (if there is any) the one(s) 
that have significant market power are appointed as SMP operators.  This can be 
done in two ways: 
 a firm can be declared to have SMP by a rather quantitative method: that 
would require the legislation to define a clear threshold (eg. above 25% 
market share – as defined by the pre-2003 system) 
 or by a more qualitative method, after market analysis, which means a 
complete market dominance investigation is carried out, searching for firms 
having a single or joint dominant position, taking into account all the 
relevant factors that are assessed under competition law (post-2003 
system).592  
 Lastly, the appropriate measures are applied.  This can go in two directions 
depending on whether dominance is found or not.  In case there is no 
dominance the appropriate measure is to apply no measure, which – in case 
there has been past dominance issues – means withdrawing all previously 
applied measures.  If the regulator finds a dominant operator it has to apply at 
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least one remedy.  The remedy should be chosen according to the nature of the 
identified shortcoming in terms of effective competition, internal market, and 
interests of the European citizens. The remedy also has to be proportionate. The 
Access Directive593 provides an ascending list of behavioural remedies: 
 transparency, 
 non-discrimination, 
 accounting separation, 
 access to facilities, and 
 price control, 
 other remedies (potentially even structural ones) can also be chosen, 
in exceptional circumstances, with the Commissions agreement. 594 
While the process is carried out by the national regulator the Commission reviews 
all the decisions that may affect trade between member states and has the right to 
veto a market definition that does not fit the recommendation or an SMP 
designation, or issue (non-binding) opinion on the preferred remedy option.595    
De Streel calls SMP regulation “the hybridisation of the sectoral regulation by 
competition law”.596 This is because SMP regulation is conceptually half way 
between ordinary regulation and competition law.  Also in the deregulatory process 
(at least in the telecommunications sector) SMP regulation falls between regulation 
and competition since it is aimed to control the market power until competition 
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becomes strong enough, which takes time. 597 
 
The SMP process is in many respects similar to the way an alleged abuse of 
dominance case is handled under competition law.  In both instances the market is 
defined according to the same principles, then – having defined the market – the 
next task is to assess market power (“market dominance”).  At the same time the 
SMP guidelines notes that having SMP does not mean that the company has 
dominance or that the company breached competition law (Para 30). 
SMP regulation is applied ex-ante like regulation but has a defined addressee like in 
competition law cases (although regulation can be alike).  Also, the role of the 
sector regulator is of major importance (although the competition authority has 
concurrent powers).  
The further dissimilarities essentially arise out of the ex-ante nature of SMP 
regulation which at the same time makes it similar to ordinary regulation.  While 
according to general competition law, dominance itself is not objectionable (an 
abuse has to be proven as well), in terms of SMP regulation the simple finding of 
SMP may trigger legal consequences.  This means that the burden of proof is much 
lower on the regulator applying SMP regulation 598  than on the competition 
authority applying competition law.599  The reason for this arrangement is that in 
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newly liberalised markets it would be probably too late to enforce consequences 
after the abuse: it would not be sufficient to promote competition.600  
 
2.1 The pros of SMP regulation 
 
Having discussed the special features of SMP regulation, in the next step the 
benefits arising out of this unique arrangement are analysed.  It has been shown 
that since the concept of SMP regulation is approximately in the middle between 
(ordinary) regulation and competition law; the benefits of SMP regulation are also a 
mix of benefits of regulation and competition law, which makes it suitable for areas 
where competition is under development.601 
The literature assessing and criticising SMP regulation is well advanced, some of the 
issues are widely debated (for example the connection between SMP regulation 
and de-regulation, or legal certainty).  The following section builds on this 
literature, including the debated areas, in order to give an overview of the major 
pros and cons of the concept.  
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Flexibility 
 
In the conclusions of the report of the 1994 Corfu Summit, the Heads of State and 
Government in the European Council talked about “current unprecedented 
technological revolution in the area of information”.602 
It seems to be clear from the Green Paper on the Liberalisation of 
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks that while 
preparing the regulation governing the reform process the Commission aimed for 
as much economic freedom (competition) as possible, because they thought it is 
essential to accommodate to this “unprecedented technological revolution” in the 
telecommunications sector: 
“Telecommunications is a domain that is characterised by constant change and 
rapid technological progress. It is only in a free and open environment, driven by 
market forces, that enterprises can achieve the degree of flexibility necessary if 
they are to react quickly to new developments and adapt to them.”603    
Flexibility, however, had to be achieved while also maintaining a high level of legal 
certainty604 as the Commission forecast that “[i]nvestment will not be forthcoming 
unless a clear and stable regulatory framework is promptly established”.605  The 
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regulators can rely on the competition cases which promotes legal certainty while 
remaining flexible.606   
The need for a rather special type of regulation seemed to have been well 
understood.  SMP regulation has been an integral part of telecommunications 
regulation since the beginning of the reforms, although it went through 
considerable change. 
The SMP procedure is carried out normally in a pre-set time period, but can also be 
triggered independently by any circumstance that is significant from the SMP 
regulation’s perspective.  This latter is extremely important as regulation in general 
is often criticised for moving slowly, which is a huge issue in such a fast-changing 
sector as telecommunications.607  
Flexibility under the 2003 system is enhanced as the previous +25% market share 
threshold essentially meant that all incumbents should be under some form of 
regulation, which has been removed, giving more freedom to the regulatory 
authority.  The system is also more flexible than ordinary regulation. Under SMP 
regulation a firm can be regulated, de-regulated and re-regulated by the regulator 
on the sole basis of finding SMP, which then enables the regulator to issue 
remedies, while for example under the British system of regulation the licensee had 
the right of refusing to accept the modification of its license608 which meant that 
the regulator had to basically bargain with the licensee instead of regulating it.  
Under SMP regulation both the circle of SMP firms and the obligations prescribed 
can be changed flexibly as necessary, while staying within a pre-set framework.  
Thereby, from a legal perspective it meets the requirement of certainty and from 
                                               
606 Larouche (2002) 129, 136-137 
607 Brisby (2006) 114 
608 Brisby (2006) 119 
239 
 
an economics perspective it does not enhance risks.  Certainty under SMP 
regulation is higher than competition law simply as it is an ex-ante solution.609  
Under competition law the competition authority only establishes that a certain 
action was a breach of law retrospectively, before that – depending on the actual 
case – the firm can be less confident about the consequences of their actions.  
Government interventions can be even more extreme and pose a much bigger 
threat to legal certainty.  They can make a huge and unexpected impact, thereby 
the simple potential of that raises the risks factor of an industry.               
The certainty of SMP regulation is, however, somewhat reduced by the fact that 
SMP regulation does not suspend the applicability of competition law.  Perhaps the 
Deutsche Telekom case serve as a good illustration for this arrangement reduces 
certainty.  The Deutsche Telekom claimed that since its access prices are regulated, 
its pricing practice cannot be regarded as margin squeeze under competition law, 
but the Court of Justice dismissed this argument.610   
 
Asymmetric application 
 
According to Blankart et. al. “EU telecommunications policy has been strongly 
influenced by asymmetric market power regulation with an intrinsic bias against 
incumbent carriers”.611 
The obligations prescribed under SMP regulation does not concern all the market 
participants, but only the one(s) having SMP.  This creates an asymmetry between 
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the companies in the market612: SMP firms have to face additional burdens while 
their competitors enjoy maximum liberty.  Such treatment is discriminatory, 
however in practice the potential of these firm(s) of engaging in anti-competitive 
behaviour – that is not present at the other firms – probably justify their 
discrimination. 613 
This feature of SMP regulation seems to be similar to the logic of how competition 
law deals with abuse of dominance issues: if a company is dominant it has a 
“special responsibility”, however, under competition law an abuse needs to be 
proven before any action.614 
It has to be noted that ordinary regulation may be asymmetric as well.  For example 
under the Telecommunications Act 1984 regulation has been carried out through 
licences; most licences issued were fairly similar but BT’s licence has contained 
many different conditions.615  However, asymmetry is not an essential feature of 
ordinary regulation, while in SMP regulation – based on the discrimination of firms 
having SMP – it is integral part of system.  
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Facilitates innovation 
 
Regulation in practice can mean setting many different obligations; however every 
obligation essentially puts some burden on the firms’ behaviour.  This burden may 
restricts the firm’s ability to expand into new directions and ultimately to come up 
with innovative solutions. A good example is telephone handsets: after regulation 
was lifted their development accelerated considerably.616  
SMP regulation enables focusing the regulation to SMP firms only.  Non-SMP firms 
enjoy maximum liberty, which in itself has the side effect of enabling innovation. 
 
Stronger than competition law 
 
Competition law aims to protect the competitive market structure in order to 
promote economic efficiency, while SMP regulation has an enhanced toolkit which 
can be used to correct market imperfections.617 
Besides, SMP regulation is carried out by a sector regulator.  While competition 
authorities have an oversight of the whole economy and they assess issues on a 
case-by-case basis, sector regulators have a different focus.  They are closer to the 
industry because they regulate it on a permanent basis.618 
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Further benefits arise out of SMP regulation being similar to regulation, as it is 
applied ex-ante too (although some of the competition law decisions are made on 
an ex-ante basis, and some regulatory decisions have ex-post characteristics as 
well619). 
SMP regulation’s ex-ante nature enables it to prevent anti-competitive behaviour 
and not just react to it.620  This is reflected by the SMP Guidance stating that “ex-
ante obligations on undertakings designated as having SMP is to ensure that 
undertakings cannot use their market power either to restrict or distort 
competition on the relevant market, or to leverage such market power onto 
adjacent markets” (para. 16).  This makes an important difference in markets where 
dominant firms notoriously engage in anti-competitive actions: firms harmed by 
such practice cannot be fully compensated by an ex-post intervention because the 
volume and frequency of the unlawful conduct can still impede them setting their 
feet and growing in the market.  Additionally, it is implicit from the National 
Carbonising case621 that dominant companies are not required to compensate their 
competitors for the disadvantages they may be under based on competition law.622  
The possibility of wider actions against it – in case they abuse their market power – 
may be an additional deterring factor for the incumbents. 623 
SMP regulation is useful in sectors where competition law would be inefficient to 
handle market power issues624 due to the reoccurring need for intervention.625 This 
                                               
619 Larouche (2002) 129, 131-132 
620 Ian Dobbs, Paul Richards, Innovation and the new regulatory framework for electronic 
communications in the EU’ 2004, 25(11) European Competition Law Review, 718 
621 National Carbonising Company Decision 76/185 [1976] OJ L 35/6 
622 Geradin, O’Donoghue (2005) 361-362 
623 Ibid 364 
624 De Streel (2003) 535 
243 
 
is particularly the case in markets where there is high barriers to entry, where 
compliance requirements of intervention are high, frequent and/or timely 
intervention is indispensable, or where legal certainty is of utmost importance.626   
 
Facilitates entry 
 
This issue is heavily connected to the previous one.  The mere potential for 
incumbents engaging in exclusionary practice may deter entry. Competition law 
only applies after an abusive conduct has been carried out and a remedy is only 
issued after the legal process has been carried out.  The length of this process can 
vary; procrastination however, can result in the inability of issuing an effective 
remedy for example when – due to exclusionary practices – the firm has already 
been forced out of the market.  Being aware of the lack of effective protection in 
such instances firms may not even try to enter.  Under SMP regulation this problem 
can be solved as the remedy is present before the abuse. 
 
Facilitates competition and de-regulation 
 
Under SMP regulation the regulatory authority can take pro-active measures to 
create competition, including ones that reduce the ability of the incumbent to 
compete. 627 
 
Facilitating de-regulation is perhaps the most important – at the same time 
debated – feature.  In a sense all the previous features connect to this as they 
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facilitate competition, which is the ultimate aim.628  The Framework Directive629 
sets out different aims, such as: the promotion of competition (Art.8.2), the 
development of the internal market (Art.8.3), and promotion of the interests of 
citizens of the EU (Art.8.4), while there is no hierarchy set by the directive, in 
practice the promotion of competition seems to be in the centre.630  
Although SMP regulation is often claimed to be about de-regulation, the 2003 rules 
rather brought re-regulation631 which, however, promoted competition.  Ex-post 
competition law is rather only capable of prohibiting the abuse of dominance, it will 
not eliminate dominance and facilitate competition. For that, ex-ante regulation is 
needed.632   
When competition is strong enough there is no need for ex-ante intervention any 
more633 therefore it has to be withdrawn to provide as much space as competition 
as possible. 634  On this basis, deregulation is an objective of the reforms concerned 
and SMP regulation is a good tool for that as it is on the borderline of regulation 
and competition law.  SMP regulation is automatically withdrawn once the 
assessment finds no SMP.635   As the concepts of SMP regulation and competition 
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law are essentially the same since 2003, the transition from SMP regulation to 
competition law (de-regulation) is relatively straightforward. 
 
Arguably, SMP regulation is generally successful in the telecommunications sector 
in promoting competition and thereby enabling regulatory withdrawal.  In fact, in 
terms of deregulation the telecommunications sectors are the leading ones ahead 
of all the recently reformed utilities in the EU.636  In 2003 the Commission 
Recommendation 2003/311 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation (in accordance 
with the Framework Directive) assigned 18 product or service markets, as 
potentially warranted for ex-ante regulation. The deregulation process however 
seem to be successful: in 2007, Commission Recommendation 2007/879 restricted 
the list to 7 markets.  At the same time techno-economic factors are likely to have 
played an important role in the facilitation of competition, so the extent to which 
this can be attributed to SMP regulation is questionable. 
 
2.2 The cons of SMP regulation  
 
The following section describes the most frequently criticised features of SMP 
regulation: 
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Costly – time-consuming – complicated 
 
The process leading to setting the obligation is time consuming and complicated.637  
Completing the first round of assessments took considerable time for the national 
regulators after the 2003 package came into effect.638  
The regulators have to carry out extensive data collection in order to be able to 
assess the competitiveness of the market concerned, this is followed by the analysis 
of the data, drafting of findings, choosing appropriate remedies, submitting the 
draft to national and EU consultation. All these, before the decision can come into 
effect, then the cycle starts again.639  As an illustration, Ofcom’s final ruling on the 
SMP conditions relating to leased lines ended up to 652 pages. 640  
Besides the time necessary to carry out the relatively complex assessment, appeals 
can cause additional delays as they often have a suspensory effect.641  By the 
strategic use of appeals the SMP operators can significantly reduce the 
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effectiveness of the regulation.  In some cases several years may pass until a 
decision can come into effect.642 
Reducing the complexity of the market reviews was already a priority before the 
2006 regulatory reforms. The regulatory burden seemed to be disproportionately 
heavy for especially newly established regulators, and new entrants.643  
 
Mixture of concepts that do not fit together 
 
SMP regulation has been criticised in the past for being not aligned with 
competition law.  The concept of SMP regulation was first introduced as part of the 
1997 EU telecommunication regulatory package by Directive 97/51/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Council 
Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a 
competitive environment in telecommunications.  Article 2 (3) of the Directive 
stated that:  
“an organization shall be presumed to have significant market power 
when its share of the relevant leased-lines market in a Member State is 25 
% or more” 
At this stage (1997-) the 25% threshold seemed to be a useful concept, in order to 
make procedures more straightforward.  At the same time the regulation was not 
totally inflexible, there was a possibility to appoint firms below the 25% market 
share or exclude firms even though they had 25%+ market share.  
In order to do so the National Regulatory Authority was required to take into 
account:   
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• the organization's ability to influence the leased-lines market conditions,  
• its turnover relative to the size of the market,  
 its access to financial resources and its experience in providing products and 
services in the market. 
At this stage the fixed threshold was not problematic, as at the beginning of the 
reforms, in most cases it was quite obvious anyway which firm (the incumbent) had 
SMP.  Putting the standard of proof higher (prescribing a full market analysis) would 
have caused unnecessary delays and costs.644   
At the same time, setting the threshold at 25% (although it was somewhat flexible) 
invoked much criticism, mainly as the logic behind SMP is quite similar to the 
dominance concept of EU competition law, however the latter sets the threshold 
around 40% (in general, but other factors such as contestability and demand-side 
elasticity are just as important). This, therefore, created a contradiction within the 
laws applicable to the telecommunications sector. Germany even refused to apply 
the 25% threshold on this basis.645    
The Commission argued that the whole point of regulating the sectors is that 
competition law principles would be insufficient therefore a different and stricter 
threshold makes sense. Besides, as a practical advantage, this way the burden of 
proof on the national regulatory authorities is lower.646  Some argued that the 25% 
threshold should be raised as the market matures.647 
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One of the biggest debates during the drafting of the 2002 regulatory package was 
about how much have the markets matured: how strict regulation is needed, and in 
what extent can competition law take over the previous regulation.  After 
substantial discussion, having considered different options,648 the system was 
changed.  The Commission’s aim of step by step deregulating the sectors and 
leaving them solely governed by competition law necessitates the two laws to be in 
line with each other, so the process of transition can go smoother.  Art 14 (2) of the 
Framework Directive now states that:  
“[a]n undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, 
either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to 
dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
customers and ultimately consumers.”  
The Directive also sets out that national regulatory authorities should “take into the 
utmost account the guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant 
market power”.649  
Considering the dynamics of the deregulation process, the EU started the reform 
then introduced SMP regulation as an intermediate solution until the markets 
become competitive enough to allow deregulation which means that only 
competition law applies.  The “second phase” of the EU reform process was about 
putting some constraint on the incumbents, so they cannot use their remaining 
market power to carry out exclusionary practices.650 
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According to the 2003 rules SMP regulation has been aligned with competition 
law,651 however the criticism of inconsistency seem to remain on a different basis.  
It has been suggested that “The Framework consists of an unstable amalgam of 
competition law concepts, primarily dominance, with ex ante regulation and 
remedies to which such concepts are not particularly suited”. 652 This is because 
there are certain political expectations towards outcomes of the 
telecommunication regulation while competition law concepts disregard such 
issues.653  Also Veljanovski argues that the Commission looks at the competition law 
or sector specific regulation issue as if it was only about the ex-ante and ex-post 
differences, hence they simply complement each other, while in reality this leads to 
double standards rather than a dual system. 654   Or according to Larouche 
“competition law concepts (…) are stretched to their limits and potentially even 
over-extended, in order to deal with situations where regulatory intervention is 
certainly defensible”.655  At the same time de Streel argues that we have to 
differentiate between competition law principles and competition law intervention, 
as the former is essentially a “rigorous economic way of looking at the market and 
decrypting the forces at play” they use should not be restricted to competition law 
interventions; market regulation should equally be based on it.656   
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SSNIP test is unreliable on non-competitive markets  
 
SMP regulation uses the hypothetical monopolist test to define the market 
boundaries, just like the merger control regulation, but in SMP this is applied in a 
forward looking way.  
While the SMP Guidelines state that the hypothetical monopolist test is only “[o]ne 
possible way of assessing the existence of any demand and supply-side 
substitution” (para 40) and it also mentions looking at case law as a potential 
alternative (para 65), the Commission recommendation justifying ex ante 
regulation657 solely uses the hypothetical monopolist concept without referring the 
case law.658  
At the same time, it is well-know that the use of hypothetical monopolist test is 
problematic on non-competitive markets (see Cellophane-fallacy). This is because 
the method assumes that the initial price is competitive, which is not likely to be 
the case in the markets concerned.659 
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De-regulation is not incentivised 
 
It has been discussed that whether SMP regulation (adequately) facilitates de-
regulation is questionable.    
Under SMP regulation there is no pre-set time table, which could at least give a de-
regulation target for the authority.660  There is also no built-in incentive in SMP 
regulation for the regulator to withdraw regulation, or abstain from regulation.661  
This can be an issue, considering that the regulator has an incentive to over-
regulate thereby increasing its own importance. On the contrary, by achieving 
complete de-regulation the authority would essentially make itself unnecessary. 
One of the conditions of applying ex-ante regulation under the SMP regime is that 
competition law would be insufficient, however this is rather unexplained 
requirement: it has not been defined when should competition law be considered 
sufficient.662 
While there is no target within the SMP system for de-regulation, the Commission 
seem to be able to address the issue through the Recommendations on the markets 
relevant for ex-ante regulation.663 
Still, Blankart et. al. argue that “a clear-cut economic analysis of the remaining need 
for sector-specific regulation is still missing”, suggesting that  regulatory focus 
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should be adjusted to the firms’ network-specific market power and asymmetric 
regulation should be abandoned.664  
 
SMP applies to new-build assets 
 
In terms of the telecommunications sector due to its innovative nature the issue of 
emerging markets has to be considered as well. These are special scenarios and 
they have to be treated accordingly.  While new markets may grow out of highly 
competitive ones, an emerging market is likely to be dominated by one firm, who 
invested in developing a new product or service. 665  On the basis of dominance it 
would potentially qualify for SMP regulation.  At the same time an early regulation 
of these new markets may foreclose them and also eliminate the incentives for 
investing in R&D, while one of the duties of the regulators is “encouraging efficient 
investment in infrastructure and promoting innovation”666.  However, the regulator 
has to issue at least one remedy when SMP is detected.  As a result there is a 
regulatory contradiction between promoting innovation and compulsory remedying 
when there is an SMP operator.667  Noticing the issue, recital 27 of the Framework 
Directive establishes that “guidelines will (…) address the issue of newly emerging 
markets, where de facto the market leader is likely to have a substantial market 
share but should not be subjected to inappropriate obligations”. On this basis the 
SMP guidelines (para 32.) states that “NRAs should ensure that they can fully justify 
any form of early, ex-ante intervention in an emerging market, in particular since 
                                               
664 Blankart et. al. (2007) 414 
665 Miguel Rato, Nicolas Petit, ‘Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: 
Established 
Standards Reconsidered?’ (2013) 9 (1)European Competition Journal, 1, 9 
666 Framework Directive Art. 8.2. (c)  
667 Dobbs, Richards (2004) 718 
254 
 
they retain the ability to intervene at a later stage, in the context of the periodic re-
assessment of the relevant markets. “ 
Under SMP regulation, in an emerging market the regulator does not apply 
remedies even if (which is usually the case) there is an SMP operator.  However, 
SMP regulation applies fully to new-build assets.  It has been argued that this cause 
regulatory inconsistency,668 besides all the negative effects that justifies non-
application of regulation for emerging markets. 
 
Lack of harmonisation 
 
The 2003 review brought much more freedom; the new regulation can be used 
more flexibly by the national regulators.  The downside of this is that it can lead to 
inconsistent regulation (within the EU).  According to Hocepied and de Streel “the 
2003 framework does not provide a clear regulatory vision”.  They note that in the 
2003 package there are overarching principles and broad objectives while the 
regulators have enhanced discretion. There are soft law materials providing more 
detail, but these are often very vague. The institutional setup does not compensate 
the discretion either. 669 
While the regulatory approach is harmonised and is based on in-depth economic 
analysis, also the Commission issues recommendation on markets susceptible to ex-
ante regulation, the regulatory outcomes diverge between Member States. Only a 
fragment of this is justified on the basis of different circumstances in different 
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member states.670 There is particularly insufficient harmonisation in terms of cost 
counting methods.671   
Lack of harmonised enforcement reduces legal certainty. Deficiency in legal 
certainty means increased risks for the operators which sets back investments.672  
 
Asymmetric 
 
The pros of asymmetric regulation have been discussed already. The comparison of 
the UK telecommunications reform to Australia offers an interesting insight to the 
effectiveness of asymmetric regulation, showing a rather negative picture.  
In the UK BT was not allowed to enter into several markets (for example cable TV), 
based on the assumption that BT’s already existing strong positions would allow it 
to leverage its market power to these other markets thereby paralysing 
competition.  While it is clear to see the logic behind this theory, in practice the 
policy resulted in a rather week cable sector. In contrast, in Australia, Telstra – the 
(partially) state-owned public telecommunication operator – was not restricted in 
such ways still, concurrent networks were laid down in record time, bringing an 
unexpected level of network-based competition.  This example therefore suggests 
that – even in the presence of a dominant incumbent, which in theory necessitates 
asymmetry – the “pro-competitive” asymmetric regulation may actually bring less 
competition than a symmetric one.673  This does not mean that the regulation of 
the incumbent is unnecessary or even bad.  Experience with no regulation both in 
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the German electricity sector and the telecommunications sector of New Zealand 
suggest that the lack of a regulatory framework is highly ineffective in newly 
reformed sectors.674   
This is in line with Knieps’s suggestion: “[a]symmetry of market power due to 
monopolistic bottleneck facilities, however, does not in itself require asymmetric 
regulation. Instead, the symmetry principle requires that all firms have access to 
local telecommunications networks on terms identical to those of the incumbent 
(non-discriminatory access).”675 
 
3. How could SMP regulation be utilised in electricity? 
 
The following section assesses how would SMP regulation (as currently used in the 
EU for the telecommunications sector) apply to the electricity sector. The 
Hungarian electricity sector is used as an illustration, since Hungary is the only 
country in the EU that applies SMP regulation in the electricity sector.  In order to 
show a more universal potential for the application of SMP regulation the 
Hungarian practice is contrasted to the situation in the UK.  It has to be noted that 
SMP regulation would essentially mean re-regulation in terms of the competitive 
levels, as currently these are solely governed by competition law.  This might seem 
like a step backwards for this reason. The need for re-regulation has been discussed 
earlier.  A general question that has to be addressed here is whether SMP 
regulation is suitable for re-regulation. 
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While SMP regulation is often regarded as de-regulatory,676 it is more precise to say 
that it is flexible: the regulator can decide whether regulation is needed or not.  
This makes de-regulation straightforward, as there is no need for political 
(legislative) decision.  At the same time re-regulation is just as simple.  As a matter 
of fact the 2003 reform of the EU telecommunication regulation, which formed SMP 
regulation to its current state, was neither de-regulatory in effect nor meant to be 
de-regulatory.677  While as defined by the 1998 regulation, SMP regulation was 
rather connected to the ex-monopolist (aiming at controlling its retained market 
power) after the 2003 reform SMP regulation was only connected to the 
inefficiency of competition law.  This is a major shift in the regulatory paradigm that 
is likely to allow for the extension of the regulation.678  Therefore, on this basis the 
potential applicability to the electricity sector cannot be ruled out.    
The following analysis looks at how the three-step regulatory process would be 
carried out in the electricity sector, based on the Hungarian experience and 
comparing it to the UK.   The part builds on the previously assessed pros and cons 
of SMP regulation, in order to show whether (or in what respect) the features of 
SMP regulation fit relatively better to the telecommunications sector than to the 
electricity sector.  
 
3.1 Market definition 
 
As a start the regulatory authority should define the markets.  One of the criticised 
points of SMP regulation, that is especially relevant here, was that it relies on the 
SSNIP test, which is unreliable in cases where the reference prices are above the 
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competitive level.  Considering what has been said at the introduction about price 
tendencies and governmental concerns, there is a possibility that prices are above 
the competitive level in the electricity sector.  
SSNIP test leads to a too broad market definition when it is based on a supra-
competitive price.  This may drive the whole regulatory process off track, as a when 
the market is defined too broadly, SMP becomes invisible.  A firm having SMP might 
appear to be non-SMP because the too broad market definition makes it look like it 
has to face competition from market players, who are in fact not competing in that 
market. 
This is, however, more of a problem when the SSNIP test is applied to a complex 
sector, with many markets of products and services that are more or less 
substitutes of each other because in cases like that (due to the supra-competitive 
base-price) the SSNIP test is going to result in falsely combining a number of 
markets.  In telecommunications this is surely a threat679 as there are many 
markets, closely related to each other and their features change quickly.680 
However, the electricity sector is much simpler than the telecommunications 
sector.  There are no closely related products and services, development is much 
slower so the market boundaries are much more stable. 
Having a quick look at the Hungarian experience might be illustrative.  Act LXXXVI. 
of 2007 (VET) introduced SMP regulation to the electricity sector.  The definition 
used by this Act is the very same as the one used in telecommunication, that 
originates from EU law; a firm has significant market power if it “has a dominant 
position on a relevant market alone or together with another market participant, 
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i.e. a position of economic strength affording it the power to act to an appreciable 
extent independently of competitors and users”.681  
According to VET the authority shall analyse three markets:  
1. wholesale electricity markets, 
2. retail electricity markets, 
3. markets for capacity and energy required to ensure ancillary services.682 
This is three markets in total, with clearly different functions. In comparison, in the 
telecommunications sector 18 markets qualifying for ex-ante regulation has been 
identified. This has been cut back to 7 in 2007, which suggest the simplification of 
(at least) the markets susceptible for ex-ante regulation. 
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Figure 54 Recommendation on regulated telecom markets (2003/2007) 
Source: Future electronic communications markets subject to ex-ante regulation  
 
However, the most up to date report on the issue683 identifies the markets of the 
current communications sector as the following:  
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Figure 55 Structure of the telecom sector 
The continuing higher complexity of the communications sector suggest that 
market definition – and the connected problem with the use of the SSNIP test – is 
much more of an issue for the communications sector than for the electricity 
sector.  Since the structure of the electricity sector is much less complex than 
telecommunications (markets in the UK can probably be defined similarly as in 
Hungary) extra competitive prices should have less distortive effect. 
 
3.2 SMP assessment 
 
In the second step the NRA have to analyse whether one or more undertaking(s) 
active in that market possesses significant market power.  Originally, this was fairly 
straightforward: the ex-monopolist has been identified as an SMP operator.  The 
pre-2003 SMP system basically reflected this issue, however even back then, the 
Commission was off the view that joint dominance can be found to exist in the 
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telecommunications sector.684  Later on, several telecommunications regulators 
notified joint dominance in the sector.685  Still, BEREC is off the view that the future 
revised SMP Guidelines should put more emphasis on joint dominance.686  
The Hungarian experience with SMP regulation in electricity is rather similar to this 
early stage of the EU telecommunications regulation.  According to the VET in 2008 
MVM (the ex-monopolist incumbent) was appointed as a firm having SMP in the 
wholesale electricity markets.  MVM was ordered to auction its capacity which is in 
excess of 40% of the total market, and also price control was set.687  In 2011 the 
SMP procedure was carried out again: while the auction order was kept as before, 
the price control no longer applies.688 
In 2009 concerning the markets for capacity and energy required to ensure ancillary 
services also branches of the MVM was appointed as firm having SMP and price-
related obligations were made.689 
The regulator established that the country’s territory can be divided into more than 
one retail electricity markets.  All together four firms have been appointed as 
                                               
684 Andrew Tarrant, ‘Significant market power in the regulation of telecommunications 
markets’ 2000, 21(7) European Competition Law Review, 323 
685 Ofcom filed a notification to the Commission argueing that Crown Castle and ntl holds 
joint dominance, although this notification was leter withrawn.  The Irish Commission for 
Communications Regulation established the Vodafone and O2 held joint dominance on the 
concerning the wholesale market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone 
networks. 
686 BEREC, ‘Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service  markets 
susceptible to ex ante regulation - BEREC’s opinion’ (2014) available at: 
file:///C:/Users/47/Documents/Second%20draft/4438-berec-opinion-on-the-commission-
recommen_0.pdf accessed: 07/10/2014, 11 
687 Hungarian Energy Office, Decision 739/2008 
688 Hungarian Energy Office, Decision 747/2011 
689 Hungarian Energy Office, Decision 727/2008 
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having SMP in providing universal service and ordered to undertake transparency 
related obligations.690  
Although there are quite a few market players in both competitive markets – it is 
beyond question that the Hungarian market is dominated by the MVM (Hungarian 
Electric Works).691  Although the MVM owns plants producing about 30-40% of the 
total Hungarian generating capacity, it controlled much more than 70%692 of the 
total generating capacity via long term contracts693 with other generators.694  It is 
fairly clear, that SMP regulation in the Hungarian electricity sector is essentially 
used to control the ex-monopoly’s retained market power.   
However, assessing SMP in the UK’s electricity sector is much more complicated in 
this respect. In England and Wales after the splitting up of the CEGB the market 
started to operate as a duopoly695 because two participants generated the majority 
                                               
690 Hungarian Energy Office, Decision 114/2009 
691 R. Pesic, D. Ürge-Vorsatz, ‘Restructuring of the Hungarian Electricity Industry ‘ (2001) 
13(1) Journal of  Post-Communist Economies 8, Energia Kontroll Projekt, ’Kormányzati 
kudarcok, járadékvadászat és korrupciós kockázatok a magyar villamosenergia-szektorban’ 
available at: http://energiakontrollprojekt.hu/info/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/EKP_tanulmany_Jaradekvadaszat-es-korrupcio.pdf 19 
692 CF Hungarian Energy Office, ‘Annual report to the European Commission’ (2009) 16 
693 Koppányi Szabolcs et al ‘Az ex ante piacszabályozás lehetőségei a magyar energetikai 
szabályozásban’ Review ordered by the Hungarian Energy Office, Budapest, 2007, 61-62 
694 CF Energia Kontroll Projekt, ‘Kormányzati kudarcok..’ (2010) 20, Horváth J. Ferenc, 
‘Piacnyitás a villamosenergia-iparban’ available at: 
http://www.beszelgetnikell.hu/index.cgi?r=&v=&l=&mf=&p=-
letoltes_horvathjf_vandorgyules.doc accessed 20/08/2010  2-3 
695 CF: ER Larsen, DW Bunn, ‘Deregulation in electricity: understanding strategic and 
regulatory risk’ (1999) 50 Journal of the Operational Research Society  340, Valdivielso del 
Real, ‘Takeovers and the Evolution of the Electricity Sector in Britain and Spain: the Insights 
and Limits of the Varieties of Capitalism Perspective’ CSGR Working Paper 259/09 38 
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of the energy.696 The generation level was initially very concentrated;697 it has been 
suggested that only three firms are simply not enough to bring effective 
competition.698 However, later on, generation became more competitive699 partly 
because of new entry,700 which was enabled by the cheap construction costs of 
CCGT plants and by power plant sales required by the government,701 partly as they 
became competitors with other UK generators, such as Scottish Power and Hydro-
Electric. 702   After the privatisation the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of the 
generation market declined constantly.  
Currently none of the six big firms that are active on the competitive markets 
(Centrica, EON/PowerGen, RWE/National Power, EdF Energy, Scottish Power and 
                                               
696 “British Energy’s nuclear power stations are not a pricesetting power source in the 
wholesale market” - Business and Enterprise Committee, ‘Energy prices, fuel poverty and 
Ofgem’ HC Eleventh Report of Session 2007–08 Vol I [48], 
697 Larsen, Bunn (1999) 339 
698Vassiliki Koumpli, ‘Competition Rules or Sector-Specific Regulation for the Liberalisation 
of the European Electricity Markets? With Reference to the English, Greek and German 
Third-Party Access Regimes’ (2007) 25 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 178, CF 
Richard Green, ‘The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales’ (1999) 47 The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 107 
699 David Hawdon, Lester C. Hunt, Paul Levine, and Neil Rickmany, ‘Optimal sliding scale 
regulation: an application to regional electricity distribution in England and Wales ‘ (2007) 
Oxford Economic Papers 59, 461 CF Rachel A. Mitchell, ‘The Electricity Directive of the 
European Union: What Can the Member States Learn from the Experiences of Privatised 
England and Wales’ (1998-1999) 14 Am. U. Int’l L. 790 
700 Cf: Chi-Keung Wooa,b, Debra Lloydc, Asher Tishler, ‘Electricity market reform failures: 
UK, Norway, Alberta and California’ (2003) 31 Energy Policy, 1109 
701 Stephen Littlechild, ‘Smaller Suppliers in the UK Domestic Electricity Market: Experience, 
Concerns and Policy Recommendations’ (University of Cambridge Electricity Policy 
Research Group working paper 2008) available at: http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/littlechildsuppliers.pdf accessed 26/08/2010 6 
702 Mitchell (1998-1999) 790, 
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Scottish and Southern Electricity) is even close to have enough market shares to 
dominate the market alone.703  The concentration of the generation market is so 
low that even the „Big Six” together only generates about half of the total 
output.704  The British market is one of the less concentrated one in the EU. 
However, the ease of monitoring other firms’ behaviour and ability of punishing 
unilateral actions, together with the lack of competitive pressure present by 
potential entry means that even though concentration is low the UK electricity 
sector’s features can facilitate oligopolistic behaviour.  In fact there is both 
theoretical and empirical evidence for exercising joint dominance. 705   As an 
example Harker and Waddams establishes that the UK’s electricity sector 
“display[s] all the characteristics normally associated with collective dominance, in 
particular the repeated interaction of six firms who have the position of being both 
incumbents and entrants”.706 
The vertically integrated “Big Six” in most of the times has enough generating 
capacity to supply their own domestic and SME707 consumers.708 As a result the 
                                               
703 Koumpli (2007) 178  
704 CF: Business and Enterprise Committee, ‘Energy prices, fuel poverty and Ofgem’ HC 
Eleventh Report of Session 2007–08 Vol I [43], [48] 
705 Catherine Waddams, ‘The Effect of Liberalizing UK Retail Energy Markets on Consumers’ 
2005 (21) Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 135, CF Anderson (2009) 73, Hannes Weigt, 
Anne Neumann and Christian von Hirschhausen, ‘Divestitures in the Electricity Sector: 
Conceptual Issues and Lessons from International Experiences’ 2009 (22) The Electricity 
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706 Catherine Waddams, Michael Harker, ‘Introducing competition and deregulating the 
British domestic energy markets: a legal and economic discussion’ 2007 Journal of Business 
Law, 269 
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708 Business and Enterprise Committee, ‘Energy prices, fuel poverty and Ofgem’ HC 
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wholesale market has a balancing function only,709 and trading mainly concerns 
short term deals. Liquidity and transparency on the wholesale market is low.710 
Arguably, the effect of this lack of liquidity is that small suppliers outside the “Big 
Six” cannot buy the electricity they need to provide they own customers on the 
retail market.711  They could buy from the individual generators, but for these 
individual generators it is problematic to sell only such small quantities that these 
suppliers are willing to buy.712 When both connected levels are ‘locked’ entry is 
rather just feasible by entering both levels, which is inevitably less feasible. 
Accordingly, in terms of the UK’s electricity market SMP may only exist in its joint 
form. Furthermore leveraging of market power can be an issue, since the same 
players are present on both the upstream and downstream competitive levels.  As 
part of the EU telecommunications regulation, SMP regulation clearly applies to 
joint dominance713 cases since Article 14 of the framework Directive – in line with 
the Court of Justice case-law – defines SMP as the following:  
“an undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either 
individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that 
is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of competitors customers and ultimately 
consumers”. 
                                               
709 Ibid 
710 Total traded electricity is currently equivalent to 2-3 times physical delivery. Ofgem 
notes that this is low compared to other commodities, for example gas trades at around 11 
times physical delivery. It is also in stark contrast to German and Dutch electricity markets, 
where liquidity in recent years has been increasing. 
711Littlechild (2008) 47, Business and Enterprise Committee, ‘Energy prices, fuel poverty 
and Ofgem’ HC Eleventh Report of Session 2007–08 Vol I[58] 
712
 Ibid 
713 CF SMP Guidelines Art 86 
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As the definition of SMP is harmonised with the dominance concept of article 102 
of TFEU, the regulators have to take into account the Commissions practice and the 
EU Courts’ case law on the relevant issue,714 which includes joint dominance.  
According to the SMP Guidelines, the Commission’s position is that joint SMP may 
exist when two or more undertakings have “substantially the same position vis-à-vis 
their customers and competitors as a single company has if it is in a dominant 
position, provided that no effective competition existed between them”715, adding 
that this may be due to links between those undertakings, although finding such 
links is not a perquisite to establish that the undertakings are in joint dominance.716  
Establishing joint dominance is a very complex task however many features have 
been identified that enhances the possibility of tacit collusion, which gives a 
guidance for the assessment.  These features include transparency, possibility of 
retaliation, no countervailing reaction of the peripheral competitors, inter alia 
concentrated market, mature market, similar cost structure and market shares.717  
When these features are present it is likely that the undertakings individually find 
that the best strategy for maximising profits is to raise prises instead of competing, 
as they can reasonably assume that other undertakings will also rather raise prices 
than compete.718  Hence, joint dominance can be established under the current 
SMP regulation (as applied to the telecommunications sector) based on the above-
mentioned anti-competitive features.  
Whether SMP regulation can provide a good solution (and not just a possible 
solution) to the oligopoly problem is questionable.  De jure – in the 
                                               
714 SMP Guidelines Art 70. 
715 SMP Guidelines Art 87 
716 Tarrant (2000) 323 
717 De Streel (2003)  540 
718 Tarrant (2000) 324 
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telecommunications regulation – SMP regulation applies to joint dominance as 
well, so it can capture such problem. However, the asymmetric treatment (as 
described before as part of the “pros”)   – the essence of SMP regulation – seems to 
offer the less benefit the more firms are identified as having SMP.  This is because 
the benefit is ultimately materialised by the freedom of firms that do not possess 
SMP.  The smaller the number of these firms is, the less benefit can be realised via 
SMP regulation.  At the same time “ordinary” regulation can offer a simpler and 
cheaper solution.  However, as it has been discussed earlier whether regulatory 
asymmetry is beneficial or not is highly questionable and SMP regulation offers 
other benefits.  Besides, going back to ordinary regulation would, mean taking two 
steps back and essentially giving up the aim of achieving a competitive electricity 
sector.  This would also pre-empt the reform, which in that case would be no more 
than privatisation. An intermediate solution – something between competition law 
and ordinary regulation – is needed.   
     
3.3 Decision on remedies 
 
Having found SMP, in the third step the regulator has to choose the appropriate 
remedies. The selection of remedies under the EU telecommunications regulations 
consist of transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, obligations for 
access to and use of specific network facilities, and price control and cost 
accounting obligations.  As Article 8 of the Access Directive provides that a 
regulator may impose remedies outside this list (with only procedural restrictions), 
under the telecommunications regime the number of possible remedies is 
conceptually unlimited.  The possibilities are only restricted by national regulations 
putting restrictions on the powers of the regulators. The only substantial 
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requirement under EU law is proportionality.719 SMP remedies are similar to the 
competition law ones, however, as SMP regulation applies ex-ante and it is 
relatively easy (within the restricted scope of the regulation) they offer a much 
more efficient solution for markets where there is a continuing need for 
intervention.720  Also the aims of the two are different: competition law remedies 
aim at sanctioning a previous breach of law, while SMP remedies are aimed at the 
objectives set by the regulation.721 
The Hungarian application of SMP regulation to the electricity sector is similar in 
this respect. The VET lists the possibly applicable remedies sorted by markets 
concerned. The authority may prescribe to a firm having SMP on all markets duties 
related to: 
(a) transparency  
(b) equal treatment,  
(c) price limits or cost-oriented pricing (concerning the wholesale electricity 
markets and the retail electricity markets practices of charging too high prices to 
competitors of its affiliate, charging too low prices which can impede entry, 
showing undue preference to specific users and unreasonable bundling are 
especially stressed).722 
SMP operators active on the wholesale electricity markets might furthermore be 
required to hold public auctions at specific intervals.723  SMP operators of the retail 
                                               
719 SMP Guidance Art. 21 
720 De Streel (2003) 542 
721 SMP Guidelines Para. 31 
722 VET Article 111 (3) 
723 VET Article 111 (1) 
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electricity markets can be obliged to draw up a reference offers.724  If the SMP 
operator participating in either the wholesale electricity markets or the retail 
electricity markets, is part of a vertically integrated firm, the reorganisation of the 
internal structure can also be ordered (this can include even ordering full 
ownership unbundling of transmission and distribution businesses).725  
In order to have structured assessment of the circle of possible options a systematic 
approach is needed.  Remedies can be divided into structural and behavioural.  
Structural remedies tend to be more intense interventions however they are one-
time solutions, which has many advantages.  Behavioural remedies are less forceful 
but they come with a continuing need for supervision by the regulator.  Structural 
remedies have been widely used in the UK’s electricity sector already: the 
competitive levels are separated from the non-competitive ones.  There is vertical 
integration between the competitive levels which may be a potential issue.  
However, while the importance of strict unbundling of the natural monopolies and 
the competitive firms is out of question whether integration between the 
competitive level is all-in-all beneficial or harmful is debateable.  Some suggests 
that letting firms of the different competitive markets merging is rather 
beneficial.726  Vertical integration has economic advantages that can be passed on 
to consumers.727  Some suggest that without the integrated nature of these 
                                               
724 VET Article 111 (2) 
725 VET Article 111 (4) 
726 Richard Meade, ‘Electricity Investment and Security of Supply in Liberalized Electricity 
Systems’ Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=831585 accessed 25/08/2010  25, CF 
Ofgem, ‘Mergers in the electricity distribution sector Policy statement’ (2002) Executive 
summary 2 
727 CF Ofgem, ‘Mergers in the electricity distribution sector Policy statement’ (2002) 
Executive summary 5, 10-11, 19 
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companies, prices would be already higher.728 Accordingly (any sort of) separation 
which could be applied successfully as part of SMP regulation to benefit consumers 
would not likely to qualify as a potential new remedy in the electricity sector.  
Furthermore, as the bottleneck parts – the network – are already strongly 
separated in the electricity sector of the UK, access related remedies: non-
discrimination and obligations for access to and use of specific network facilities are 
also not likely to be able to bring about any sort of change in how the electricity 
sector currently works. 
Moving on to non-structural remedies, it can be established that transparency is 
normally used as an accessory obligation, to facilitate regulation.  Equal treatment 
is used to prevent discrimination in the access terms.  This is less important when 
the network is separated, as they are in the UK.  The only solution that has not been 
applied or cannot be ruled out on the basis of no potential effect in the sector is 
price regulation of the competitive levels.   
 
 
Price regulation 
 
Here this paper focuses on the main criticism of price regulation and especially 
price regulation in the electricity sector.  Since price regulation in the electricity 
sector is a very controversial issue the debate over it is considered in more detail.   
First of all price regulation is a very complicated task: all the factors that 
automatically shape the optimal price in a competitive market should be taken into 
                                               
728 “The Chief Executive of Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) told us: “At present […] 
supply is loss-making. If it was not for the fact that all of the six are vertically integrated, 
prices to customers would already be higher than they are now”.” - Business and Enterprise 
Committee, ‘Energy prices, fuel poverty and Ofgem’ HC Eleventh Report of Session 2007–
08 Vol I [53] 
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account to the appropriate extent, which is obviously impossible.  Therefore, 
regulated prices are going to be either below or above the perfectly optimal price.  
Both too high and too low prices are problematic. A too high price reduces 
consumer surplus: consumers have to pay an extensive price for the product, 
furthermore some consumers fall out of the market as they will not buy the 
product for the excessive price, or not buy as much as they would otherwise buy. A 
too low price is harmful as they might not allow the firm to recover its costs to 
maintain operation, or deter investments when the company is not allowed to reap 
a fair profit.   
In ordinary cases for regulation these arguments are weak, because they are based 
on the comparison of a regulated price to the perfectly competitive price. Such 
comparison essentially has no practical implications, as where the price is regulated 
due to the lack of competition the real alternative is only the extensive price that 
would be charged in the lack of competition (and price regulation). 
However, in cases where there is scope for competition to emerge this is not the 
case. Paradoxically, where competition is possible, price which is too low is a much 
bigger issue than one which is too high.  This is because an excessive price attracts 
entry.  New entrants than induce competition which drives the price down. So 
without any intervention competition can be induced, a competitive price is 
formulated, while the costs of regulating are saved and the problems of the 
imperfectly regulated price do not constitute an issue.  In a sense the argument is 
that in cases like this – while price regulation would bring more consumer surplus 
on the short run – in the long run the consumers are better off without price 
regulation.  
Moving away from the UK, it has to be taken into account that the EU is fully 
against price control in electricity. The Commission argues that consumers would 
be better off if prices were not regulated because this would enable them to reap 
the benefits of a unified energy market assuming that there would be greater 
competition due to the unification of the national markets. Still, about half of the 
Member States’ governments seem to be sceptical about those benefits and 
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maintain price regulations.  From a political perspective there is a great difference 
between the Commission and the Governments: the governments are much closer 
to the consumers (voters) than the Commission, so the Commission is probably 
focusing rather on achieving a unified EU energy market (which is a stand-alone aim 
of the EU) while the Member States’ governments rather just want to ensure that 
citizens get affordable electricity.  
It is worth quoting the speech of Günther Oettinger (EU Commissioner for Energy) 
at the Second Conference on the completion of the EU internal energy market at 
Charlemagne (de Gasperi) on 8 April 2013729: 
“Let me be very clear what it means to have regulated prices in places where 
markets could work: 
- the service levels will remain low, as the regulated prices keep competitors 
at bay and there is little competitive pressure to serve consumers better. 
Our household surveys have indeed shown that consumers are most 
dissatisfied and frustrated in countries where prices are regulated below 
costs, 
- if prices are regulated the new possibilities for consumers to play an active 
role in the electricity market and for establishing new business models for 
energy services and demand response by introducing smart meters remain 
unused, 
- with regulated prices, investments will not take place as there is no 
incentive, 
                                               
729 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/oettinger/headlines/speeches/2013/04/doc/20130408_symposium_en.pdf accessed: 
17/12/2013 
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what then happens is, the tax payer pays for rebates on the energy bill – 
sometimes the same taxpayer who defends lower energy prices. Or, even more 
risky, public deficits rise even further.” 
Another EU argument against price regulation is based on creating a single market 
for electricity and thereby changing the game in the EU.  The Commission seem to 
assume that regulated prices hold back the unification of the EU energy sector, 
which would enhance competition and therefore create naturally low (competitive) 
prices plus other kinds of benefits that are generally associated with competition.  
The Commission believes that as a single EU market for electricity would bring all 
the key EU players to compete against each other reducing the market 
concentration.  Also according to one of the latest Parliament research paper 
assessing the costs of the lack of a single EU electricity market, “price regulations 
can be justified (…) in case of insufficient market players to stimulate 
competition”.730  This seems to assume that the presence of a sufficient number of 
market players leads to competition.  However, lack of competitors may not be an 
issue in terms of the UK electricity sector.  
A potential problem in the electricity sector (at least in the UK) may be tacit 
collusion.  It is true that higher number of competitors make tacit collusion less 
likely, however, the number of competitors is not the only feature influencing 
market behaviour and especially the electricity sector seem to have many other 
features that facilitate collusion.731     
                                               
730 Cost of Non-Europe in the Single Market for Energy - ANNEX I - A cost estimation of 
existing gaps and barriers available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/504466/IPOL-
JOIN_ET%282013%29504466%28ANN01%29_EN.pdf accessed: 12/12/2013, p. 15. 
731 Waddams, Harker (2007) 269 
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Since SMP is flexible and relatively fast: the regulator can withdraw price regulation 
for the first sign of awakening competition, for example diminishing of features 
facilitating joint dominance.     
It has to be noted that price regulation can facilitate competition when done 
correctly.  The above-cited Parliament research paper assessing the costs of the 
lack of a single EU electricity market takes the point of the Working Group on 
Transparency in EU Retail Energy Markets that: “regulated prices, if set 
appropriately and competitively, can play a key role in encouraging competition. A 
regulated tariff should provide a benchmark for a 'fair' and transparent energy 
price, against which other, non-regulated price offers are pitched and decisions to 
switch are taken”.732  In this case, setting a well-calibrated price cap could remove 
the potential for gaining supra-competitive profits by colluding, which is likely to 
lessen (or even eliminate) the incentive of colluding in general. At the same time a 
price cap would not eliminate the possibility of price competition.  Driven by the 
aim of maximising profits, firms – who would have less incentive to collude – could 
instead try to earn more profits by competing for the customers with prices below 
the price cap.  While it is true that competition is not only about prices (but also 
innovation, choice etc.)733, considering the main features of electricity as a product, 
price is likely to be the key. 
 
   
                                               
732 Working Group Report on Transparency in EU Retail Energy Markets Report prepared 
for the 5th 
 Citizens' Energy Forum – November 2012 available at: accessed: 16/12/2013, p. 7, 
footnote7  
733 Stephen Littlechild, ‘The Nature of Competition and the Regulatory Process’ 2011 (1) 
Intereconomics 12 
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4. Possible alternative solutions 
 
In the previous part we have described how SMP regulation could be used in the 
electricity sector, concluding that it is not too telecommunications specific.  Here 
we take a step further by comparing it to other potential options. 
It has to be noted, that only perfect competition is expected to deliver a fully 
desirable outcome, but perfect competition is rather a theory than an actually 
observable process.  In terms of the EU electricity sectors in the short/mid-run 
achieving even a high level of competitiveness is an extremely optimistic aim.  
Therefore, for the close future a second-best option has to be chosen. This implies 
two things about the assessment:  
• In terms of the analysis this means that the alternative options should be 
measured to each other (in terms of political feasibility, potential outcomes 
etc.) and not to a perfectly competitive scenario. 
• The preferred option should have a potential to facilitate competition.      
Conceptually, this chapter assesses four types of solutions that can be applied to a 
sector that is underachieving due to lack of competition: 
 Competition law – enforced by the Competition Authority 
 Direct Government intervention 
 “Ordinary” regulation enforced by the sector regulator 
 SMP regulation  
SMP regulation has been analysed in detail already. Here the aim is to consider the 
other possible options and analyse whether they could provide a better solution.  
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4.1 Competition law – Competition Authority 
 
Market power can be controlled by competition law as well.734  During the reform 
process, before the deregulation it is the sector regulators’ job to maximise 
consumer surplus, after the deregulation the competition authority is responsible 
for the sector.  The supervision of the competition authority is enough, when there 
is competition in the market, and intervention is only occasionally necessary.  
However, the competition authority does not have the sector specific knowledge 
(at least to the same degree) and capacity to deal with constantly emerging issues, 
which is essential in the lack of real competition.  Furthermore, competition law 
applies ex-post and when the frequency of anti-competitive conducts is high, ex-
post interventions might not be able to remedy the harm suffered by the 
competitive process itself.  This is the case when competitors are forced out of the 
market by the time the case has been decided, they cannot run their business and 
thereby compete due to reoccurring anti-competitive conducts, or they find entry 
too risky for these reason and stay out of the market.  Ex-ante regulation might 
work better in such cases.735  SMP regulation was specifically designed to control 
market power when competition law is insufficient for the purpose. 736  De-
regulation is only justified when competition can achieve lower deadweight welfare 
loss than regulation.737 
The sole use of competition law is the baseline scenario in terms of the competitive 
levels of the electricity sector in the UK and Germany.  In Germany straight after 
                                               
734 Geradin (2001) 116 
735 See conclusions on respective US reforms - William G. Shepherd, ‘Dim prospects: 
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the de-regulation the Competition Authority was solely responsible for the whole 
electricity sector (networks included). The results of the reform were much worse 
than the UK’s.738  It has to be admitted that lack of a sector regulator was probably 
not the only issue.  However, considering that the competition authority itself 
admitted that it does not have the capacity to adequately deal with all the 
emerging problems and the government ended up putting the sector under a 
regulator’s supervision seem to suggest that general competition law was a weak 
solution.  This, however, dates back to the pre-2005 system and competition is 
expected to develop by time.  Also this example concerns the monopolistic levels of 
the electricity sector in Germany (which is not the case anymore), which limits the 
relevance to the competitive levels.     
It is interesting to note the contrast between the attitudes towards 
telecommunications and electricity regulations.  In general, the EU 
telecommunications regulation – although the telecommunications sectors are 
considered to be more competitive – still upholds the possibility (SMP) regulation.  
This is because controlling market power is off major importance in newly 
liberalised markets, as generally the incumbents will retain a large market share.739  
New Zealand experimented with the sole use of competition law in the 
telecommunication sector, but it did not turn out to be successful.740   
Early on in the reform process a mixed regulatory solution has been applied for the 
UK’s telecommunications sector, where the regulator enforced essentially 
competition law.  Oftel considered that its powers under the Telecommunications 
Act 1984, together with the general competition law enforcement were inadequate 
to control BT’s dominance, and was of the view that the preferred solution would 
                                               
738 See Chapter 1 
739 Geradin, O’Donoghue (2005), 360   
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be the application of competition law by the regulator.  After considerable debate 
BT agreed to Oftel’s proposal of changing its license considerably by essentially 
incorporating the EU competition law rules (the current section 101 and 102) which 
meant that Oftel can enforce these laws directly.  These rules, the so called “Fair 
Trading Conditions” (FTCs), Condition 18A of B.T.'s licence uses the EU competition 
law standard of “dominance”, which means that applying the regulation requires a 
proper competition assessment, hence the solution is a mixture of regulation and 
competition policy (similarly to SMP).  The government seemed to be pleased with 
this setup, since it basically reinforced it by the Competition Act 1998, which gave 
concurrent but principal responsibility of applying the competition rules in the 
telecommunications sector to the regulator (vis-à-vis the competition authority).741 
There is also a precedent for the UK for arguing for a cautious de-regulation of the 
telecommunications sector.  Although the UK is well known for its pro-liberalisation 
attitude, during the debate of the 2002 EU telecommunications regulations 
package she was one of the parties voicing their concerns that too early regulatory 
withdrawal would result in loss of competitiveness in the sector.  The UK was 
especially concerned about joint dominance which led to the establishment of a 
more sophisticated market dominance criterion.742  Interestingly such concerns 
over the electricity de-regulation are less visible.   
There has been an attempt by the regulator of including a regulatory institution 
similar to SMP regulation into the licences of the UK’s biggest electricity generators. 
In July 1999 Ofgem started an investigation of the allegedly excessive electricity 
prices, which led to the proposal of including so called “Market Abuse Licence 
                                               
741 Veljanovski (1999) 25-29 
742 Peter Humphreys, Seamus Simpson,’Globalization, the ‘Competition’ State and the Rise 
of the ‘Regulatory’ State in European Telecommunications’ 2008 (46) JCMS, 862-863 
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Condition” (MALC) in the generators licences.743  The MALCs would have enabled 
the regulator to step up against the abuse of significant market power in the 
wholesale electricity market.744  AES and British Energy did not consent to the 
modification of their licences; therefore Ofgem referred the issue to the 
Competition Commission.  Ofgem informed the other generators concerned that 
depending on the outcome of the Competition Commission’s findings it plans to 
reconsider the inclusion of the condition in their licences as well. 745   The 
Competition Commission rejected the inclusion of the proposed condition in those 
two licences and therefore Ofgem withdrew the condition from all other licences 
too. Besides some generator-specific circumstances, the Competition Commission 
had three main reasons for deciding against the inclusion of the MALCS and 
insisting on the sole use of competition law:  
 The pool system was expected to be changed by the NETA in the autumn of 
2000 (although it only happened in 2001).746  The CC said that it is not 
possible to forecast if there are likely to be problems with market power 
under the NETA system, while there is no evidence suggesting that the 
                                               
743 David Newbery, ‘The relationship between regulation and competition policy for 
network utilities’ 2006 Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, 23 
744 Competition Commission, ‘AES and British Energy: A report on references made under 
section 12 of the Electricity Act 1989’ available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2001/453elec.htm accessed: 11/03/2013, 88 
745 Ibid 
746 Competition Commission, ‘AES and British Energy: A report on references made under 
section 12 of the Electricity Act 1989’ available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2001/453elec.htm accessed: 11/03/2013, 88 
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successful operation of NETA would be hindered by the lack of including a 
prohibition of abuse of market power in the licences.747 
 According to the CC “such a prohibition would cause uncertainty, because of 
the difficulty of distinguishing between abusive and acceptable conduct, and 
would risk deterring normal competitive behaviour”.748 
 In CC’s view falling market shares made it less likely that firms on the long 
run are going to be able to abuse market power, even in rare exceptional 
circumstances. 
So in the UK the competitive levels of the electricity sector remained solely 
governed by competition law which is enforced by the competition authority.  In 
essence the Competition Commission seemed to think that competition law was 
satisfactory, while the sector regulator would have preferred to have competence 
as well.   
Most importantly, the government seemed not to be content with this 
arrangement: the Energy Act of 2010 implemented the Market Abuse Licence 
Condition (MALC) into the law. The so called “exploitation provision” of the act 
empowers the Secretary of State to modify the licence ”for the purpose only of 
limiting or eliminating the circumstances in which, or the extent to which, a licence 
holder may obtain an excessive benefit from electricity generation in a particular 
period”.749 
The Competition Commission’s “Evaluation of the Competition Commission’s past 
cases –Final report” of 2008 concluded that according to the market developments 
                                               
747 Ibid Para 1.7. 
748 Ibid Para 1.12 
749 Energy Act of 2010, Part 3, Para 18 (2) 
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after the rejection of the MALCS the decision was appropriate.750  The fact that the 
Government basically “overruled” this decision by including the MALCs in the new 
Energy Act seems to show that the Government did not find competition law 
satisfactory and tries to involve Ofgem more.  However, the MALCs have never 
been used in practice. 
The examples mentioned above suggest that competition law in not substantially 
inappropriate, its concepts and logic fits to the cases concerned.   It is the 
procedural features of competition law which can be accounted for its insufficiency; 
in a sense SMP regulation seems to offer a superior solution to competition law for 
cases where the level of competitiveness is relatively low, as it is an ex ante 
measure, applied by a specialist regulator. As the SMP guideline notes: 
“competition authority does not, in principle, have the opportunity to conduct a 
periodic review of its decision in the light of market developments, whereas NRAs 
are bound to review their decisions periodically” (para 28). SMP regulation offers 
the benefit of a flexibly (and quickly) adjustable regulation, carried out by the 
regulator which has the capacity and specialised knowledge likely to be necessary 
for reformed sectors.  Regulation is also better placed to create competition 
(regulation for competition) than competition law.751  As Beesley and Littlechild 
note:  
“The U.K. regulator's duty to promote competition reflects in part the 
fact that it is not possible to move from a nationalized monopoly to a 
competitive industry in a single step. The regulator needs the authority 
and duty to complete the process of transition (as does the Secretary 
                                               
750 Competition Commission, ‘Evaluation of the Competition Commission’s past cases –
Final report’ (2008) available at: http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/pdf/non-
inquiry/our_role/analysis/evaluation_report accessed: 16/03/2013, 7-8 
751 Geradin, ‘Institutional aspects...’ (2000) 9 
283 
 
of State), otherwise obstacles to competition might remain in 
place.”752 
Besides, as competition law is essentially the baseline solution (that is applied 
currently), when the government expresses its intention to it implies that it is not 
satisfied by the current state of the electricity sector it implies that competition law 
alone does not bring the expected outcomes.  Admitting that there are issues 
(which has happened already), but things continue to be the same as there is not 
seem to be a better solution can have severe political consequences as it makes the 
government look incapable in the eyes of the voters. 
Still, the recent referral of the energy market for a full competition investigation to 
the CMA,753 and the changes by the ERRA754 in the concurrent application of 
competition law by the regulator and the competition authority (strengthening the 
latter755) suggests that competition law and the use of the competition authority is 
regarded as the solution for the problems of the electricity sector.  The CMA report 
is expected to provide a lot of insight to the electricity sectors competitiveness and 
the possible problems.  Until this report is published far-reaching conclusions on 
the necessary future steps are not justified.  It can still be established that if 
(according to the findings of the report) a one-off solution cannot solve the 
(perceived) problems but in the future a more interventionist approach will be 
                                               
752 M. E. Beesley, S. C. Littlechild, ‘The Regulation of Privatized Monopolies in the United 
Kingdom’ (1989) 20b(3) The RAND Journal of Economics, 454, 464 
753 CF Ofgem, ’Ofgem refers the energy market for a full competition investigation’ 
available at: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/press-releases/ofgem-refers-energy-market-full-
competition-investigation accesset: 08/10/2014 
754 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
755 Niamh Dunne, ‘Recasting Competition Concurrency under the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013’ (2014) 77(2) Modern Law Review, 256 
284 
 
needed, the application of the regulator would be more advantageous than the use 
of the competition authority.    
 
4.2 Government intervention 
 
More recently the British government expressed its intent to “legislat[e] so that 
energy companies have to give the lowest tariff to their customers”756 which 
essentially means direct governmental intervention in the competitive levels of the 
electricity sector.  This would be a rather extreme solution, not frequently used in 
the EU and it would be inconsistent with the competitive market. 
Governmental intervention carries many downsides, which ultimately makes 
regulation via a regulatory authority a more beneficial solution. 
The first issue is very similar to one mention before in connection with competition 
law: lack of specialisation.  In terms of government regulation this is perhaps less of 
an issue though in cases where essentially a ministry – specialised to the sector – is 
responsible.  Still, the regulatory authority tends to be a more specialised entity 
that is created to focus solely on a sector.  This makes an important difference 
when a sector is complex and highly technical: simply having more information 
makes the regulator better placed to carry out an intervention.  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, concerns over political popularity is a 
central issue for the government but not for the regulator which has considerable 
implications on regulation.  In order to stay in power the governing party needs 
votes.  The need to gain popularity before the election incentivises the government 
                                               
756 ‘Millions to see energy bills fall after David Cameron promises tariff reform’ The 
Telegraph, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/consumertips/household-
bills/9616124/Millions-to-see-energy-bills-fall-after-David-Cameron-promises-tariff-
reform.html accessed: 22/04/2013 
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to make populist interventions in the market.  This practice might be, however, 
rather unbeneficial to consumers on the long run.  A regulatory authority is free 
from such political concerns, and by assigning the task of regulation to a separate 
regulator, the government’s possibilities for such politically motivated interventions 
are reduced by a more technocratic organisation.757  
Also, occasional government interventions can lead to less transparency.  When 
competencies are shared, it is hard to understand who is doing what and which 
(whose) agenda will prevail.758 
Government policies obviously have some influence on regulation.  However, it is 
beneficial for government policies to stay on a level where the decisions do not 
invoke controversy among the main stakeholders, and leave the more debatable 
and more technical decisions to sector regulators, which are more resistant to 
allegations of partiality.759 
Due to their political nature government interventions also tend to be less 
predictable, which is however very important for companies’ investment 
decisions.760 
SMP regulation seems to offer a better solution than government intervention 
simply because it involves the regulatory authority intervening in the market within 
a pre-set framework.  
                                               
757 David Coen, ’Business–Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play Regulatory Games in 
European Utility Markets’ 2005 (18) Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions 377 
758 Hancer et. al. (2003) 359 
759 Ibid 361-362 
760 Ibid 367-368 
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Furthermore, changing the legislation – which would involve the parliament or/and 
the government – would be much slower, besides a specialist body is better placed 
to understand the changes of the sector and adjust regulation accordingly.761  
 
4.3 “Ordinary” regulation 
 
Another solution would be ordinary regulation, such as price cap regulation in the 
network levels.  This would neutralise the issues arising out of institutional matters, 
as it would mean that a sector regulator would apply the regulation.  
At the same time this solution would basically empty the idea of the reform, 
because it would mean that the reform is not more than privatisation. Privatisation, 
however, does not necessarily lead to efficiency gains in itself762 which would 
remove the justification for the reform.763  
As Littlechild notes: “[c]ompetition is indisputably the most effective means 
perhaps ultimately the only effective means of protecting the consumers against 
market power. Regulation is essentially a means of preventing the worst excesses 
of monopoly; it is not a substitute for competition. It is a means of ‘holding the fort’ 
until competition arrives”.764 
                                               
761 Nagy Csongor István, ‘A jelentős piaci erő jogintézménye a villamosenergia-piac 
szabályozásában – jogalkotói önellentmondás’ in Verseny és Szabályozás 2008, available at: 
http://econ.core.hu/file/download/vesz08/07_piaciero.pdf accessed: 02/03/2013, 152 
762
 David Hall, Emanuele Lobina, ‘The relative efficiency of public and private sector 
water’ (2005) PSIRU Discussion Paper, 2  
763 Waddams (2005) 132 
764 Littlechild (1983) para.4.11 
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Competition is expected to incentivise firms to keep prices down,765 hence creating 
competition as an aim should not be abandoned because that could lead to the 
aimed efficiency gains.  
Also, from a political perspective issuing “ordinary” regulation would be rather 
embarrassing: politicians rather tend to de-regulate early trying to prove that the 
reforms are working as expected. 766  Going back to “ordinary” regulation would, 
however, essentially imply that the whole idea behind the reform was wrong.  As 
the Conservatives started the reform, going back to regulation would mean 
admitting that they were wrong, which could undermine the credibility of the 
current Conservative government.  Moreover, since the opposition also hailed 
competition, their political credibility would suffer as well (although to a lesser 
extent) if they were to go for this solution.   
Making only one step back (to SMP regulation) hence, looks like a more favourable 
and politically more feasible option. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The starting point of the paper was that although whether the competitiveness of 
the electricity sector of the UK is satisfactory or not is questionable, since there is 
growing political pressure for some kind of intervention (especially concerning 
lower prices) the question is rather what to do, not whether to do something or 
not.  Therefore, this paper is devoted to give guidance on the issue of “what to do”.   
                                               
765 Waddams (2005) 132 
766 William G. Shepherd, ‘Dim prospects: effective competition in telecommunications, 
railroads and electricity’ 1997 (42) The Antitrust Bulletin,163 
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More specifically the research question addressed in this chapter is whether the 
electricity sector could learn from the telecommunications sector by adopting SMP 
regulation.  The use of SMP regulation is the main regulatory difference between 
the EU electricity and telecommunications regulations, the latter being considered 
as the “etalon” of the various sector reforms while it is admittedly far from being 
perfect.  SMP regulation in the telecommunications sector is used to control market 
power after the liberalisation until competition became strong enough to make 
regulation redundant and competition law can take over.  
The paper starts by the introduction of SMP regulation and follows by discussing its 
pros and cons.  It is possible that the features of the telecommunications sector 
make SMP regulation a more useful tool that it would be in electricity.  In order to 
see whether there is a strong case for this argument, the paper analyses how would 
SMP regulation (as it is currently applied to the telecommunications sectors) apply 
to the competitive levels of the electricity sector of the UK, building on the 
experience of the only country that uses SMP regulation in the electricity sector in 
the EU: Hungary.  This is done within the framework of the 3-step SMP process. It 
has been found that: 
• Market definition is potentially more straightforward then in 
telecommunications, the markets identified by the Hungarian authority (1. 
wholesale electricity markets, 2. retail electricity markets, 3. markets for 
capacity and energy required to ensure ancillary services) seems to be useful 
in general.   
• Collective dominance may be an issue in the UK, but this could be captured 
by SMP regulation. 
• Out of the potential remedies price regulation seems to be only one that 
could bring real change to the sector (other remedies are either being used 
already, or not likely to have any significant effect) but this issues is quite 
controversial.  At the same time SMP regulation provides for the use of any 
alternative intervention that is deemed to be necessary in light of the SMP 
assessment.  
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Having concluded that SMP regulation is not too telecommunications specific and 
can be applied to electricity, the next step is to compare it to alternative solutions. 
It is recognised that SMP regulation cannot be compared to perfect competition, 
because it is particularly unrealistic in the sectors concerned.  It only makes sense 
to compare SMP regulation to the use of other possible solution.  The alternatives 
considered were competition law only, government intervention, ordinary 
regulation.  Recent developments in the UK (the referral of the electricity sector for 
a full competition investigation to the CMA and ERRA rebalancing the concurrency 
between the regulators and the competition authority in favour of the latter) may 
suggest that the competition authority/competition law is regarded as the 
preferred option.  It is would be premature to make far reaching conclusions before 
the CMA investigation is over, however, if (according to the findings of the report) 
the electricity sector will need reoccurring interventions the use of the regulator 
might be a better solution than the use of the competition authority. 
Overall, having analysed SMP regulation and compared it to these other second 
best767  options the chapter concludes that the introduction of an SMP-style 
regulation could be a potential and politically feasible alternative solution.  
Although, introducing SMP regulation to the UK electricity sector would be a pill 
hard to swallow because it would essentially mean taking a step back from 
competition law. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
767 Second best to perfect competition. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
The starting question of the research was whether there are regulatory lessons to 
be learnt from the comparison of the electricity and telecommunications 
regulations of the UK and Germany.  This has been done by first comparing the 
regulations and then evaluating the different solutions and checking for their 
applicability in the other sector or jurisdiction.  The initial comparison of the 
regulations has shown three major differences: 
• Separation of the network in the electricity sector while not (so much) in the 
telecommunications sector, and different regulatory attitudes towards 
separation in the UK and Germany, 
• One authority responsible for the regulation of both the electricity and 
telecommunications sectors (as well as some other sectors) in Germany 
while these are regulated by separate authorities in the UK.  At the same 
time there is a common tendency of regulators regulating more 
sectors/markets (through regulatory mergers or by gaining more 
competencies). 
• In both countries (moreover on the EU level) SMP regulation is used to 
regulate the telecommunications sector, while there is no such concept 
within the electricity regulation (except in Hungary). 
Chapters 2-4 are devoted to analyse these differences in order to see whether 
regulatory lessons can be learnt and solutions successful in one country/industry 
could be applied more widely.  Chapter 1 gives a general background of the sectors 
concerned. 
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Conclusion by chapters 
 
The conclusions of the analyses of these differences are provided separately below, 
then – based on the conclusions of these chapters – the overall conclusion is 
discussed.    
 
Chapter 1 
 
Firstly, Chapter 1 gives a description of the developments in the sectors concerned 
after the reforms.  Secondly, these developments are assessed.  The general aim 
behind the reforms was to create as much competition in the sectors as possible.  
There are many ways this can be (and are) evaluated.  This chapter concerns 3 
features that are connected to competition: (1) price developments, (2) changes in 
the market structure focusing on the erosion of the incumbents’ market shares and 
(3) consumer satisfaction.  We compare the tendencies and assess if they reflect 
the expectations of the reform initiatives.  
More specifically, we seek to answer two questions: 
• Which sectors have better tendencies and 
 To what extent these results seem to be connected to the regulations 
concerned. 
Chapter 1 first provides an overview of the changes in the regulations concerned.  
Then, it looks at data/studies concerning the features chosen: firstly prices768, then 
market shares/concentration769 and lastly consumer satisfaction770. 
                                               
768 Data from: European Central Bank, ‘Price effects of regulatory reform in selected network 
industries’[ 2001],  DG Competition, ’Report on Energy Sector Inquiry’ SEC(2006)1724 part 2 
available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/full_report_part2.pdf accessed 
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We find that prices generally tend to increase in the electricity sectors while they 
are decreasing or stagnating in the telecommunications sectors.  Overall, in terms 
of the telecommunications sector the data shows better tendencies in Germany, 
                                                                                                                                    
02/07.2012, EUROSTAT, Sophie Bismut, ‘Competition in European Telecom Markets’ (2006) 
64 Communications & Strategies, Teligen, ’Report on Telecoms Price Developments from 
1998 to 2009 - Produced for: European Commission Directorate General for Information 
Society’ available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-
agenda/scoreboard/docs/pillar/studies/voice_tariff_1998_2010.pdf accessed: 14/07/2012 
769 Data from: Dr. Felix Chr. Matthes, Katherina Grashof, Sabine Gores, ’Power Generation 
Market Concentration in Europe 1996-2005 - An Empirical Analysis’ (2007) available at: 
www.oeko.de/oekodoc/308/2007-002-en.pdf accessed 12/08/2014, EUROSTAT, DECC, 
’Quarterly domestic energy customer numbers’ available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/quarterly-domestic-energy-price-
stastics accessed at: 15/06/2014, Bundesnetzagentur annual reports, available at: 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cln_1421/EN/General/Bundesnetzagentur/Publications
/publications_node.html accessed: 15/06/2014, Bismut (2006),  
770 EC, ’Eurobarometer 47.0: L’Europe des Consummateurs, Les Citoyens face a l’ouverture 
a la concurrence des monopoles de services public.’ 1997 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_110_public_fr.pdf accessed: 
20/05/2012, EC, ’Eurobarometer 53 : Les Européens et les services d’intérêt généraux.’ 
2000 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/serv_gen/cons_satisf/sur15_fr.pdf accessed: 
20/05/2012 
EC, ’Eurobarometer 58: Consumers’ opinions about Services of General Interest.’ 2002 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_176_summ_en.pdf 
accessed 20/05/2012 
EC, ’Eurobarometer 219 Consumers opinions on Services of General Interest.’ 2005 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_219_report_en.pdf 
accessed: 20/05/2012  
EC, ’Eurobarometer 260, Consumers opinions on Services of General Interest.’ 2007 
available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/serv_gen/cons_satisf/eb260_report_en.pdf 
accessed: 20/05/2012, IPSOS INRA, ’Consumer Satisfaction Survey - Final Report’ (2007) 
available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/serv_gen/cons_satisf/consumer_service_finrep_
en.pdf accessed: 22/05/2012 
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while in the electricity sector prices are generally lower in the UK although there 
prices between the two countries converge gradually. 
The incumbents’ market share losses are more extensive in the UK than in Germany 
in both sectors.  The German telecommunications incumbent have been losing 
market share to a much greater extent than the electricity supply incumbents, 
while the electricity generation sector has got more concentrated  since the 
reforms started.  In contrast, in the UK the concentration of the electricity 
generation market has been decreasing, while currently the telecommunications 
incumbent’s (broadband) and the electricity supply incumbents’ (average) market 
share is both around 30% with a slightly increasing trend in telecommunications but 
a decreasing trend in electricity supply. 
In terms of consumer satisfaction until 2004 the UK electricity sector shows the 
best tendencies, which is followed by the UK telecommunications sector.  The 
German consumers were less satisfied with these services than the UK consumers, 
while they were much more satisfied with the telecommunications sector than with 
the electricity sector.  Interestingly, according to the IPSOS survey carried out in 
2006 the ranking is the exact opposite. 
We have found limited correlation between regulatory changes and changes in the 
tendencies of these features, and concluded that in order to evaluate the 
regulations a more in-depth and more qualitative analysis is needed.  This research 
is carried out in the following chapters.  
Chapter 2 
 
One of the general differences between the electricity reforms and the 
telecommunications reforms within the EU, is that the electricity reforms rely 
heavily on industry restructuring while the telecommunications reforms rather just 
have it as an ultima ratio intervention.  
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Arguably,771 the networks (or at least part of them) – which is essential for 
companies on the competitive levels to provide their services – in both sectors 
constitute a natural monopoly and both sectors had vertically integrated 
incumbents (monopolies).  The incumbent operator has an incentive to preserve its 
position (keep competitors out of the market), and can easily do that by restricting 
access to the network without which competitors cannot provide a service.  Such 
anti-competitive practice can be tackled in two ways: 
 By ordering the incumbent to separate the network business: the separate 
company that runs the network have no incentive to discriminate between 
companies on the competitive levels seeking access to the network in order 
to be able to provide services. 
 By regulating the terms of access: the incumbent still have an incentive to 
try and promote its branch on the competitive level by providing better 
access to the networks that is essential to compete, but it has no freedom to 
do that, since the terms of access are not dependent on the company but 
they are regulated by an independent authority.    
Arguably, separating the levels is a more effective solution to provide access to the 
network.  This is because it affects the incentive to distort the competitive market 
through the terms of access, while regulation only disables offering access with 
unequal terms, but the network company still has an incentive to try and 
circumvent the regulation.   
While electricity regulations in the EU tend to rely on the first option, the 
telecommunications regulations rely on the second one.  This raises several 
questions: why choosing to apply an allegedly weaker solution to provide access to 
                                               
771 While it seems to be clear that the electricity networks (transmission and distribution) 
are natural monopolies, in telecommunications the fixed network to some extent 
competes with the cable network, and also the mobile networks can offer some 
alternative.  
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the network in the telecommunications sector when access is crucial to have 
competition in the related levels?  Does access work differently in the 
telecommunications sector than in the electricity sector or is it less important in 
term of enabling competition?  Accordingly, the second chapter seeks to answer if 
there is a justification for the different regulatory solutions applied in order to 
provide access to the network in the two sectors. 
The question is answered in two steps.  The chapter first looks at the theory behind 
vertical separation, and then the practical results of vertical separation (in terms of 
creating access) are assessed. 
The first part starts with describing the pros and cons of vertical separation and 
then it looks at the concerns over anti-competitive practices in the lack of vertical 
separation.  Finally, the different degrees of vertical separation are considered.  The 
conclusion on this part is that vertical separation in general (i.e. in both the 
electricity and telecommunications sectors) should be a stronger tool than 
regulation in providing access to the network.  At the same time (depending on the 
features of the integration concerned) vertical separation may lead to efficiency 
gains or losses.  This means that depending on the features of the integrated 
business, ordering separation may lead to considerable loss of efficiencies.  The aim 
of providing access (and thereby enhancing competition) and enhancing efficiency 
arising out of vertical integration, can be balanced by using different degrees of 
separation, the highest being ownership separation, while the baseline is simple 
access regulation.   
This might mean that overall, consumer welfare can be maximised by the 
separation of the networks in the electricity sector but allowing integration in the 
telecommunications sector.  However, this issue is outside of the scope of the 
chapter; the focus is solely on access, and access in theory should be facilitated by a 
higher degree of separation. 
The second part aims to assess whether more complete separation leads to 
enhanced entry in practice by looking at market structure statistics (from Chapter 
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1) in more detail.  This enables the evaluation of loss of the incumbents’ market 
shares.  It is understood that the structure of the market does not depend solely on 
entry occurring due to the fair terms of access (the most obvious alternative factor 
is probably scale of economics: the number of market participants depends on the 
size of the market and the scale of economics in the production), however, the 
market structure is a measurable feature closely related to access.  Besides, the 
data on the market structure are used widely by both public bodies and authorities 
in order to evaluate the regulations concerned. 
In the second part firstly the regulations of the Member States concerned are 
described.  The UK and Germany offers a great basis of comparison because the 
regulations of these Member States have very different attitude towards the 
subject, the UK being much more pro-separationist than Germany.  In the UK right 
at the beginning of the reform ownership separation have been ordered between 
the generation and the related transmission network, and about ten years later also 
legal separation between the distribution networks and the supply level was made 
mandatory.  In the UK, the telecommunications incumbent’s network business has 
also been (functionally) separated.  In contrast in Germany no separation was 
ordered in the electricity sector at the beginning of the reform, only later on when 
separation was compulsory due to EU law. The German telecommunications 
incumbent’s network business remained integrated with the rest of the company 
even though EU bodies established that the Germany telecommunications 
incumbent did not provide fair access to the network.772 
The comparison of the UK and Germany therefore allows us to evaluate the effect 
of separation and the lack of separation in both the electricity and the 
telecommunications sector.  This is done by analysing the market structure: trends 
in the incumbents’ market share loss, and (in the electricity generation levels, 
where there were more than one incumbents’) number of firms present in the 
                                               
772 CF Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission (C-280/08 P) [2010] 5 C.M.L.R. 27. 
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market.  We found stronger correlations between more complete separation and 
the incumbents’ market share loss in the electricity sectors than in the 
telecommunications sectors in both countries.  Although, the UK 
telecommunications incumbent’s market share (broadband) is about half the 
German incumbent’s, this is hardly linked to its separation; the market share of the 
UK incumbent rather increased slightly after the separation. 
We therefore concluded that although a more complete separation in theory 
provides a stronger solution to ensure fair access, in practice there is more 
evidence for this in the electricity sector than in the telecommunications sector, 
which means that the use of different solutions in the two sectors seem to be 
justified even on the basis of access.  Since the practical results suggest that in 
respect of vertical separation there are substantial differences between the 
electricity and telecommunications sectors, we conclude that cross-sectoral 
regulatory lessons cannot be drawn.   
 
Chapter 3 
 
Another difference in the electricity and telecommunications regulatory regimes of 
the UK and Germany is that Germany operates one regulator that regulates both 
industries while in the UK the sectors are regulated by separate regulators.  In the 
UK there is one regulator (Ofgem) responsible for the electricity and gas sectors 
(together often referred to as the energy sector) and one (Ofcom) responsible for 
regulating the telecommunications sector.  In contrast in Germany the 
Bundesnetzagentur regulates the electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal and 
rail sector.   
Looking at the history of the reforms, however, shows a similar tendency in this 
respect in both countries: merging regulators (in the UK) and expanding the 
competence of the regulator to more sectors (in Germany).  Ofgem is a result of the 
merger of Offer (previously the electricity regulator) and Ofgas (previously the gas 
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regulator).773   Ofcom has been created through merging Oftel (the previous 
telecommunications regulator), the Radiocommunications Agency (who regulated 
the mobile sector together with Oftel), and the Broadcasting Standards and 
Independent Television Commission.774  The Bundesnetzagentur has started off as a 
telecommunications and post regulator (previously known as the 
Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post) then new competency 
areas were added to these.  In essence developments in both countries resulted in 
one authority having to deal with an increased number of sectors.   
Very recently some EU countries took this even further by merging their sector 
regulators and their competition authorities.  The Netherlands established the 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets on the 1st April 2013.  This 
entity has been created by merging the Netherlands Consumer Authority, the 
Netherlands Competition Authority and the Netherlands Independent Post and 
Telecommunication Authority (OPTA).775  A few months later Spain created the 
National Markets and Competition Commission (Comisión Nacional de los 
Mercados y la Competencia) by merging the competition authority with numerous 
sector regulators, creating a super-regulator enforcing competition rules and 
regulating the telecommunications, energy, railway, postal, audiovisual issues and 
also airports.776 
                                               
773 Ordered by the Utilities Act 2000 
774 As defined by the Communications Act 2003 
775 CF The Netherlands Competition Authority’s press release: ’Green light for the 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets’ available at 
http://www.nma.nl/en/documents_and_publications/press_releases/news/2013/05_13_g
reen_light_for_the_netherlands_authority_for_consumers_and_markets.aspx accessed: 
28/02/2013 
776 ECN Brief, ’Spain: Creation of the new National Markets and Competition Commission, 
CNMC’ available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/03_2013/es_cnmc.pdf, 
accessed at: 15/03/2014  
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It is interesting to see this tendency of merging regulators in the EU.  The Member 
States were free to choose the structure of their regulators; the EU law contained 
no restrictions in this respect. 777  Most regulatory authorities in the EU were 
created between 1996 and 1998778 and roughly 10 years earlier in the UK.  At this 
time Member States preferred to set up single sector regulators.  The trend of 
establishing multi sector regulators started only recently, Germany being at the 
forefront by setting up the Bundesnetzagentur in 2005.   At the same time multi 
sector regulators are not new inventions.  They have a history especially in Third 
World countries and they have been studied widely.  The primary reason for setting 
up multi sector regulators there is lack of funding and experts available for 
operating separate entities.  This, however, is unlikely to be the main reason behind 
the merger in EU countries.  This tendency in the EU therefore raises number of 
questions: are multi sector regulators superior – so the UK could learn from 
Germany in setting up a multi sector regulator as well?  Does it make sense to start 
merging regulators just now or would it have been better to start by creating such 
entities in the first place?  The third chapter is aimed at answering these questions. 
The chapter starts by describing the relevant developments in the UK and Germany; 
the significant difference between the current regulators in these countries and the 
similar tendencies of merging regulators.  The Dutch and Spanish examples our out 
of the scope of the research, not simply because the thesis compares the UK and 
Germany, but also because merging regulators with competition authorities lead to 
numerous additional issues to be considered, and this would take away the focus 
from simply mergers between regulatory authorities.   
                                               
777
 Damien Geradin, ‘Institutional aspects of EU regulatory reforms in the 
telecommunications sector: an analysis of the role of national regulatory authorities’ (2000) 
1 Journal of Network Industries, 5, 18 
778 Damien Geradin, ‘Institutional aspects of EU regulatory reforms in the 
telecommunications sector: an analysis of the role of national regulatory authorities’ (2000) 
1 Journal of Network Industries, 5, 6 
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This is followed by the description of the most important features (in this respect) 
of the regulatory authorities: independence, accountability, ability to resist capture, 
cost effectiveness and regulatory quality. 
In order to answer the first question – whether multi sector regulators are superior 
to single sector regulators – we analyse the potential changes in the key features 
that arise out of changing the structure of the regulators, all other things being 
equal.  This analysis leads to a collection of the main pros and cons of creating multi 
sector regulators.  We find that the pros and cons are both significant, therefore it 
cannot be stated that multi sector regulators are superior to single sector 
regulators. 
This leads to the next question: is it justified to merge the regulators?  The chapter 
analyses the importance of the pros and cons in the early stages of the reform and 
then in a more developed stage.  We find that generally the pros of the multi sector 
regulators (which are at the same time the pros of the single sector regulators) are 
less important at the beginning of the reform, but they become more important as 
the reforms develop and it is the other way around with the cons.  For example the 
risk of regulatory failure is higher with multi sector regulators, simply because if the 
regulator fails, it will affect all the sectors regulated by it, however, there is a higher 
probability of such an occasion when the regulator has less experience, than later 
on.  Also, multi sector regulators are perceived to be more resistant to capture, but 
since capture takes time, it is less of an issue in the initial stages of the reforms.  
These mean the creating single sector regulators and then merging them is more 
beneficial than creating multi sector regulators at the start. 
The next question is whether there is a potential for the UK to learn from Germany, 
i.e. to create a similar multi sector regulator.  More generally this question is about 
how to time the regulatory mergers.  In this respect some of the pros and cons are 
less relevant than others, either because there are alternative (and perhaps better) 
ways of adjusting them (for example independence or accountability can primarily 
be changed by the specific relevant rules), or because they are not visible (for 
example when capture or regulatory failure becomes visible it is normally already 
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too late).  We found that perhaps the most useful features in this respect are 
mergers between the different regulated sectors and costs savings.  Mergers 
between the regulated sectors is highly visible and at the same time there are clear 
benefits arising out of one regulator regulating one business entity that is present 
in different sectors.  Potential cost savings can also be calculated having in depth 
information on the operation of the regulators.  We find that since there is no 
visible trend of companies expanding from the electricity to the 
telecommunications sector (or vica versa) a merger between Ofcom and Ofgem 
could rather only be justified based on costs savings. 
         
Chapter 4   
 
The last major difference we have identified having compared the electricity sectors 
and the telecommunications sectors of the UK and Germany is that the 
telecommunications regulations to a large extent build on the concept of SMP 
regulation while the electricity regulations do not use a similar tool.779  The same 
can be found in (or perhaps in a sense originates from) EU law.  Except for Hungary, 
none of the Member States use SMP regulation in the electricity sector.  
Chapter 2 described how – as part of the electricity reforms – the networks 
(monopoly levels) were separated from the competitive levels of the electricity 
sector (generation and supply), while in telecommunications sector used a more 
behavioural regulation (structural separation under this regulation is possible, but 
only as a last resort).  Currently, the competitive levels of the electricity sectors of 
both the UK and Germany are free from regulation (price regulation has been 
abolished), while SMP regulation still applies to the telecommunications sector in 
                                               
779 The Market Abuse Licence Conditions in the UK are similar but they have never been 
used in practice. 
302 
 
general.  This is rather surprising, since the telecommunications reforms are more 
mature than the electricity reforms, and the telecommunications reforms also 
seem to be generally more successful than the electricity reforms.780  Still, in 
telecommunications there is more regulatory oversight than in the electricity 
regimes. 
The electricity reform of the UK seem to be among the most successful ones in the 
EU in terms of creating competition based on the number of competitors on the 
market.  At the same time political pressure on the electricity sector is growing in 
the UK: both the Conservatives and the Labour Party expressed concerns over the 
recent trends in the electricity reform (especially rising prices) arguing for a more 
interventionist approach.  Whether these political concerns are justified or not are 
debatable, however we believe that this debate should be based on economics and 
not law.  Perhaps the most relevant legal issue in this respect is to analyse the 
conceptual different options to intervene the market in case it would be deemed 
necessary.   
Accordingly, this chapter is aimed to analyse if the electricity regulation could 
“learn” from the telecommunications regulation by introducing a regulatory 
concept similar to SMP regulation. 
The analysis starts off by describing what SMP regulation is and how it works.  We 
argue the SMP regulation is conceptually half way between “ordinary” regulation 
and competition law.  For example, it is applied ex-ante and it is carried out by a 
sector regulator instead of a competition authority, but the application of the 
regulation is very similar to how abuse of dominance cases are assessed under 
competition law781: in the first step the market is defined, than companies having 
significant market power are identified, finally remedies are chosen to be applied.  
                                               
780 CF the findings of Chapter 1 
781 Although there are differences in the details. 
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This combination makes it an especially useful tool to handle the period at the 
beginning of the reform.  After the liberalisation there is normally an incumbent 
that dominates the market.  It takes time for competitors to erode the dominant 
position of the incumbent or in other words for competition to reaches a 
sufficiently developed stage.  The incumbent’s market power during this period 
calls for enhanced control and supervision which could be done better by a sector 
regulator than by a competition authority.  However, it is beneficial to have a 
regulation that is flexible and can be restricted to only the necessary areas.  The 
next part describes the pros and cons of SMP regulation, its strong a weak sides in 
more detail.  The literature on this issue is well developed; SMP regulation is a 
widely debated topic. 
So far SMP regulation was considered as it applies to the telecommunications 
sector.  The next part considers the way it could be used in the electricity sector.  
This part relies on the pros and cons described earlier and analyses whether the 
different features of the electricity sector makes SMP regulation less able to control 
market power in this sector.  We build on the Hungarian experience of using SMP 
regulation in the electricity sector as well, and contrast it to the features of the 
electricity sector in the UK, in order to reduce country specificity.782  We find that 
defining the market (step 1) is easier in electricity than in telecommunications since 
the sector is less complex.  This also means that there is less scope for errors in 
electricity through the use of the SSNIP test.783  In terms of identifying companies 
having SMP (step 2), we found that the situation of the UK electricity sector could 
be challenging, since there is certainly no single incumbent (as opposed to the 
Hungarian electricity sector, or perhaps the telecommunications sector of the UK).  
                                               
782 Country specific features could mean that – although it is the same sector – the 
regulation is appropriate in one country but not in another.  
783 Such as the Celophane fallacy. 
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SMP regulation can be applied to joint dominance784, although the higher ratio of 
firms are regulated the less can benefits will prevail out of the asymmetric 
regulations.  Lastly we assess the remedies available (step 3), especially price 
regulation.  The issue here is controversial since whether intervention to the 
electricity sector in the UK is necessary is questionable in the first place.  This 
research, however only concerns SMP regulation as a potential alternative of more 
conventional types of interventions, if intervention will be deemed necessary.  In 
this respect, since SMP regulation offers a wide toolkit when it comes to remedies 
(as a matter of fact according to Article 8 of the Access Directive the regulator may 
impose remedies outside this list given) we are off the view that SMP regulation 
could be appropriate.  Having assessed the main types of remedies normally 
available under SMP regulation, we have identified price regulation as an arguably 
helpful new remedy. 
Lastly, the chapter concerns some other solutions: competition law, government 
intervention and “ordinary” regulation.  In terms of the first one we find that since 
the use of competition law is the baseline scenario, if more intervention will 
deemed to be necessary, this by definition should be more than simply competition 
law.  SMP regulation offers an alternative since its potential to intervene exceeds 
what competition law offers and it is carried out by a sector regulator that has 
more sector specific knowledge and resources to offer better control over market 
power.  The second option (government intervention) is essentially rejected on the 
basis that this would lead to politically motivated regulation, which would reduce 
legal certainty.  This would be especially harmful in a sector such as electricity 
where long term decision making is crucial.  The use of a regulator would be more 
beneficial since it is more of a technocratic, non-political body.  Lastly, we find that 
                                               
784 CF Andrew Tarrant, ‘Significant market power in the regulation of telecommunications 
markets’ 2000, 21(7) European Competition Law Review, 323 
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“ordinary” regulation would be in a sense taking two steps back,785 which is 
potentially unnecessary, besides SMP regulation offers more flexibility to facilitate 
competition and gradually hand over the market for the sole governance of 
competition law. 
On this basis, we conclude that using SMP regulation in the electricity sector is a 
potential alternative if a more interventionist approach will be considered 
necessary and the use of SMP regulation would be in many respects more 
beneficial than some other types of interventions.  
Overall conclusion 
 
We have analysed three areas where differences exist between the electricity and 
telecommunications regulation of the UK and Germany.  Our goal was to see 
whether there are cross-sectoral lessons to be learnt.  Out of the three areas in two 
we have found no potential for wider application:  
 In terms of vertical separation (which is widely used in electricity but not so 
much in telecommunications) we found that – although in theory it should 
promote access and thereby competition in general – there is no evidence 
that would support its wider application in practice in the 
telecommunications sector. 
 Regarding the creation of super regulators we found that overlaps between 
industries (in terms of ownership etc.) provide the most compelling case for 
regulatory mergers.  Since there are such no visible links between the 
                                               
785 This is because we argue that conceptually SMP regulation is half way between 
competition law and ordinary regulation. 
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electricity and telecommunications sectors of the UK yet, the creation of a 
German-style super regulator is unlikely to be justified.786   
We discovered one area where there is a potential for the electricity regulation to 
learn from the telecommunications regulation: the application of SMP regulation.   
Recent political statements in the UK787 suggest that there is a dissatisfaction with 
the way the country’s electricity sector is serving the society.  Especially prices are 
mentioned as being too excessive.788  At the same the electricity prices in the UK 
are below (consumer prices789) or only slightly above (industrial prices790) the EU 
average, which might suggest that (if UK prices are excessive) there are problems 
with the electricity sector in many other Member States as well.  
Electricity prices are defined by several factors.  However, the fact that Ofgem 
recently referred the electricity sector for a full competition investigation to the 
                                               
786 Unless there are potentials for cost savings. 
787 ‘Millions to see energy bills fall after David Cameron promises tariff reform’ The 
Telegraph, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/consumertips/household-
bills/9616124/Millions-to-see-energy-bills-fall-after-David-Cameron-promises-tariff-
reform.html accessed: 22/04/2013,  
‘Ed Miliband: Labour would freeze energy prices’ BBC, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24213366 , accessed: 24/10/2014 
788 CF ’UK energy bill crisis looms as consumers pay more despite using less’ The Guardian, 
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/oct/17/britain-energy-bill-crisis-
gas-electricity accessed: 22/10/2014 
789 CF EUROSTAT, ‘Electricity prices for households consumers 2013 – second semester’ 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/File:Electricity_prices_for
_households_consumers_2013s2.png#file, accessed 26/10/2014 
790 CF EUROSTAT, ’ Electricity prices for industrial consumers 2013 – second semester’ 
available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/File:Electricity_prices_for
_industrial_consumers_2013s2.png, accessed: 26/10/2014, 
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CMA791 may suggest that the problem is believed to be related to how the 
competitive levels function.  In the UK electricity sector, market power (which may 
have been abused to obstruct competition) can only exist in a joint form; in an EU 
comparison the UK electricity sector is fairly unconcentrated.792  
We argue that SMP regulation – a solution similar but stronger than competition 
law, applied by a regulator – could provide a solution to the perceived problems.  
The fact that Ofgem referred the sector to the CMA, together with the regulatory 
changes brought about by the ERRA793 which strengthen the CMA vis a vis the 
sector regulators794 seem to signal that currently the CMA is perceived to be the 
key to solve the issues of the electricity sector.  Before the publication of the CMA’s 
report on the matter it would be premature to draw far-reaching conclusions about 
this.  However – especially if the findings will suggest that there are issues with the 
sector that cannot be remedied by a one-off intervention – the use of SMP 
regulation is likely to be a better solution than using the CMA.  This is mainly 
because SMP regulation is applied by a regulator who has more capacity and better 
knowledge of the sector, which are important when there is a reoccurring need for 
intervention.   
   
 
 
                                               
791 Ofgem, ’Ofgem refers the energy market for a full competition investigation’ available 
at: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/press-releases/ofgem-refers-energy-market-full-
competition-investigation accessed: 26/10/2014, 
792 CF Market concentration data in Chapter 1. 
793 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
794 Niamh Dunne, ‘Recasting Competition Concurrency under the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013’ (2014) 77(2) Modern Law Review, 256 
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Further research 
 
The section below concerns the limitations of the thesis, and in line with the 
possibilities for further research. 
 
In General 
 
It has been mentioned that there is a trade-off between depth and the range of the 
research when resources are fixed.  This thesis only concerned two countries the 
UK and Germany795 in more detail.  Although, these countries are very different 
from a regulatory perspective, they are among the largest and most developed 
countries in the EU.  The geographically/jurisdictionally restricted scope is, 
however, a limitation towards the general (EU level) applicability of the findings. 
This limitation could be decreased by considering more countries.  This could be 
done using a structured approach.  The EU Member States are classified in many 
different ways, based on their size, location, time of EU accession, currency etc.  
Firstly, an appropriate method should be chosen to enhance the coverage of the 
study then the research could be carried out similarly to the current method of 
analysing the respective issues in the UK and Germany. 
 
Possible extensions       
 
Chapter 2 
 
Currently, under chapter 2 only functional separation of the telecommunications 
network is considered, and based on the UK experience the conclusion was that in 
                                               
795 Although in Chapter 4 Hungary is considered too. 
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practice ordering functional separation may not enhance entry.  However, 
ownership separation – that is an even more complete type of separation, as well 
as a stronger intervention to the sector – is not considered.  Ownership separation 
in the telecommunications sector is rather rare, but there are countries such as 
Singapore and New Zealand which are experimenting with it.  Analysing the 
developments in such countries could be used to take the research further in this 
respect.   
Another limitation is that the chapter does not concern efficiencies, only entry.  We 
have shown that there may be a trade-off between efficiencies that can arise out of 
the integrated operation and facilitating access.  In order to assess whether 
separation in the telecommunications sector leads to enhanced or decreased 
consumer surplus a full cost-benefit analysis would be needed.  This would however 
require extensive economic analysis. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 concluded that “a merger between Ofcom and Ofgem could rather only 
be justified based on costs savings”.  The robust assessment of potential costs 
savings would require detailed information on the workload and the internal day to 
day operation of the authorities concerned. 
Another way of taking the research further would be to analyse regulatory mergers 
that also include the competition authority.  As it has been mentioned, the research 
refrained from this, because it would necessitate considering conceptually different 
legal issues.  Furthermore the scope of the research is regulatory differences 
between the UK and Germany and none of these countries have a precedent for 
such merger. 
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Chapter 4 
 
It has been mentioned that the research here is restricted to legal issues.  This has 
shown that SMP regulation could be applied to the electricity sector and it would 
potentially be a better solution than some other types of interventions.   However, 
there are some additional questions here that could be answered by economic 
analysis. 
Firstly, whether any additional intervention is necessary: in this respect the current 
level of competition should be analysed to see whether there are problems and if 
so how could they be solved.  More information on this is expected to go public 
after the CMA finishes its investigation.  
Secondly, we have only compared and evaluated SMP regulation vis a vis some 
other solution from a legal perspective but a full regulatory impact assessment 
would be needed to analyses the related economic issues. 
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